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ABSTRACT

In his recent book The Steady-State Economy: The Economics of
Biophysical Equilibrium and Moral Growth Herman E. Daly develops
the concept of an ends-means spectrum and suggests that economic
theory with its emphasis on economic growth has been both too
materialistic and not materialistic enough.1

In ignoring the

ultimate means and the laws of thermodynamics it has been insuf
ficiently materialistic.

In ignoring the Ultimate End and ethics

it has been too materialistic.

There are, however, impressive

intellectual traditions that criticize economic theory with its
emphasis on growth in production from each of these two perspec
tives.

M o d e m statements of these critical traditions are evident

in current policy debates concerning economic growth, energy, the
environment, etc.

But the underlying issues are not new, and we

can learn much from past thinkers who were perceptive enough to
foresee the problems of a growth economy before they emerged in
full bloom.
The object of this dissertation is then twofold.

First, it

attempts an historical exposition of two traditions of economists.

1.
Herman E. Daly, The Steady-State Economy: The Economics of
Biophysical Equilibrium and Moral Growth (San Francisco: W. H.
freeman 5 Co., 1977): lS-26.

v

The first tradition has been labeled neo-malthusian and includes
those economists and other scholars who because of their belief that
natural resources are a unique and essential factor of production
in the economic process have explicitly incorporated the biophysical
environment into their economic analysis.

The second tradition in

cludes those economists who would attempt to evaluate the worth of
the output of the economic system by a more ultimate goal than that
used by most economists (i.e., the satisfaction of '’given'* wants).
This second tradition would hold that the existence of this ulti
mate goal and a partial description of it can be derived from a
study of man’s human nature.
Second, the concluding portion of this study will attempt to
show the methodological importance of what an acceptance of these
two traditions would be for conventional economic theory.

Building

upon an Aristotelian epistemological foundation, the conclusion will
argue for an holistic methodology which explicitly incorporates
into economic analysis a consideration of the biophysical environment
and the Ultimate End of man’s nature.

It should be emphasized that

this concluding portion will be tentative and suggestive in nature.

vi

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In his recent book The Steady-State Economy: The Economics of
Biophysical Equilibrium and Moral Growth Herman E. Daly develops
the concept of an ends-means spectrum and suggests that economic
theory with its emphasis on economic growth has been both too
materialistic and not materialistic enough.*

In ignoring the

ultimate means and the laws of thermodynamics it has been insuf
ficiently materialistic.

In ignoring the Ultimate End and ethics

it has been too materialistic.

There are, however, impressive

intellectual traditions that criticize economic theory with its
emphasis on growth in production from each of these two perspec
tives.

M o d e m statements of these critical traditions are evident

in current policy debates concerning economic growth, energy, the
environment, etc.

But the underlying issues are not new, and we

can learn much from past thinkers who were perceptive enough to
foresee the problems of a growth economy before they emerged in
full bloom.
The object of this study is then twofold.

First, it attempts

an historical exposition of two traditions of economists.

The

first tradition has been labeled conservationist and includes
those economists and other scholars who because of their belief

1

that natural resources are a unique and essential factor of pro
duction in the economic process have explicitly incorporated the
biophysical environment into their economic analysis.

The second

tradition includes those economists who would attempt to evaluate
the worth of the output of the economic system by a more ulti
mate goal than that used by most economists (i.e., the satisfac
tion of "given" wants).

This second tradition would hold that

the existence of this ultimate goal and a partial description of
it can be derived from a study of man’s human nature.

This tra

dition has been labeled "humanistic" in a recent book by Mark A.
9

Lutz and Kenneth Lux.“

It may be helpful to visualize the evolu

tion of these two traditions by means of a simple chart which
juxtaposes these two traditions in the context of mainstream and
neo-Marxist economists.

This chart is an expanded version of one

found in Lutz and Lux.'5
Second, the concluding portion of this study will attempt to
show the methodological importance of what an acceptance of these
two traditions would be for conventional economic theory.

Build

ing upon an Aristotelian epistemological foundation, the conclusion
will argue for an holistic methodology which explicitly incorporates
into economic analysis a consideration of the biophysical environ
ment and the Ultimate End of man’s nature.

It should be emphasized

that this concluding portion will be tentative and suggestive in
nature.
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The classification into conservationist and humanistic tra
ditions is in ternis of emphasis and starting point only.

Many

writers are to a considerable extent in both traditions.

This is

to be expected because the two traditions are not really so logi
cally independent as may at first appear.

For example, many

questions of final goals such as distributive justice and intergenerational equity are muted if one believes that continual
economic gTowth is biophysically possible.**

Likewise if one’s

arena of concern is limited to satisfying as many as possible
immediate and autonomous effective wants, then many long-run
biophysical constraints are no longer of much interest.
Economics has often been defined as that discipline which
studies the allocation of scarce means or resources among competing
wants or ends.

This definition has been the source of as much

confusion as understanding because of an ambiguity in the mean
ings of the two underlined adjectives.

To enlighten rather than

to obfuscate, it is necessary to distinguish, in the first instance,
between relative and absolute scarcity and, in the second instance,
between competing autonomous ends, unrelated to any final or ulti
mate end, and competing contingent or intermediate ends that are
derived from a single Ultimate End.

Is one resource scarce only

relative to another, while the aggregate of all resources is not
scarce, or is the aggregate also scarce in an absolute sense?

Do

ends compete only as purely autonomous wants, or do they also com-

5

pete in terms of their capacity to serve an objective Ultimate
End, even if the latter is not well-defined.
In most m o d e m economic analysis scarcity is defined to be of
the relative nature, and the goal of economic efficiency is to
satisfy as many as possible of the competing demands or ends of
the economic agents, which demands are perceived to be autonomous
or "given," i.e., beyond analysis.

Such use of the relative mean

ing of scarcity, although legitimate and necessary in treating
with a certain type of economic problem, will almost certainly
lead to misunderstandings when one discusses the issue of scarcity
of resources with geologists, geographers and ecologists, whose
disciplines by definition are concerned with determining the
aggregate supply levels of low entropy primary matter-energy (both
living and lifeless). Such a use will also lead to difficulties
when discussing the issue with physicists and chemists whose
second law of thermodynamics leads one to the inescapable conclusion
that mankind's use of such matter-energy is limited in an absolute
manner.

As for the other term, in any discussion of the appropriate

meaning of the phrase "competing ends," economists who use this
phrase in the sense that such ends are totally autonomous with the
individual will be talking at cross-purposes with philosophers,
theologians and other humanists who perceive such competing ends as
being determined by some more ultimate or final end of man.
It must be emphasized that in going back to the very defini-

6

tions of the most basic concepts in economics (scarce means,
competing wants) we are definitely not playing mere "word games."
Some will no doubt argue that it does not make any difference how
one uses the terms of scarcity and competing, as long as one
carefully defines his usage.

Such an argument can be shown to be

fallacious because, in the very act of defining words, one is
building into one's framework of thought and analysis certain
presumptions that will have drastic implications at a later stage
in the analysis.

Though it is important to precisely and carefully

define one's terms, it is much more important to take care that
such definitions are consistent with observations of reality as
students of this particular area of reality perceive it.

To state

that it does not make any difference what the meanings of such
phrases are, as long as such phrases are carefully defined, is to
weave fantasies.

Such fantasies may be carefully defined, they

may be marvels of rigor, they may be consistent to the last detail,
they may include "n" number of dimensions,they may be logical to
second, and even more order conditions; but, nonetheless, they are
basically fantasies since they are not consistent with the perceived
reality of the acknowledged experts such as the physical chemists,
on the one hand, and the humanists, on the other.
The nearest approach to discussing these issues in conventional
economics theory has been in the consumer demand analysis first
suggested by Carl Menger and later followed up by Kelvin Lancaster.

7

As Lancaster notes, "the view of some economists of an earlier
generation (Menger, for example) that goods were desired in order
to satisfy ’wants' was somewhat along the general line of our
analysis: the various characteristics can be viewed, if you like,
as each helping to satisfy some kind of 'want'."^
Actually Menger had made a somewhat different and more percep
tive observation.

Menger had noted that not only did goods have

characteristics which satisfy "needs" (not "wants" as Lancaster
had stated)^ but also that such "needs arise from our drives and
the drives are imbedded in our nature.

An imperfect satisfaction

of needs leads to the stunting of our nature."^
However, neither Menger nor Lancaster explored man’s nature
for clues to these "needs" or "wants."

Instead, both turned their

focus and analysis upon those characteristics in commodities which
satisfied these "needs" or "wants."
As Menger noted, the question of needs leads directly to a
discussion of man's nature.

Is there a legitimate study of the

nature of man called the philosophy of man, or is such a philosophy
impossible, and thus a fraudulent endeavor?

Such a philosophy

would have to answer questions about the essence of man, and tell
what is helpful in aiding one to be a completely full and essential
person in the analogous manner that a good practitioner of the
discipline of medicine can tell us what will lead to good health
and what will not.

And just as the doctor would have to know what

8

"good health" is and how to achieve it, so would the philosopher
of man have to know what is the "essence of man" and how to
achieve it.

Is such a knowledge possible for man?

of Socrates has been debated over the centuries.

This question
The very fact

that there has been such a prolonged debate would seem to imply
that, on the one hand, such a knowledge was at least partially
possible and, on the other hand, that such a knowledge of man's
own nature will never be complete.

Or in other words, though some

questions about the essence and destiny of man will be partially
answered, there will be other questions that defy complete
resolution.®
The possibility that there is only partial and less than cer
tain knowledge about every facet of man's nature is not a very
pleasing result to modern man with his desires to have certain,
complete, precise, and hopefully, quantifiable knowledge.

This

may, however, be more of an indictment against the epistemological
desires of the m o d e m cult of quantification than against the philo
sophic stuJ/ of man's nature.

It is only a small and insecure

mind which avoids this inherent tension and uncertainty in the
study of man's nature by stating that since not everything can be
learned for certain and precisely about the essence and destiny
of man, then nothing can be known about the nature and Ultimate
End of man.

We seem to have forgotten Aquinas' dictum that it is

better to know a little about that which is really important than

9

a lot about that which is unimportant.
Unfortunately, the view that value judgments about the nature
of man and the Ultimate End cannot be fruitfully discussed because
they are allegedly mere statements of subjective or autonomous
preferences has acquired widespread acceptance within the economic
profession.

Some economists may be insisting upon the possibility

of a purely positive science because they have accepted the odd
notion that "man can ultimately only fight"

9

when their ultimate

values about the nature of man conflict, and that the question is
then reduced to one of "thy blood or mine."^

But it is sheer

dogmatism to insist that such disagreements can never be resolved
through discussion and research.1^

The Achilles heel of this

positivistic methodology is the implicit encouragement that it
gives to ethical solipsism.

All economists agree that value judg

ments must be added to positive economics in order to obtain policy
12
recommendations.
But if such basic value judgments are arbitrary
statements of subjective preference and also an indispensable part
of any policy recommendation, then are not all policy recommendations
finally arbitrary, mere matters of personal preference that cannot
be tested even if esconced in a sophisticated and rigorous quanti
tative methodology.
Such an epistemological approach has momentous implications.
Since such a methodology will not allow any knowledge about the
nature of man and his Ultimate End which would heirarchically order

10

the demands of man, we are led to have an unbounded volition in
man.

Thus the will which is the desiring, wanting, demanding

part of man's nature becomes autonomous when making the decisions
which motivate man.

This Hobbes can declare, "Reason is and

always must be the servant of the p a s s i o n s . T h o u g h such a
philosophy or lack of philosophy is called "rationalism," it would
be better labeled "irrationalism,"

As R. G. Collingwood has re

marked, "many behavioral scientists are engaged in the propaganda
of irrationalism, which is defined as the attempt to provide a
rational basis for the irrational flight from responsibility."

14

Such a methodology can progressively reduce the capacity of social
scientists for moral outrage and will result in what Karl Mannheim
has called a "crisis in valuation" which he defined as the loss of
genuinely ethical judgmental capacity.

Lacking this judgmental ca

pacity to distinguish between the legitimacy and non-legitimacy
of an economic commodity, modern economic theorists, when they
have to deal with the question of what are the valid needs and
demands of the individual consumer, have decided that since not
everything can be known for certain and precisely (i.e., quanti
tatively) about the nature of man and his legitimate needs, then
nothing at all can be stated about the legitimacy of the individual's
demand and that the only way to proceed in one's analysis of con
sumer's demand is to treat each effective demand as equally good.
The nature of man is thus implicitly defined by the use of the term
"economic agent."

Man is viewed as an agent with insatiable wants

II

which are given, i.e., beyond analysis.

Hence the economics

profession's use of the term economic "goods'1 as if there were
no economic "bads."

This may, or may not be, a satisfactory

methodology; it is, however, no less a normative stance than
anything that will be put forward in this study.

Not to pass

judgment upon it is in fact to join up, that is, to render a
positive judgment.
This study will then pass judgment on such a methodological
stance derived from the conclusion that the nature of man cannot
be studied fruitfully.

Furthermore, since one's judgment in this

issue ultimately will depend upon one's view of man's nature, it
is necessary to outline my definition of man's nature.

The defini

tion of man assumed throughout this study is one that is derived
from the Greco-Judaeo-Christian tradition: Man is viewed as being
composed of a material body and an inmaterial component that inter
penetrate each other thoroughly.

The inmaterial dimension is,

moreover, ranked as more important not only because it can reflect
upon its own nature and thus orientate the direction of the whole
self, but because in a limited sense it shares in the existence of
an absolute immaterial reality, whether one views this as Plato’s
Logos or the Judaeo-Christian God.

Man has, therefore, the material

economic needs of any oxidising machine, while at the same time he
has an interior spirit that will not be satisfied with only an
ever-increasing accumulation of economic goods.

12

In medicine, when one takes a certain amount of addictive
stimulant for the sake of good health, the amount of the stimulant
is finite and limited by the end of good health.

When, however,

one takes such a stimulant for its own sake, the desire for it
becomes infinite since it is no longer limited by a final goal, but
has become an end in itself.

The same is true of the output of the

economic process which, rather than being used

for the sake of

achieving the final goal of life, tends to become the final goal
itself.

Since output is then not limited by any final goal, the

desire for it becomes infinite.

We get hooked on economic growth.

To paraphrase Descartes, such a lifestyle would be based on the
philosophical foundation:

"I make and I buy, therefore I am."

In such a philosophical perspective man's reason becomes sub
ject to the desires of the acquisitive side of his nature rather
than the dominant partner in the orientation and direction of his
activities.

To act irrationally comes to mean only that, given

one's desires, one commits some action which is inconsistent with
such desires.

It makes no difference what one's desires are, because

they are seen to be beyond the reach of reason.

As long as he used

the most efficient tools, the completely mad Captain Ahab was
entirely rational in his search for the white whale.

No less an

economist than Frank Knight has remarked on such a view:

"Living

intelligently includes more than the intelligent use of means in
realizing ends; it is fully as important to select the ends intel-

13

ligently, for intelligent action directed toward wrong ends only
makes evil greater and more certain."^

More recently, Tibor

Scitovsky has written about such activity:

’This may well be an

example of the higher irrationality of behavior governed by
narrowly rational calculation."1^
Most economists, however, have refused to follow Knight and
Scitovsky in a discussion of how man’s economic behavior affects
the achievement of his final end, but instead have evaded this
issue by placing it outside of the realm of the discipline of
economics.

Such an approach might appear to be well and good;

after all, there has to be a division of academic labor just as
much as physical labor.

Yet the profession of economics cannot

absolve itself in this instance by such a simple side-step because
it is of the essence of economics that it deal with scarce resources
and competing ends.

How can a discipline efficiently allocate scarce

resources among competing ends if it has the wrong definition of both
scarce resources and competing ends?

If the economics profession

should somewhat arbitrarily accept an unrealistic definition of
either of these two terms (say because of tractability to arithmomorphic analysis), to that extent all of its mental endeavors, no
matter how arduous and sophisticated, will be abberations from
reality.

As such they may do more harm than good.

Such faulty analysis would not be too harmful, however, if it
only left the economists in error.

But economics provides society

14

with the image of economic society and this image, in turn, notably
affects the behavior of society. ^

As Warren Samuels has written,

"Economists should and do participate in the social valuational
process, despite disclaimers to the contrary."

18

If the economics

profession accepts as appropriate the image of relative scarcity
and competing autonomous ends, then such views of these critical
phrases will in a very subtle manner become the guiding vision of
society, which will, in turn, reinforce the economists in their
beliefs.
Yet there have been some economists during the Industrial
Revolution who have incorporated the concept of absolute scarcity
into their analysis.

The name of Thomas Robert Maithus immediately

comes to one's mind when one acknowledges the importance of absolute
shortages.

There have been economists who have eschewed the satis

faction of autonomous given wants of consumers as the final criteria
for determining the worth of the output of the economic system.
J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi in Nouveaux principes d* Economie
politique, John Ruskin in Unto this Last, and R. H. Tawney in The
Acquisitive Society have each in their own way raised questions
about determining the worth of the output of the economic system.
Each of these humanistic economists have refused to let go of the
conclusions reached slowly and with great difficulty about the
final end of man by the Greco-Judaeo-Christian civilization and to
accept in their place the conclusions of an economic methodology

15

founded upon the principles of utilitarianism and the epistemology
of positivism moderated by individualism.^®

Each investigated

whether the increases in production and consumption experienced
during their lifetime benefitted man in achieving his final end
which, following the Greco-Judaeo-Christian tradition, they de
fined as life in all its dimensions, especially in the higher
inmaterial dimensions.

It would seem worthwhile to back up and

learn from our predecessors who have discussed these concepts.
Such learning from history will be the goal of the next two
chapters.

CHAPTER I
FOOTNOTES

1.

Herman E. Daly, The Steady-State Economy: The Economics of
Biophysical Equilibrium and Moral Growtn [San Francisco: W. H.
Freeman £ Co., 1977): 18-26.

2.

Mark A. Lutz and Kenneth Lux, The Challenge of Humanistic
Economics (Menlo Park, California: The Benjamin/Cummings
Publishing Company, 1979).

3.

Lutz and Lux, The Challenge of Humanistic Economics, p. 52.
The chart lists several names which neither I nor Lutz and
Lux discuss. In a correspondence with Mark Lutz he writes
"I was absolutely floored by the fact that you came up with the
same historical sequence of scholars as we did. How did you
pull them out of the dark? In any case, it confirms that we
have discovered something that is of real substance. One day
Sismondi and Jobson will have to be recognized as absolutely
top economists whose major fault was to be too far ahead of
their times." (Letter dated May 4, 1979).

4. Talbot Page discusses the varying ethical implications of a
growth and non-growth economy in his Conservation and Economic
Efficiency (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 197?):
162-169, 178-179.
5. Kelvin Lancaster, Consumer Demand: A New Approach (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1971) The parentheses were in
original.
6. It is interesting to note that Menger always spoke of "needs"
(Bedurfinis) and not wants or desires (Wunsch and Verlangen)
as Frank Knight pointed out in his preface to the English
translation of Carl Menger’s Principles of Economics (Glencoe,
Illinois: The Free Press, 195UJI
7. Carl Menger, Principles of Economics: 77.
8.

"There is no denying that the structure of wants is not amenable
to ordinary analysis. Wants are dialectical concepts, with
blurred, not sharply drawn, boundaries. But this is no reason
for refusing to describe and study them. After all, their
structure is not completely amorphous." Nicholas Georgescu-
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17

Roegen, "Utility," International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, Volume 16, p. 262.
9.

Milton Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics,"
in Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1953): 5.

10.

Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of
Economic Science (London: MacMillan, 1935): 150

11.

Why do economists assume that criticism of conflicting judg
ments lead to consensus in one area but is altogether useless
in another area? For philosophically informed discussion of
this issue by economists, see Sidney S. Alexander, "Human
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CHAPTER II

CONCERN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1800-1962)

Nineteenth-Century Concern for the Environment
Although it was Rachel Carson who in 1962 aroused modern
American public opinion to the dangers of the m o d e m industrial
economy upon the biotic environment, she was, by no means, the
first to recognize the conflict between an expanding industrial
economy and a delicate biotic and limited environment.

And al

though it was the Arab oil embargo in 1972-1973 that forced upon
Americans the recognition of the total dependence of our economy
upon a limited and exhaustible supply of certain natural resources,
there were perceptive scholars who had sounded the tocsin over
potential natural resource shortages long before the OPEC nations
flexed their oil muscles.

Analysis of the relationship between

our m o d e m economy and the biotic and physical resources of the
earth has a long and widely-based, if somewhat checkered, intel
lectual history.
This section will attempt to provide an historical outline
of this intellectual concern for biophysical resources in industrial
economic systems from the time of Thomas Robert Mai thus to the time
that Rachel Carson published the Silent Spring. The intellectual
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history of a concern is an elusive subject which must be bounded
if it is ever to be finished.

Since the concern is over the social

scarcity of biophysical resources, social scientists as well as
biological and physical scientists have a legitimate interest in
this concern.

But to be more precise, it is that area of study

wherein the biophysical sciences and the social sciences overlap
that will most likely generate the knowledge which is necessary for
the wise utilization and allocation of our biophysical natural
resources.

Accordingly, in this study we have limited our search

of authors either to biological and physical scientists who took an
active intellectual interest in problems of social scarcity, or to
social scientists who acknowledged explicitly that our economy is
totally dependent for its very existence upon the physical re
sources of this globe as well as upon the proper functioning of
many delicate and intricate biotic, physical and chemical reactions
within the environment.
The significance of Maithus was not in the resolution that he
gave to the problem of natural resource scarcity, but in the manner
2
that he framed the problem.
Once Mai thus discussed the dynamics
of population growth and the limitations of the earth's fixed
resources, social scientists were forced to acknowledge that the
problem of how mankind with its growing population and expanding
industry could survive on a fixed, limited and delicate environ
mental base was a critical and real threat.
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Mai thus developed his position in the following manner in his
first essay on the subject:
I think I may fairly make two postulata.
First, that food is necessary to the existence
of man. Secondly, that the passion between
the sexes is necessary and will remain nearly
in its present state . . . Population, when
unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio.
Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical
ratio.*3
There were thus two basic assumptions which Maithus used to
justify his pessimistic conclusion that "the superior power of
population cannot be checked without producing misery or vice."^
First, he assumed a rapid increase in population whenever the amount
of food rose above the subsistence level.

Second, he assumed a

slower increase in the food output from the relatively fixed natural
resource of land.

Both of these assumptions have been explored and

discussed from many angles.

In this chapter I shall focus upon

the latter of these two assumptions by discussing those scholars
who have attempted to show the importance of natural resources in
their economic analysis.

It should be pointed out

that the inti

mately related assumptionof population dynamics will not be
discussed in this paper even though the population question has
probably generated more research than the resource question.

As

indicated in the title to his later editions, An Essay on the
Principles of Population, or, A View of Its Past and Present Ef
fects on Human Happiness;

with an Inquiry into Our

Respecting the Future Removal or Mitigation of

the

Prospects
Evils WhichIt
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Occasions Maithus himself devoted almost all of his attention to
studying the dynamics of population growth rather than to the
resources which supported the population.

He seemed to take it

for granted that one could safely assume that food was 1) the basis
of all life, and 2) its supply could not be increased very rapidly.^
Most of Maithus's immediate followers also turned their attention to
the problem of restraining population growth rather than to that of
analyzing the natural resource base that supported a population.^
It was not until 1865 that a thorough analysis of the resources
Q
supporting a m o d e m economic system would be undertaken.
In that
year the economist William Stanley Jevons brought Malthusian thought
up to date with the industrialization of England and the repeal of
the C o m Laws.
This is what Mai thus argued. He said that, though
our numbers tend to increase in uniform ratio, we can
not expect the same to take place with the supply of food.
We cannot double the produce of the soil, time after time,
ad inf ini turn. When we want to double the produce of a
■Field we cannot get it by simply doubling the labourers.
Any quantity of capital, and labour, and skill may fail
to do it, though discoveries from time to time do allow
of a considerable increase. Yet the powers and capabilities
of organic and inorganic nature always present this re
markable contrast. The former are always relative to
the number of existing beings, and tend unceasingly to
increase. But exterior nature presents a certain ab
solute and inexorable limit, uncertain and indefinable
though that limit may be.
The whole question turns upon the application of these
views to the consumption of coal. dXir subsistence no longer
depends upon our produce of c o m . The momentous repeal
of the C o m Laws throws us from c o m upon coal.3
Jevons wrote The Coal Question in order to probe into the source
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of the British industrial supremacy of his times.

He prefaced the

second edition of The Coal Question with a summary statement of
his principal hypothesis.
Renewed reflection has convinced me that my main
position is only too strong and true. It is
simply that we cannot long progress as we are now
doing. I give the usual scientific reasons for
supposing that coal must confer mighty influence
and advantages upon its rich possessor, and I
show that we now use much more of this invaluable
aid than all other countries put together. But
it is impossible that we should long maintain so
singular a position.10
Jevons* position was quite straightforward.

It was that the

British industrial economy had taken advantage of the energy of
coal more than the industry of any other country.

Thus British

industrial supremacy depended upon the use of vast amounts of
easily accessible coal.

However, this supremacy could not last

because 1 ) the coal was becoming more difficult to obtain, and 2 )
other countries such as the United States and Germany had larger
reserves of coal and were beginning to utilize their resources.
This meant that in time that Great Britain's industrial might
would be surpassed by these countries.

Also, and more importantly,

it meant that in time the economy of Great Britain would begin
to slow down.

One of Jevons* main concerns was how the Britith

nation of the mid-nineteenth century should use its unparalleled
and never-to-be-repeated industrial greatness which was based upon
coal.

As he concluded The Coal Question:
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If we lavishly and boldly push forward in the
creation of our riches, both material and intel
lectual, it is hard to over-estimate the pitch of
beneficial influence to which we may attain in
the present. But the maintenance of such a posi
tion is physically impossible. We have to make
the momentous choice between brief but true
greatness and longer continued mediocrity.^
At the same time as the Englishman Jevons was treating of the
importance of coal to the British economy, an American, George
Perkins Marsh, was undertaking a much more comprehensive project,
a study of the inpact of mankind throughout history upon nature.
According to Marsh, through wanton destruction and profligate
waste the earth was:
fast becoming an unfit home for its noblest
inhabitant, and another era of equal human
crime and human improvidence,. . . would re
duce it to such a condition of impoverished
productiveness, of shattered surface, of
climactic excess, as to threaten the depri
vation, barbarism, and perhaps even extinction
of the species.1^
In many ways the studies of Jevons and Marsh complement each
other.

Jevons investigated the dependence by one particular

country at one particular time upon one particular resource.

March

investigated the impact of civilized man throughout his history
on his environment.

Jevons' work was a scientific and detailed

case study; Marsh's work was that of a generalist, as he himself
recognized.
energy.

Jevons was concerned with one source of industrial

Marsh was concerned with the total biotic and land en

vironment that supported civiliation,

but not with the metals and
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fossil fuels that constructed and powered an industrial economy.
Marsh introduced his topic with a brief discussion that
linked the fall of the ancient Roman Empire to a decrease in its
natural resource base.

Next, in a wide-ranging investigation,

Marsh generalizes from the example of the Roman Empire to the
whole of western civilization.

It is in this section that some of

his most memorable indictments and expressions of concern are found
over the way that western man has destroyed his environment.

After

this general introduction, Marsh discusses man’s role in plant and
animal domestication, and the effects of such domestication upon
the organic and land environment.

Next, in the largest chapter of

the book entitled "The Woods" he explores the consequences of
deforestation which was one of his chief concerns, because he had
been personally involved in the deforestation that had occurred
on the Green Mountain slopes of his native Vermont, and he had
observed the scrub and desert regions of the Mediterranean.
The remainder of the book surveys man's impact upon two other
aspects of nature, that of water and dunes.

He concludes by show

ing that man's actions, though individually negligible, may in the
aggregate alter the structure, composition and destiny of the earth
and its inhabitants.
Marsh's analysis of mankind's impact upon the earth attracted
wide attention at the time.

It directly inspired an 1873 state

ment by concerned scientists which, in turn, led Congress to
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establish a national forestry commission and to set aside certain
lands as forest preserves.

From this forest commission would come

the leaders of the Conservation movement that would spread over
the United States from 1890 to 1910,
The foresters were concerned with the indiscriminate deforesta
tion that was taking place in the United States,
American frontier was coming to an end,

By 1890 the

Americans in their search

for their manifest destiny could no longer face west and see un
limited expanses of forest resources beckoning to them.

It was

the end of am era, and it is no surprise at this critical time in
its history, the United States stopped momentarily to take a rough
inventory of its natural resources and to consider just how they
should utilize such resources.

The forests were the first of the

great natural resources in the United States which were depleted so
rapidly and wantonly as to attract attention and cause concern.

As

mentioned just above, as a result of a concerned statement by the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, the Division
of Forestry was created in 1882.

In 1886 Dr. B. E. Femow, a

leading conservationist, took charge of the work of forestry in
the United States Department of Agriculture.

Since the history of

the role of the foresters in the First Conservation Movement of
the United States would take us too far afield, it will be omitted
in this study with the exception of some work by B. E. Femow. ^
Early geologists also concerned themselves about the supply
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of crude petroleum.

The Geological Survey of Pennsylvania showed

a concern over oil supplies as early as 1874,

In 1883 the Pennsyl

vania State Geologist, Peter Lesley, sounded a distinctly warning
note:

"The next generation will gather from our oil history, with

angry astonishment, a lesson of warning in political economy, only
useless because coming too late."^
Nathaniel Southgate Shaler, professor of geology at Harvard,
expressed a conservationist philosophy similar to Marsh, but he
emphasized more than Marsh the importance of minerals and the
fertility of the soil.

In 'The Economic Aspects of Soil Erosion,"

Shaler warned his readers in vigorous language of the dangers
that their fertile soil resource would wash away if American farmers
continued to abuse the land.^

This warning would ring true to the

many American fanners who saw their top soil either wash away or
blow away during the Dust Bowl era.

In his best-known book, Man

and the Earth, Shaler endeavored to set forth certain reasons why
there should be a change in the point of view that Americans com
monly regarded the resources of the earth.
preface;

Shaler noted in the

"As a teacher of Geology, I have seen that there is a

complete lack of understanding in our communities as to the duty
we owe to our successors in their use of these limited resources.
It is important to note that Shaler, as Marsh had before him,
recognized that the careful conservation of America's resources
would not only require more information derived from careful research,
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but also, and even more essential, a change in attitude by Ameri
cans.

There was a need for more than the optimistic utilitarian

approach

that progress would be able to resolve all the problems

of resource scarcity.

Therewas a need for a change in heart,

a love of the earth and a respect for posterity.

for

Shaler concluded

Man and the Earth with this exhortation:
the great gain we are to have from the m o d e m know
ledge of the world is in the change of attitude it
is to bring about: in the sense of kinship with the
anciently alien realm and of duty by the gTeat
inheritance of life. To the making of this new
spirit no great body of learning needs go; it will
depend for its development far more on the way of
approach than on the mass of the knowledge that
is gained. So soon as men come to feel themselves
as really the children of the world, the tides
of affection that instinctively tend toward it,
but have been sorely hindered by ancient misunder
standings, will help in the good work, and give
us souls reconciled to their great house and eager
to help its o r d e r .
Charles Van Hise, professor of geology at the University of
Wisconsin, also played a vital role in the Conservation movement.
His book The Conservation of Natural Resources in the United States,
first published in 1910, became the textbook most often used in all
conservation courses in the universities.
why it would become a successful text.

One can easily perceive

It was illustrated, factual,

and to the point in its message to Americans to stop wasting their
fossil fuels, water, forests, and land.
Before advancing on to the economists' involvement with the
First Conservation Movement in the United States, it seems worth-
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while to summarise the conclusions of Mai thus, Jevons and Marsh and
his followers.

Maithus*s contribution is well known.

He showed

that it was necessary for a nation*s economic prosperity that its
population not outrun its supply of food energy.

Jevons brought

Maithus's thoughts up to date with the industrialization that had
taken place in the first half of the nineteenth century by attempting
to show that England's economic prosperity depended upon an easily
accessible and plentiful source of energy for its industry, and
that, since the supplies of coal were threatened with exhaustion,
so was the prosperity that depended upon than.

Jevons argued for

a heightened awareness of the importance of coal and a public dis
cussion of how England should use her declining coal fields.

Should

England's industrial system go out in a blaze of glory or should
England opt for a period of "slow restrained growth?"-^

The Ameri

can George Perkins Marsh took a wider view and attempted to show
the dependence of western civilization upon a fertile biotic en
vironment.

His historical studies showed how man’s economic system

could slowly and unconsciously destroy the fertility of an environ
ment.

He called therefore for more investigation into the impact

of man's economic system upon the environment.

Later, foresters

and geologists added warnings from their respective disciplines
about the potential destruction of forests and exhaustibility of
fossil fuels, and exhorted society to develop some ways to keep
from wasting such resources.
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Natural Resource Economic Theory of the
First Conservation Movement

In a major address before the American Association for the
Advancement of Science in 1895 Bernhard E. Femow, the noted
forester and conservationist, concluded his presentation with this
challenge to the economists of his day:

"I close with the hope

that the students of political economy will see that this branch
of their science, the economy of natural resources, so important
and yet so neglected, requires on their part a fuller and more
careful consideration."^

Evidently not one to wait around for

others, in the next year F e m o w taught a course on the economic
aspects of forestry under the auspices of the Department of Politi
cal Economy at the University of Wisconsin which Richard Ely has
claimed were the first such lectures given within a department of
political economy.20
Femow's main contribution to natural resource economic theory
was his fourfold classification of natural resources:

1) Inex

haustible resources; 2) Exhaustible and non-renewable resources;
3) Renewable resources, but liable to deterioration under increased
activity; and 4) Renewable resources whose yield could be much
increased if managed scientifically.
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It should be noted that

when F e m o w and those who follow him speak of an exhaustible and
non-renewable resource, they are referring to the aggregate supply
of the resource and not to the supply of one particular mine or
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oil well.

Neglect of this distinction has caused some confusion

in the literature on the subject.
It would not be, however, until around 1912 at the height of
the Conservation Movement that some economists took up Femow's
challenge to incorporate natural resources within the scope of
their analysis and to explore explicitly the question of the
appropriate rate of utilization of natural resources by the economy.
Were such natural resources to be treated by economists in the same
way as all other factors of production excluding labor (i.e., as
a portion of either society's homogeneous capital or land) or were
natural resources in some way unique as a group and uniquely dif
ferent in the manner that F e m o w had classified them, therefore
requiring special consideration as to their optimal rate of utili
zation.

Until that time economists generally had dealt with natural

resources under the two headings of rent and royalty.

Adam Smith

had noted that mines could yield a rent but only if the mineral
23
was relatively easy to obtain or favorably located.
David Ricardo
is somewhat ambiguous in his treatment of mines.
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In his brief

chapter entitled "On the Rent of Mines" in the Principles of
Political Economy and Taxation Ricardo accepts Adam Smith's conclu
sion that relatively fertile and/or favorably located mines could
yield a differential rent.
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However, in the previous chapter he

implies that the concept of rent should be reserved for "that
compensation which is paid to the owners of land for the use of
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its original and indestructible powers" and that the "compensation
given for the mine or quarry is paid for the value of the coal or
stone which can be removed from them, and has no connection with
the original and indestructible powers of the land,"

(i.e.,

royalty). Alfred Marshall attempted to harmonize these views by
stating that the net income from a mine includes the '*payment of
a rent as well as a royalty."^7
The conservationist did not think that this discussion of
rents vs. royalty was adequate in dealing with the issue of optimal
utilization of natural resources because it did not deal explicitly
with the question of the potential exhaustion of certain resources
and the inpact of that exhaustion as Jevons had done, for example,
in The Coal Question.

The conservation theorist would claim, not

only that natural resources as a group were a unique input into
the economic system, but that some particular resources were 1 )
essential to m o d e m industrial society, 2 ) liable to exhaustion,
and 3) unable to be replaced satisfactorily by any other resource.
Consequently, the conservationist would state that mankind had a
moral duty to preserve the vital resources for future generations
as nearly unimpaired as the nature of the resource admits.
Lewis Cecil Gray was the first economist to attempt to explore
the connection between the conservationist ethic and economic theory.
His pioneer study "Economic Possibilities of Conservation" appeared
in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1913.

In this seminal work
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Gray showed a clearer understanding of the all-important difference
in outlook between that economic theory which accepts the present
value maximization criterion for determining the appropriate utiliza
tion of a mine and the conservationist theory with its ethic of
preservation of vital natural resources than has been shown in many
more recent studies.
Though Gray states in his first sentence that "It is not safe,
without some preliminary definition, to attempt a scientific con
sideration of a concept which is chiefly a product of popular
28
discussion,"
nowhere does he give a precise definition of the
conservation ideal.

However, from his introductory discussion it

is clear that conservation has to do with natural resources:

"It

is desirable to confine the idea of conservation to its original
application to natural resources."

And that for Gray the conserva

tionist ideal has to do with conserving natural resources for the
future.

'The real heart of the conservation problem presents an

issue which taxes the resources of economic theory to the utmost.
This issue is the problem of adjusting the conflict between the
interest of present and future.

It is the purpose of this paper to

estimate the extent of this conflict of interest and to point out
the economic possibilities of conservation."
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In his discussion of that category of resources which he de
fines as being "necessarily exhsuted through use, and non-restorable
after exhaustion," ^

Gray states that "Minerals afford a tolerably

clear-cut type of resources which are absolutely limited in supply
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and non-restorable.

It is necessary to make a definite choice

between present and future.

Normally, when once used, the supply

is exhausted practically for all time. . . Yet the most serious
phases of the conservation problem grow out of the fact that some
of the most important elements, such as coal, petroleum, and iron,
are being rapidly and completely used up without hope of replace
ment."^

He concludes this first section with the preliminary

observation that "In short, it is not necessarily true that the
method of utilization which results in conservation is the method
which results in maximum profits.
In the second section Gray asks what rate of extraction the
individual owner of a mine will pursue in his quest for maximum
profits.

Gray's overall object is "to inquire what are the con

ditions which, in the case of the individual, determine the
profitableness of a conservation p o l i c y . H i s conclusion is that
"whether or not the individual will pursue a policy of exploitation
or one of conservation, depends on a number of conditions, the most
important of which are the rate of interest, the law of diminishing
productivity, and the value of the natural resources under the
individual's control."
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It is in this section that Gray first

develops the present value maximization criterion,^ which is the
criterion that most economists had implicitly accepted in the past
and would continue to use more explicitly and correctly in the
future to "determine" the optimal rate of utilization of nonrenew-
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able resources.^

Using the present value maximization criterion

as his guide Gray next discusses the role of the interest rate on
the extraction rate of a natural resource.

He concludes that "the

general effect of a high interest rate, other things being equal,
is rapid exploitation; whereas a lower interest rate makes a policy
of conservation more profitable to the o w n e r . H e concludes
this section with a discussion on the impact of prices on the
extraction rate of natural resources.

Though he is aware that

higher prices have both a favorable and unfavorable impact on
conservation, he believes that the overall impact is favorable.
"There are several reasons, however, which justify the view that
utilization will tend to be exploitative when land is cheap, and
conservative when it is dear."^
In the third and final section of his paper, Gray attempts to
show what could be done to make the present value maximization
criterion promote the conservationist goal.

He notes first that

"much, however, depends upon the character of wants.

If men desire

chiefly commodities which require a large amount of natural resources
for their satisfaction, the social demand for the objects of nature
will be correspondingly great."

And "Since an increase in social

demand results in a great increase in the aggregate utilization
of natural resources, it follows that conservation may be affected
by measures whose result is a decrease in social demand.

Such a

decrease may be effected by the restriction of population or by
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changes in the character of wants ."39

Gray admits that "alterations

of these kinds, however, are exceedingly difficult to bring about
by positive social action."40
Next he shows that if the supply of natural resources had been
artifically limited by restraining the frontier this would have
aided the conservation of natural resources.

"Hie frontier has

been the line of minimum social demand for natural resources in
proportion to the supply and, therefore, the line where the most
wasteful methods of utilization have been followed . . . Had our
fathers made the frontier a dead-line which might not be extended
until sufficient social demand existed to create high land values
at once, a maximum economy of utilization might have resulted."4^
Gray next discusses the implications of policy actions that
would directly force the resource owner to be more conserving of
his resources even though it might be economically inefficient.
For instance, "If mine owners are required to substitute wooden
supports for the columns of ore which are now employed to support
the roofs of their mines, coal that would otherwise be lost may be
saved for the future; but coal for present use will likely be more
expensive."
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He concludes this discussion with the following

observation:
Conservation if generally a policy which in
creases the burden of the present . . . Society is
confronted by. . . a choice between present satis
faction and future satisfaction. Moreover, conser
vation requires that individuals lessen their con
sumption today in order that other individuals may
enjoy the results of thei abstinence. Hence, in so
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far as it involves the saving for the enjoyment of
other generations what we might use for ourselves,
it constitutes a type of ethical requirement which
is upon a higher level than any that has heretofore
existed, - - a n ethical requirement entirely novel
in its scope. The ethical field is to be widened to
include unborn generations; not only those which
will appear in the inmediate future but also those
which are yet enshrouded in a future limited only
by the uncertain period of human life upon the
earth. Few individuals have achieved an ethical level
sufficiently exalted to induce them to curtail present
enjoyment foT the sake of shadowy generations yet to
come .43
Next Gray discusses the limitations of using an extreme
version of the conservation ethic:

"Conservation as a single

principle of action involves the equal importance of future wants
and present wants.

It requires that the want of the infinitely

distant future shall be as important as the want of the immediate
present.

Conservation as a single principle of action is reduced

to an absurdity."
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This awareness that an extreme conservation

ethic cannot be the sole guiding model for society prompts Gray to
ask the question "Where is the proper balance between utilization
and conservation,"

<1^

Gray recognizes that this is a basic philosophi

cal question, the complete answer to which would require a complete
knowledge of the nature of man.

"Philosophically considered, the

question cannot be answered with finality without such a definite
comprehension of the purpose of human existence as has not yet
been vouchsafed the race.

In the absence of more infallible founda

tions we shall doubtless lean on the 'crutch of comnon sense.

Though not a very precise answer, such an answer follows logically
from Gray's premises about the worth of conventional economic
theory, the conservation goal and his philosophy of man.
Next Gray asks if conservation policies necessarily hinder
progress in the future.

He answers:

Exploitation results in maximum production under
certain conditions, but maximum production does not
necessarily mean progress . . . Maximum production
may be accompanied by a manner of life which is not
consistent with the highest social development. . .
A vast amount of consumption is neither based on
welfare, nor an enjoyment; it is solely dictated
by convention. The enormous waste of coal required
for the electrical advertising in our great cities
is illustrative of this exploitative consumption.
As Professor H. J. Davenport has expressed it, "Every
great white way in every American city is nightly
one more chemical orgy of waste, a crime of com
petitive advertising for which some day thousands
of individuals must shiver for months." The neces
sities of conservation may compel the economist to
enlarge his field so as to apply the test of economy
as one of the criteria for the justification of
wants .47
In concluding his paper Gray wonders what policy measures can be
undertaken to create the "proper social conditions which will
provide the motives for conservation."
mends a low interest rate.
is the interest rate.
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Gray immediately recom

"A most important social condition

In all cases the interest rate must be

rendered as low as possible.

To this end adequate credit agencies

should be provided for those who own and operate natural resources."
Also he suggests that the prices of natural resources be kept rela
tively high by the government.

"Conservation requires the creation
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of high values; . . .

In this manner values may be kept sufficiently

high to cause the individual to accomplish the maximum result with
the minimum of waste."^
However, even with these policies Gray ultimately concludes
that it is mostly a question of demand.

"If social demand is allowed

to increase by leaps and bounds, the most careful utilisation may
coincide with an enormous increase in the aggregate destruction
of natural resources.

At this point are encountered questions of

population and of luxurious consumption.

The wisdom of the nations

will be none too great to deal with these phases of the problem."^
Richard T. Ely was Lewis Gray's professor at the University
of Wisconsin so it is difficult to determine whose ideas should
take precedence in time.

However that might be, Ely takes a dif

ferent approach to the problem of conservation than that of Gray
even though he cites Gray's work.

Dr. Ely assumes as a basic

premise that since certain natural resources are both indispensable
and exhaustible, they should be preserved "in a condition so nearly
unimpaired as the nature of the case, or wise exhaustion, admits.
In his analysis of the optimal rate of utilization of natural re
sources Ely rejects the deductive and abstract methodology which had
produced the present value maximization criterion and opts for an
inductive methodology which allows more direct input from the
foresters, geologists, hydrologists, etc.

It is in this section

that he takes pride in bringing the forester B. E. F e m o w into the
Department of Political Economy at the University of Wisconsin.
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Ely favors such a methodology because of his academic back
ground which was with the German historical school or inductive
method of political economy.

As Ely acknowledges in this essay,^

his methodology owes much to the German economist Friedrich List.
Though List's National System of Political Economy dealt primarily
with the development of future productive capacity through ap
propriate tariff policies, Ely shows that List's inductive analysis
of productive powers is easily and naturally extended so as to find
application to the conservation of vital resources.

Since one of

the main premises of the conservation ethic is that society should
have a careful regard for the productive power for the future, Ely
was able to show the necessity of conservation policies if one
accepts the methodology of List.
Ely goes on to argue that since laissez faire economic poli
cies based upon private present value maximization criteria would
not ensure appropriate conservation of vital resources, some public
ownership and/or regulation would be necessary if such resources
were to be preserved.

This latter argument is mostly done by use

of examples though it is at this point that Ely cites Gray's work
in his defense.^
Though there were a few other economists interested in the
study of economic theory as it applied to the conservation of natural
resources, their work was somewhat tangential to the main issue.
Such was the work of Thomas N. Carver, an economist at Harvard who
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was mainly interested in human resources, and Ralph Hess, another
economist at the University of Wisconsin,^
As the conservation movement lost much of its popular support
during and after World War I, the few economists who had attempted
to analyze the goals and principles of conservation apparently lost
their interest in continuing this line of research.

It is interest

ing to note that they seemed to shift their interest to the newlydeveloping subdiscipline of agricultural economics.

For instance,

Richard T. Ely became editor of Land Economics and collaborated on
a much-used textbook of the same name while doing his research on
the taxation of land resources.

Lewis Gray became president of the

fledgling American Farm Economic Association, author of a classic
two-volume history of southern agriculture, and later an active
administrator in the Land Resettlement Division of the Department
of Agriculture during the New Deal era.^

John Ise and Frederick Soddy
A.

The Economic Thought of John Ise

The intellectual void left when Ely, Gray and others turned
their attention away from the analysis of conserving natural re
sources to other issues would be filled in the United States by
one indomitable academic.

John Ise was b o m in 1885 very close to

the geographical center of the Unites States.

After graduate

studies at Harvard, he returned to the University of Kansas where
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during his lifetime he wrote three major books--The U.S. Forest
Policy in 1920, The U.S. Oil Policy in 1927, and the U.S. National
Parks in 1961-- as well as a remarkable monograph in 1925 in the
American Economic Review "Theory of Value as Applied to Natural
Resources," plus a quite unique textbook on Economics, besides
many other papers, addresses and essays on the subject of natural
resources and their utilization.
Though John Ise understood and appreciated the frontier ethic
as regards natural resources, he also perceived that it was destruc
tive to the American way of life in the long run.

He sounded a

theme in the first paragraph of his first book that would be his
life-long concern:
The history of the United States is fundamentally
a history of rapid exploitation of iranensely valuable natural
resources. . . Whatever preeminence the United States may
have among the nations of the world, in industrial activity,
efficiency and enterprise, in standards of living, in wealth,
. . . must be sttributed to the possession of these great
natural resources; and the maintenance of our preeminence
is dependent upon a wise and economical use of remaining
resources. Thus the question of conservation is one of the
most important questions before the American people.57
Ise's The U. S. Oil Policy stands as a socio-economic classic,
much ahead of its time.

His discussion of the social costs and

benefits of the automobile in particular and technology in general,
though fairly conrnon today, broke new ground for the economists.
His premonition that on the international scene "there are many
reasons for believing that oil will never be left entirely to
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unfettered economic sale and purchase,”

CO

has turned out to be

only too true in our time.
In addition, John Ise expanded the subdiscipline of natural
resource economic theory by investigating the alleged benefits
that society receives from a rapid exploitation of natural re
sources.

Unlike most economists, he was willing to ask critical

questions of much of the consumption of his age, or as Lewis Gray
had expressed it, he was willing "to enlarge his field so as to
apply the test of economy as one of the criteria for the justifica
tion of wants."
Can we say categorically, that the pleasure of riding
from nowhere to nowhere at 80 miles an hour is inferior in
quality to the pleasure of listening to the Eroica symphony?
As economists, we have always evaded such questions. We
have assumed that whatever the people want has economic
utility whether bootleg gin or Beethoven, and from the
predominance of demand for the former have assumed that
American happiness was increasing day by day in every way
Perhaps much of our traditional economics is pointless
and of little avail, a foundation with no superstructure,
a prologue without the opera. The production of goods,
more goods, mor things, mountains of things--to what purpose? 59
In the study, "The Theory of Value as Applied to Natural
Resources,"^® Ise probed into the question of what is the appropriate
pricing policy for exhaustible natural resources.

He began his

analysis by distinguishing between those resources which have
renewable substitutes and those resources which do not have such
substitutes.

For these latter resources which do not have substi

tutes either for themselves or for their products, the issue boils
down to the question of "how much difference are we justified in
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making between present wants and future wants?"

Ise concluded,

as indeed he must and as Lewis Gray had previously concluded,^
that it is impossible to answer this question in a definite and
precise manner.

"Doubtless future wants should be discounted

somewhat, because of various contingencies and uncertainties, but
it is doubtful if the wants of the next generation, for instance,
should be rated less than half as important as our own.

This

would mean a discount of about two percent a year."^
Ise's main contribution to the price theory of natural resources
was however in the next category, resources for which renewable
substitutes are available either for the resources themselves or
for their products.

This would certainly be the largest and most

important category, and it is in the price theory for this category
that Ise makes his unique contribution.
On the theory of forthcoming substitutes, where
should prices be fixed? The answer here is clear. Prices
of the resources or of the products derived from these
resources, should be fixed at a point approximating the
cost of producing adequate and satisfactory substitutes.
For example, the price of a barrel of oil should be priced approxi
mately the same as the cost of producing an equivalent barrel from
an agricultural crop such as sugar cane.

Pricing nonrenewable

resources at the same level as the cost of producing adequate and
satisfactory renewable substitutes would have two desirable conse
quences according to Ise.
resources.

First, it would conserve our exhaustible

Second, it would stimulate efforts to find a variety
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of adequate substitutes from renewable resources.
Ise would incorporate many of these conservation principles
into his textbook on Economics, published toward the end of his
long career.

In an opening chapter on Land he included a long

section on the waste of our resources and discussed the state of
the nation's lumber, fossil fuel, and metal reserves.

He concluded

that "the significance of all this may be seen if we consider that
our high standard of living has been possible largely because of
our rich natural resources of many kinds.
Ise goes against the drift of current economic

thinking, as

he himself recognized,^ by adding chapters discussing the American
consumer and his utilization of the products derived from exhaustible
natural resources.

In a chapter entitled "Human Wants and Utility,"

he critically investigated the usefulness of many of the consumer's
purchases.

In what other economics text could one read the follow

ing about the American consumer?
He has to work like a slave every day to get the things
that convention and fashion and social emulation and
advertising demand of him; but he winds 141 as povertystricken in wants, in the capacity to enjoy and appre
ciate, as he is rich in goods and in opportunities
for ostentation. What he needs is not the satisfaction
of the wants he has, he needs a better set of wants.
Was Ise prophetic when he concluded this chapter with the observa
tion that "the American people may soon have to learn to adjust
themselves to a stationary income and to find the joy of life in
something other than a growing flood of goods--for example, . . .
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in the development of a more genuine appreciation of some of the
simpler and less expensive but really higher and finer kinds of
satisfactions.”^
His two chapters on the machine age explore the problem of
technology and human life.

As he notes, "We have a lot of things

in these hectic days, a lot of movement, but little time for
living.”

"Modem transportation, communication, advertising,

and salesmanship— all of them important features of the machine
age--have intensified the struggle to keep up with the Jones by
making everyone more conscious of the pace that the Jones are
setting.

There is little if any general gain in this social

m a r a t h o n . H e next shows the impact of the machine age upon
exhaustible resources by pointing out that "the machine has used
up moTe oil in the past ten or twelve years, and more minerals in
the last thirty-five years, than were used in all history."^
In conclusion to this section, I would contend that John Ise’s
writings entitle him to be called America’s first natural resource
economist.

I would also submit that his incorporation of the physical

coordinates of value into his economic analysis as well as his criti
cal questioning of m o d e m man's consumption of the products derived
from our exhaustible resources are still valid and deserve to be
studied by m o d e m economists who now in increasing numbers grapple
with the problems that he alone in his time dealt with extensively.
It was unfortunate that John Ise was unaware of the work of
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Frederick Soddy, an English chemist and heretical economist who
was shocked by the economic profession's lack of attention to the
physical coordinates of value, and who urged economists to pay
attention to the principles of thermodynamics.

Soddy's analysis

would have provided a firm biophysical, if not metaphysical, basis
for many of the exhortations of Ise.

B.

The Economic Thought of Frederick Soddy

1.

Introduction:-

Frederick Soddy (1877-1956) is best known

as a Nobel Prize-winning chemist who collaborated with Rutherford
in studying radioactive disintegration, introduced the concept
of "isotopes," and was a major contributor to the m o d e m theory
of atomic structure.

Although an enthusiastic believer in scien

tific progress and in the possibility of a society in which the
fruits of scientific knowledge would be shared by all, Soddy was
acutely aware that history supported the view that science is at
least as likely to amplify evil as good.

He could not accept the

confortable view that scientists have no responsibility for the uses
to which their work is put, and although others (bankers and econo
mists) were in his view more guilty, scientists could not plead
innocent.

But the real problem was faulty economics, not faulty

chemistry, and in his latter years economics replaced chemistry as
the center of his intellectual life.
Soddy realized earlier than most the theoretical possibility
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of atonic energy.

Since his own work had contributed to the dis

covery that such a vast energy potential existed, it was natural
for him to ask, "what sort of a world it would be if atomic energy
ever became available?"^*

His answer (written in 1926) was clear:

”If the discovery were made tomorrow, there is not a nation that
would not throw itself heart and soul into the task of applying it
to war, just as they are now doing in the case of the newly de
veloped chemical weapons of poison-gas warfare . . . If it (atomic
energy) were to come under existing economic conditions, it would
mean the reductio ad absurdum of scientific civilization, a swift
annihilation instead of a none too lingering collapse."
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For

Soddy, the problem was to change economic conditions in order
eventually to make thw world safe for atomic energy and other
fruits of science.

There must be something radically wrong with

economic thought and institutions in order for the gift of scientific
knowledge to become such a threat.

Soddy was thus led to a radical

critique of economics.
Soddy's background as a physical chemist prepared him to
introduce a new level of sophistication into the neo-malthusian
critique of economic theory.

Just as Jevons had pointed out that

coal, not corn, was the driving force of a m o d e m industrial economy,
so Soddy carried the argument a step further by showing that it was
inanimate sources of energy, whether coal, oil, falling water, or
potentially atomic that was necessary for any m o d e m industrial
economy.

"If we have available energy, we may maintain life and
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produce every material requisite necessary.

That is why the flow

of energy should be the primary concern of economics."
Soddy*s discussion of the first and second laws of thermo
dynamics were pathbreaking^ and anticipated the brilliant work of
Nicholas Georgescu-Rogen in this field.

His investigations into

the original source of energy (the sun in almost all cases) led him
to distinguish between the permanently available flow of energy
and limited stocks of energy stored in the fossil fuels, a distinc
tion which is at the basis of much conservationist's thought.

Such

considerations led him to the conclusion that the ultimate basis of
economic wealth is physical.

"The wealth of the community is its

revenue, which, in the last analysis, is a revenue of energy
available for the purposes of life."
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Nature has stored such energy

in fossil fuels, but Soddy notes that such supplies are limited
and that "what we do is to unstore it (energy in fossil fuels), an
easier matter (than storing it), and to convert it into a flow before
it is of the least possible use to us."
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Soddy's investigation

into energy, its sources, conservation, and usefulness led him to
declare that "Economics deals not with energy, but entirely with
the flow of useful and available energy.
Soddy's basic philosophical approach to economics might be
called "materialism without reductionism."

He argued that we must

recognize the fundamental dualism of the material and the spiritual
and resist "monistic obsessions."
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Consequently Soddy rejects the monism of "Ultra-Materialism:"
I cannot conceive of inanimate mechanism, obeying
the laws of probability, by any continued series of
successive steps developing the powers of choice and
reproduction any more than I can envisage any increase
in the complexity of an engine resulting in the pro
duction of the "engine-driver" and the power of its
reproducing itself. I shall be told that this is a
pontifical expression of personal opinion. Unfor
tunately, however, for this argument, inanimate
mechanism happens to be my special study rather than
that of the biologist. It is the invariable charac
teristic of all shallow and pretentious philosophy
to seek the explanation of insoluble problems in some
other field than that of which the philosopher has
first hand acquaintance.7^
Yet a proper materialism must be one of the foundation stones
of economics.

In fact, "without phosphorus no thought" is a maxim

that all philosophers and ethicists should be required to memo
rize.

What mechanical science teaches economics is that,
life derives the whole of its physical energy or power,
not from anything self-contained in living matter, and
still less from an external deity, but solely from the
inanimate world. It is dependent for all the neces
sities of its physical continuance primarily upon the
principles of the steam-engine. The principles and
ethics of human law and convention must not run counter
to those of thermodynamics.81
The last sentence is very significant because it provides the

basis for many of Soddy's criticisms of the economy as a presumed
perpetual motion machine.
physical problems

For men, like other heat engines, the

of life are energy problems.

Pre-nineteenth

century man lived on energy revenue (sunlight captured by plants,
the "original capitalists").

Present day man augments this revenue

by consuming energy capital (coal, the "stored sunlight of palaeozoic
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sunmers"). While man can use fuel-fed machinery to lighten labor,
he can feed his internal fires only with new sunshine, or rather
the energy of new sunshine as transformed through the good offices
of the plant.

Life thus depends on a continuous flow of energy,

and hence the enabling requisites of life must partake of the nature
of a flow rather than only a stock.

There are limits to the degree

that this flow can be stored for future use.

A significant part

of the requisites of life must come to us as a current flow or
"revenue" that cannot in any phsyical sense be converted to a stock
and indefinitely stored for later use.

Stocks of assets, to the

extent that we can maintain them against the ravages of entropy,
are aids and accessories in improving our ability to tap the
energy revenue, but the revenue itself cannot be significantly
increased, and it cannot be saved except to a limited degree.

In

deed, the very maintenance of our accumulated stock of physical
wealth against the destructive force of entropy requires the
renewing power of the low-entropy "revenue" flow.

True, nature

has stored energy in coal, but it took geologic epochs of time, and
we are only able to unstore it.

Furthermore, the "flamboyant

period" of using up the capital stock of coal was perceived by
Soddy as a "very passing phase," after which the constraints
inposed by living on energy revenue would be more clearly seen and
unmistakably felt.
For Soddy the basic economic question was, "How does man live?"
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and the answer was, "By sunshine."

The rules that man must obey

in living on sunshine, whether current or palaeozoic, are the first
and second laws of thermodynamics.

This in a nutshell is "the

bearing of physical science upon state stewardship."
The importance of Soddy in this tradition that was concerned
about the matter/energy input into the economic system was the
scientific support that he provided the tradition.

His analysis

of the basic sources of energy and the importance of the laws of
thermodynamics added a scientific dimension to the conservationist
tradition and brought it 14) to date with twentieth-century physics
and chemistry.

Subsequent Natural Resource Economics
John Ise and Frederick Soddy were lone voices in the field of
economics.

There would be no immediate follow-up on their pene

trating and seminal ideas.

Instead most economic theorists would

follow the lead of Harold Hotelling who in a 1931 article entitled
"The Economics of Exhaustible Resources" attempted to discover
what maximizes the present value of the stream of consumer's
benefits from the stock of natural resources.
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Since the market

encourages firms to maximize the present value of their profit
stream even with exhaustible resources, Hotelling wondered whether
market forces would maximize the present value of consumer's bene
fits.

He found that under competitive conditions there is a

tendency for the market to lead toward present value maximization
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of consumer's benefits.

It is important to note that Hotelling

was working under the assumption that new resources can always be
found and/or that technology will come up with suitable substi
tutes for the vital natural resources.

In other words, there is

no such thing as absolute or Malthusian shortage, or even the
possibility of such a shortage, in his world-view.

Only particular

mines or wells are exhaustible for Hotelling, but not resources.
This is quite a different use of the word "exhaustible" than that
of Gray, Ise and Soddy.

For the most part, the economics profes

sion has followed Hotelling's methodology and assumptions, and,
explicitly or implicitly, has assumed that, for any rate of
utilization of natural resources, what is optimal for the consump
tion of the present generation will also be optimal for the
consumption of future generations.

As a result, most economists

have felt that no unique effort ought to be made in the conservation
of our natural resources.

However, Talbot Page and James Doilney

have recently shown that present value maximization, if used as
society's only criterion for determining the optimal rate of extrac
tion of natural resrouces, can lead to disastrously low future
welfare levels.
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Accordingly, in this section we shall not attempt

to outline that body of literature that had derived its inspiration
from Hotelling's methodology.

Such a technique may be useful in

resolving certain problems dealing with relative or Ricardian
scarcity, but with its assumption of unlimited natural resources
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and/or that technology will provide such resources, it does not
belong in a history of the conservation tradition.

I have mentioned

it merely to show where conservation principles were ambushed in
the history of economic thought.^
During the 1930's intellectual concern for the conservation
of natural resources dimmed somewhat.
four causes of this decline.

There appears to have been

First, the socio-economic problems

of the Depression took precedence over all other problems.

Second,

American education had become more specialized and departmentalized.
Scientists were coming to know more and more about less and less.
But the problem of wisely allocating natural resources requires
not only a comprehensive interdisciplinary knowledge of many sciences
from geology and physics to economics, ethics and philosophy but
QC

also an appreciation for the holistic integrity of the universe.
t

Third, the social sciences were becoming more positivistic in their
methodology.

Since the issues involved in the conservation of

resources quickly lead to normative judgmemts, the social scientists
became more reluctant to deal with such issues.®^

Fourth, there

was a rising faith that technology would resolve the problems of
natural resource scarcity, and that conservation of such resources
was not really needed.
What concern there was over natural resources focused upon a
problem that was only too apparent during the Dust Bowl era, the
depletion of fertile top soil, through both water and wind erosion.
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As the geographer Carl 0, Sauer expressed it in the 1930's, "Soil
destruction is the most widespread and most serious debit to be
O?
entered against colonial commercial exploitation.
After a description of such soil destruction, Professor Sauer
rejected the view that technology would resolve the food problems
of the world:
the

"The

easy denial of our dilemma by referring it to

technologist is in large

measure wishful thinking."

According

to Sauer, society still has to resolve the question of how to
conserve natural resources; a problem that Americans have not faced
squarely.
The doctrine of a passing frontier of nature replaced
by a permanently and sufficiently expanding frontier of
technology is a contemporary and characteristics expression
of occidental culture,itself a historical-geographic
product. This frontier attitude has the recklessness
of an optimism that has become habitual, but which is
residual from the brave days when north-European free
booters overran the world and put it under tribute. We
have not yet learned the difference between yield and
loot. We do not like to be economic realists.88
This brings us to the time of World War II.

During World War

II enormous quantities of resources were used up, and shortly
after the war there were some misgivings about the adequacy of
the U. S. resource base to meet the greatly increased and steadily
increasing demands for raw materials.

This concern over the adequacy

of the resources base led to the establishment of the President's
Materials Policy Commission in 1951 and to its successor, the Re
sources for the Future organization.

This commission, now usually

called the Paley Commission, concluded that the period of unlimited
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resource availability, for the United States, was over, but,
nevertheless, scarce resources could be obtained by increased
foreign trade and the resource base could be expanded by new
technology.
Not all Americans accepted this guardedly optimistic con
clusion of the Paley Commission that natural resources were plenti
ful, although maybe not in the United States. . In a response to
the Paley Commission Samuel Ordway stated, "It does not seem likely
that imports or 'technology1 will be the means of keeping us from
ultimately reaching the limit of growth."®^
However, in the hubris of the post-World War II years the
belief that the depletion of resources was the most serious problem
facing the United States was held by only a small minority of
scholars.

During this Cold War era, urged on by competition with

the Soviet Union, most social scientists saw the problem to be the
opposite:

How can we move our economy to grow ever more rapidly

and use even more resources?

Because of their faith in technology

such scientists disregarded any warnings of absolute shortages or
environmental disruption.

It would not be until Rachel Carson

wrote the Silent Spring in 1962 that once again a large number of
Americans would gradually start to concern themselves with the de
pletion of resources and corresponding abuse of the environment
upon which their very life and society depend.
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CHAPTER II
FOOTNOTES

1.

The historical exposition of concern for environmental
resources has, as far as I can ascertain, never been attempted
in any systematic manner by other scholars. This chapter is
therefore a pathbreaking study. I recognize that the inclu
sion of certain authors and the exclusion of others is a
matter of judgment. I look upon this study as a first step
rather than the definitive history of concern for natural
resources.
Because of the author’s limitations, this chapter will be
limited to Anglo-American scholars. This will unfortunately
omit the efforts of the Europeans Wilhelm Gstwald and Ernest
Solvay to develop an "energy" form of value.

2.

Though there were studies before Maithus which were con
cerned with man’s dependence upon the environment, such
studies were of a sporadic and tangential nature. See Clarence
Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore: Nature and Culture in
Western Thought from Ancient Times to the End of the Eighteenth
Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 19?6).

3. Thomas Robert Maithus, An Essay on the Principles of Population,
as It Affects the Future Improvement of Society. With Remarks
on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and other
Writers. (1798) Ed. by Gertrude Hiumelfarb (New York: Random
House, 1960): 8-9. All quotations will be from this edition.
4. Ibid.:
5.

17.

For a survey of this question of population dynamics see
Joseph J. Spengler, Population Economics: Selected Essays of
Joseph J. Spengler, (Durham, W.C.: Duke University Press,

1972).

6 . "Let us now take any spot

on earth, this Island for instance,
and see in what ratio the subsistence it affords can be sup
posed to increase. We will begin with it under its present
state of cultivation.

If I allow that by the best possible policy, by breaking up
more land and by great encouragement to agriculture, the produce
of this Island may be doubled in the first twenty-five years, I
think it will be allowing as much as any person can well de
mand.
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In the next twenty-five years, it is impossible to suppose
that the produce could be quadrupled. It would be contrary
to all our knowledge of the qualities of land. The very
utmost that we can conveive, is, that the increase in the
second twenty-five years might equal the present produce.
Let us take this for our rule, though certainly far beyond
the truth, and allow that by great exertion, the whole produce
of the Island might be increased every twenty-five years, by
a quantity of subsistence equal to what it at present pro
duces. The most enthusiastic speculator cannot suppose a
greater increase than this. In a few centuries it would
make every acre of land in the Island like a garden.
Yet this ratio of increase is evidently arithmetical.
It may fairly be said, therefore, that "the means of sub
sistence increase in an arithmetical ratio." T.R. Mai thus
(1st edition): 12. Later editions carried essentially the
same message. See pp. 131-132.
7.

For example, see Francis Palce’s Illustrations and Proofs of
the Principle of Population (London, 1622). John S. Mill was
also concerned with population control throughout much of
his life. In his youth he was once arrested for passing out
birth control literature and he would later argue that the
state had the right to control births. See his On Liberty
(1859) (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1947): llO. See
also Norman Hines, The Place of John Stuart Mill and of Robert
Owen in the History of English Neo-Malthusianism," Quarterly
Journal of Economics 42 (1928): 627-640.

8.

Though there were earlieT works on the question of the
exhaustibility of the coal fields of Great Britain, most of
these works were rather brief chapters by geologists. Their
methodology consisted in making an estimate of the amount of
accessible coal left in England and the duration of coal sup
ply, Jevons commented about such studies that "the annual
consumption is a rapidly growing quantity, and it is a most
shortsighted proceeding to argue as if it were constant."
The Coal Question: An Inquiry Concerning the Progress of the
Nation, and the Probable Exhaustion of our Coal-Mines ed A. W.
Flux (New York: Augustus M. Kelley reprint, 1965): lb. For a
review of these earlier sutdies, see chapter 2, "The Opinions
of Previous Writers" in Jevons 1 The Coal Question.
It perhaps should be noted that the economist John R. M'Culloch had previously characterized the notions of the exhausti
bility of England's coal mines as utterly futile, both in the
article on Coal in his Dictionary of Comnerce and Commercial
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Navigation (Philadelphia: Thomas Wardle, 1840) "Calling her
coal mines the coal cellars of the great city, there is in
them a supply which, at the present rate of expenditure,
will last for 2,000 years; and . . . may be regarded as in
exhaustible." Volume 1, p. 354, and in his A Statistical
Account of the British Empire: Exhibiting its Extent, Physical
Capacities, Population, Industry, and Civil and Religious
Institutions (London: Charles Knight 5 Co.. 1839) Volume 1.
p. 6 0 0 .
9.

William Stanley Jevons, The Coal Question: An Inquiry Con
cerning the Progress of the Nation, and the Probable Exhaustion
of our Coal Mines, ed. by A. W. Flux (New York: A. M. Kelley
reprint, 1965): 195. Underlined sentence was italicized in
original.

10.

Ibid., xxx.

11.

Jevons, The Coal Question: 460.

12.

George Perkins Marsh, Man and Nature, David Lowenthal (ed.)
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1965): 43.

13.

For the role of foresters in the First Conservation Movement,
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CHAPTER III

THE TELEOLOGICAL FUNCTION OF ECONCMIC OUTPUT

Progress to what and from where? , . .
The European talks of progress, because by an
ingenious application of some scientific ac
quirements he has established a society which
has mistaken comfort for civilization.1

Introduction
In the preceding section of this study an attempt was made to
explore the thought of some scholars who, since the beginning of
the Industrial Revolution, were intent on exploring the signifi
cance of the matter/energy input into the economic system.

Such

scientists attempted not only to analyze the vital dependence upon
the ultimate means (the natural resources of the globe) by any socio
economic system, but also what a society could do to minimize waste
and destruction of such resources.
In this section I shall focus upon the aggregate output of the
economic system.

More specifically, I shall attempt a historical

review of scientists who have assessed the value of the aggregate
output of the economic system by measuring its worth against some
more Ultimate End of mankind.

Herman Daly has discussed the concept

of the Ultimate End and its importance in the following manner:
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Is the nature of the Ultimate End such that,
beyond some point, further accumulation of physical
artifacts is useless or even harmful? Are some of
the intermediate ends now being served, and those newly
proposed, really undesirable, or less than worthwhile,
in the light of the Ultimate End? Could it be that one
of our wants is to be free of the tyranny of infinite
wants?
The ultimate benefit or Ultimate End is less
definable than the ultimate means. Perhaps, as a
minimum (emphasis is in the original) definition, it
could be considered as the survival and continuation of
the evolving life process through which God has bestowed
upon us the gift of conscious life. I hasten to add
that this minimum definition begs some important
questions . . .
Even though it is difficult to give a satisfactory
definition of the Ultimate End, we are forced to choose
among competing intermediate ends. The ranking of
intermediate ends into a list of priorities logically
implies seme ordering principle, some concept, however
vague, of the Ultimate End, with reference to which
intermediate ends are ordered. Some of these ends
cannot be served by aggregate growth. In fact,^produc
tion and consumption often just get in the way.**
In his analysis Daly shows that the economic profession, in
performing its rightful task of efficiently allocating scarce inter
mediate means among an array of competing intermediate wants, has
erroneously assumed that these intermediate means and legitimate
intermediate wants were infinite in quantity and number.

It should

be made clear that it is not suggested that economics cover as its
formal object the whole spectrum of reality from ultimate means to
the Ultimate End.

Such a suggestion would indicate that there was

only one all-encompassing science.

What it does suggest, however,

is that the science of economics has to be aware of the findings and
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conclusions of its neighboring sciences which impinge and over
lap upon its subject matter if it wants to be consistent with other
branches of knowledge.

Though economics is an autonomous science,

this autonomy does not give it the right to determine the content
of the concepts which it necessarily receives from other disciplines.
Such an arrogant procedure would cause a break in the continuum of
knowledge which would not only be the source of much confusion, but
also be a sure way to introduce erroneous concepts into the very
fundamental definitions of one's science.

What seems to have hap

pened historically is that economics has legitimately borrowed the
definition of these border concepts--intermediate means and ends-from its neighboring disciplines, but has not kept 14) with the more
recent investigations of these neighboring disciplines.
As the Industrial Revolution has progressed, society has
changed from an age of real penury and absolute scarcity in inter
mediate ends— food, lodging, clothing--but one of an absolute abun
dance in natural resources--forests, clean air, land, space— to an
age of abundance and surplus in intermediate ends but one of scarcity
and shortages in natural resources; consequently, the content of
these border concepts of economics has changed drastically in the
real order of events.

Yet the economics profession continues to act

and think as if nothing had changed in the last 250 years.

The

reason for this obstinacy of the economic profession in maintaining
its original perception of these border concepts in the face of all
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evidence to the contrary is not precisely known but several reasons
have been advanced.

First, the resistance to change itself.

Second,

the traditional concepts with their infinite substitutability of both
intermediate means one for another and infinite wants one for
another, the mathematical calculus can be used to full advantage.
Third, if one allows an Ultimate End (summum bonum) to determine
the priority of intermediate wants, one is drawn into the vagueness
of philosophy.

If the economics profession allows this, much of

its precision and rigor will be lost, and precision and rigor are
highly valued in the m o d e m "scientific” world.

Such a change in

the content of its most fundamental building-block concepts would
force the economics profession to admit that it is not similar to
the physical sciences with their unchanging demonstrable laws and,
in our culture, this means giving up the appearance of being truly
scientific.

As R. G. Hawtrey describes the issue:

''Economists are

proud to claim that theirs in the most exact branch of social science.
The intrusion into it of the vexed question of ethics, with the vast
amorphous phantoms of metaphysics looming in the background, would
soon make an end to that claim."^

For, as it stands now, with all

effective desires being given equal weight, one can avoid further
normative judgments.

It should, however, be pointed out that giving

all effective desires equal weight is a stupendous normative judgment
in itself.

Ignoring this problem will not make it go away.

In this

case, economists have apparently decided to just follow the line of
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least resistance.

This can be shown by asking an economist what

is it that determines the economic preferences or goals of an
individual.

The orthodox economist answers that such preferences

and goals are given, that is, subject only to and determined by the
will of the individual.

This positivistic and utilitarian response

of the economists has had serious consequences, not only for eco
nomic theory, but also for society in general.^
One obvious result of such a response for economic theory has
been that economists have constrained their range of analysis by
vigorously excluding all questions of value concerning the prefer
ences of the consumers.

John Whippen and Stephen Renas have remarked,

"As positivism became entrenched as a leading methodological position,
it led to the closure of much of economic thought . . .

By taking as

given the values and goals of Western society from the time of Adam
Smith onward, positive economists assumed them to be non-problematic.
As non-problematic, these values were not subject to examination."^
Ben B. Seligman is even more telling in his indictment of
positivistic economics:
Overconcem with economy of thought has too
led to the use of mental bulldozers, leaving the
lectual landscape quite barren. To remove a few
that obscured their view, positivists frequently
entire forests.^

often
intel
trees
leveled

The latter (/the positivistic economist) eschews any
identification with goals, asserting that analysis can
only elucidate the implications of his model and that he
must pursue these implications wherever they may go. He
is not concerned with teleology or norms . . . Yet, he
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may be charged with the patent fact that there are
specific norms hidden in his positivist economics for
when he speaks of the relationships between ends and means
he is establishing perforce certain boundaries of be
havior patterns.7
Positivism has abolished the desire to engage in
open and free speculation about the nature of man and
the universe.®
John Kenneth Galbraith has parodied this closure of economic thought
in his usual delightful manner:
The first step (in making economics "scientific")
was to divorce economics from any judgment on the goods
with which it was concerned. Any notion of necessary
versus unnecessary or important as against unimportant
goods was rigorously excluded from the subject . . .
Nothing is so thoroughly drilled into the minds of the
young as the need for this restraint. Nothing in
economics so quickly marks an individual as incom
petently trained as a disposition to remark on the
legitimacy of the desire for more food and the
frivolity of the desire for a more elaborate auto
mobile.
After making this indictment against the conventional wisdom
of economic theory, Galbraith follows his mentor Veblen who made
the very same point with his phrase "conspicuous consumption
and argues that, since the consumers cannot achieve what is best
for society in their own private spending binges, the affluent
society should allow some other organized body to make the choices
of what should be produced, allocated and consumed in our society.
Veblen seemed to prefer an organization of engineers to make these
crucial decisions, somewhat akin to the technocratic solution; while
Galbraith favored more public sector goods and services as could
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only be obtained by increased government intervention.
There is, however, another more ancient and more radical
tradition besides that of Veblen and Galbraith which questions the
economist's uncritical conmitment to maximizing the individual's
subjective consumption preferences as the final goal or end of an
economy.

This is the very ancient tradition which traces its origin

back to Greek philosophers and to the beginnings of the JudaeoChristian civilization.

It is more radical than the Veblen-Galbraith

critique because it questions the very desirability of any increase
in gross national product. Veblen and Galbraith question more the
composition and the manner in which the gross national product is
consumed rather than the amount of gross national product.

This

Greco-Judaeo-Christian tradition emphasizes that a critical evalua
tion of the consumption of economic products is just as important
as increased productivity and efficient allocation of scarce means.
This tradition holds that the value of economic goods and services
are determined by the extent that they contribute to the achievement
of some final goal (the summum bonum) of man, and which final goal
is conceived as something beyond just the satisfaction of increasing
one's economic productivity and consumption.

In such a tradition,

it is not only possible but, indeed, quite likely that the increased
satisfaction of consumer's subjective preferences could do more harm
than good.

G. K. Chesterton has remarked,

And as long as Mr. Mark Starr and others continue
to tell the people that all the various gadgets foisted
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upon us by capitalists to make profits are gifts of the
Almighty for enabling us to lead fuller, larger, nobler,
higher, wider, deeper, etc., lives so long will the people
remain in utter darkness.^
In such a teleological vision, the value of economic "goods"
is determined by a final goal, and the final goal is determined by
a study of man's nature.

This brings us once again to the Socratic

question of "What is man?."

Along with other Greek philosophers,

Aristotle probed deeply into the question of what use of material
possessions makes for harmony and happiness in man's life.
Perhaps the Latin ideal of "contemplatio in actione" which
using a certain amount of poetic license I have translated as "in
the wise use of possessions man reflects the harmony of divine
reality" best describes Aristotle's goal.

The possession of certain

economic goods and services were necessary but not sufficient ele
ments in the search for the good life.

Aristotle noted that "a

good man may make the best even of poverty and disease, and the
other ills of life; but he can only attain happiness under the
opposite conditions. . . This makes men fancy that external goods
are the cause of happiness, yet we might as well say that brilliant
performance on the lyre was to be attributed to the instrument
and not to the skill of the performer."

12

It was the wisdom shown in the use of a moderate and har
monious amount of material possessions, rather than the maximum
accumulation of such possessions that constituted the essence of
the good life.

In this sense Aristotle differs from m o d e m econo-
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mists who view

the accumulation of material possessions as the end

of both the individual and nation.

Barry Gordon has described

Aristotle's thought about material possessions in the following
manner:
In Aristotle's view, economics is not the competing
technology it has tended to become in the hands of many of
its twentieth century practitioners. Much of the engi
neering- style literature which pervades m o d e m professional
journals and monographs in the field would seem pointless
to him. This pointlessness stems, given his perspective,
from the dissociation of that literature from explicit
consideration of what he takes to be the central question
of human thought and action, the nature of the happy life

It is pointless then to investigate means of increasing
the conmunity's command over the use of resources while
dissociating the investigator from analytical involvement
in the question of how that enhanced command might result
in a genuine improvement of quality of life for the
comnunity.1*
Aristotle taught that the art of economy consisted in using
economic possessions moderately and wisely in improving one's self
toward a higher order of wisdom and virtue.

There are two other

basic attitudes one might take concerning economic possessions.
One can take an ascetic position and view such output as a neces
sary evil to be renounced as far as possible in one's pursuit of
inmaterial ideals.

On the other hand, one can take a more modern

position and have as one's primary goal the constrained maximisa
tion of such economic goods and services.

These three approaches

to economic possessions might be labeled and categorized as follows:
1) "Ascetism" in which worldly or material possessions are viewed
as necessary evils and thus renounced as far as possible.
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2) "Materialism" in which the object of society is to produce and
consume as large a quantity of economic goods and services as is
economically efficient.

The materialism referred to here is not

intellectual and philosophical but practical (concern for comfort,
living standards, per capita GNP).

3) "Contingentism" in which

economic goods and services are used to the extent that some more
final goal based upon man*s nature would dictate.
It is with hesitation that one coins such an awkward label as
"contingentism" for this third way of evaluating economic posses
sions.

I have thought of such names as "Moderation," "Neutrality,"

or "Functionalism," but have rejected them all for one reason or
another; "moderation" and "neutrality" because although they dis
tinctly imply that an inordinate amount of economic possessions is
not to be pursued above all else, such names do not make it clear
that use of such goods is to be determined by another more final
goal.

The word "Functionalism" is suggested by R. H. Tawney in

The Acquisitive Society, but he uses it with a somewhat different
though related meaning.

It is indicative of our age that there does

not exist an apt word or phrase which would label clearly that
philosophy of life that would look upon economic possessions as
neutral objects whose total value is completely contingent upon
their relationship to some more final or higher goal.

This same

indictment of m o d e m society can be made when one reflects that
Ruskin's name for material possessions which harm an individual or
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society, "illth" in opposition to wealth, has never caught on.
The Greek philosophers were quite aware of this distinction be
tween the accumulation of wealth for its own sake and the production
and consumption of wealth, the proper use of which would be de
termined by some Ultimate End of man.

Aristotle used the term

"chrematistics" for that study which sought to maximize wealth for
its own sake, while economy was that science which explored the
harmonious and natural use of economic possessions.

Needless to

say, he thought that chrematistics was inferior in its substance
to that of economics.
However, it seems that our more m o d e m age cannot even imagine
material possessions being anything except good, hence our word
for the product of our economic system, economic "goods."

Our

usage of the word "goods" is a materialistic narrowing of a dis
tinctively ethical word, still surviving in its usage as a "good
life."

Such usage is an excellent example of how one's terminology

can affect one's analysis.

Since we somewhat arbitrarily label

the result of production "goods," how can one argue against such
production?
Despite this inherent bias in the very terminology and the very
marrow of our society, there have been some social scientists in
the last two hundred years to critically question the value of
ever-increasing economic possessions for individuals and society.
It will be the object of this chapter to discuss some of the mani-
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festations of this third way of contingentism which are found
in the history of modem economic thought.
There were two criteria used in the selection of scholars for
inclusion into this chapter.

First, such scholars either had to

be acknowledged economists (Sismondi, Hobson and Tawney) or, if
non-economists, they had to attempt to discuss the value of economic
output in a theoretical and reasonably complete analytic manner
(Ruskin and Chesterton).

Second, they had to subject economic

output to an humane assessment.

And, as noted and discussed above

in the introduction, the definition of humanism is one that is de
rived from the Greco-Judaeo-Christian tradition.*^
But before we jump from the ancient Greek civilization of
Aristotle to the m o d e m conmercial and industrial age, a few
conments seem in order on the intervening centuries. 15 Though one
can find particular statements which could be used to justify all
three of the above mentioned approaches to material possessions,
it is safe to say that the third approach of contingentism was
perceived to be the ideal by the leading Judaeo-Christian philisophers in these intervening centuries.

R. H. Tawney writes:

The most fundamental difference between medieval
and m o d e m economic thought consists in the fact that,
whereas the latter normally refers to economic expediency,
however it may be interpreted, for the justification of
any particular action, policy or system of organization,
the former starts from the position that there is a moral
authority to which considerations of economic expediency
must be referred.16
What has, however, been modified is the final goal itself.
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For Aristotle the final goal was to improve man's mind and will
or, in other words, wisdom and virtue.

This was a goal that man

kind would have to pursue unaided and alone.

In the Judaeo-Christian

civilization, this pursuit of the final goal is given a definite
direction.

Using the writings of the Old and New Testament of the

Bible as their foundation, the medieval philosophers and theologians
were able to construct a philosophy of life that was more detailed
and definitive than was that of Aristotle in pointing out what was
the final goal of mankind and how the production and consumption
of economic possessions should be used in the pursuit of that goal.
This teleological view of economic possessions is made quite
clear in the thought of Thomas Aquinas^

and in a very precise

statement on the subject in the basic writings of Ignatius of
Loyola, the Spanish founder of the Jesuits, written toward the end
of the medieval ages.
Man was created to praise, reverence, and serve
God Our Lord, and by this means to save his soul.
And the other things on the face of the earth were
created for man's sake, and in order to aid him in the
prosecution of the end for which he was created.
Whence it follows that man ought to make use of
them just so far as they help him to attain his end, and
that he ought to withdraw himself from them just so far
as they'hinder him.18
Anyone investigating the history of that idea which I have
labeled contingentism, that is, viewing economic production in a
neutral light and asking for what, in economic writings from the
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time of Adam Smith onward is likely to experience much frustration.
The source of such frustration is easily found and is the following.
It should be as obvious as it can possibly be that before a reasonably
intelligent being or society begins an endeavor, such a society
would determine the overall usefulness or worth of the project
and, only after such an evaluation has been finished, would he at
tempt to efficiently perform the task.

And, if by some chance, the

performance of the task came to be substantially more difficult
than it had initially been thought would be the case, then the
intelligent society would once again review the whole project
to its overall worth to human happiness.

e ls

It is the essence of in

sanity to pursue a task without ever looking at the overall picture.
Yet such an insanity seems to be the lot of m o d e m commercial
civilisation.

R. H. Tawney has characterized our society in the

following manner:

f,It is a commonplace that the characteristic

virtue of Englishmen is their power of sustained practical activity,
and their characteristic vice a reluctance to test the quality of
that activity by reference to principles.”

19

Tawney then goes on

to compare our society to a squirrel energetically and efficiently
but futilely running in place in a revolving cage.

Some of the

same ideas must have been going through the mind of J. R. Hicks
when he wrote that "one cannot repress the thought that perhaps
the whole Industrial Revolution of the last 200 years has been
nothing else but a vast secular boom, largely induced by the
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unparalleled rise in population.

If this is so, it would help to

explain why, as the wisest hold, it has been such a disappointing
episode in human history."^0
Since it is easy to prove that in times of real penury, increased
material production is a real source of benefit to society, m o d e m
conventional economic theorists have then extrapolated and assumed
that ever more is better.

This supposition is the same as saying

that although a would-be violinist cannot make music without a
violin, all that is necessary for ever better music is an ever
larger violin.
Thus the critical social scientist seeking to explore recent
history of economic thought that he might be aided in evaluating
the overall usefulness of increased economic productivity, will
soon experience a sense of frustration because of the lack of
writings on this subject.

When one thinks of all the essays, studies

and books written by economists on rather arcane and trivial re
finements of economic theory, and how little is written on the worth
of all this economic productivity in achieving the final goal of
mankind, a sense of defeat can easily set in.

"Unhappy man that

I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"21
Yet there were some economists who did attempt to maintain
a critical stance in the face of the dominant economic theory.

The

first of these was the Swiss economist, J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi.
It is necessary to remember that Sismondi was writing in a time of
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transition from the craft system to the factory system, and that
his criticism will be directed against the excesses that ordi
narily occur in such a transition period,

Sismondi was well

equipped for his role as a critic of the excesses of industrialism
as he was one of the few economists of his generation who had the
historical ability and acumen to observe the transitory nature of
his era.
We are, and this point cannot be sufficiently
stressed, in an altogether new state of society, of
which we have absolutely no experience. We tend to
divorce completely all sorts of ownership from all
sorts of work, to break down all relationships between
man and master, to deprive the former of all associa
tions in the profits of the latter.
In a very early age of industrialism Sismondi was attenpting to
orientate the economics profession from the abstractions of eco
nomic man that would ultimately be its hallmark.

He wanted economics

to describe and analyze a changing economic scene and to hold fast
to the ancient hard-earned truths about man.

Instead economists

would eventually come to declare that their concepts and abstrac
tions were what were permanent, and that the nature of man was what
was unknowable and fleeting.

J. C. L. Simonde de Sismondi
More than one historian of economic theory has pointed out
that the contributions of J. C. L. Simondi de Sismondi have been
unjustly ignored by the economics profession.

Thomas Sowell has
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shown that Sismondi made five major discoveries in economic theory
which the economics profession overlooked and then had to redis
cover.^

diaries Gide and Charles Rist have suggested that Sismondi

should be considered the real founder of the school which has since
become known as economie sociale in France and Sozialpolitik in
Germany, and, if not the founder, at least a precursor of the
Historical School.^

Elie Halevy has pointed out that Sismondi

was the first writer to give expression to the belief that industrial
society tends to separate into two absolutely distinct classes-those who work and those who possess--which distinction was to play
such an important role in the Marxian system. ^
In this study I want to investigate another contribution of
Sismondi that has been overlooked and which consequently had to
be rediscovered.

This is Sismondi's role as a moral and humane

critic of the classical economic theory. ^

This role was unknown,

or at least unacknowledged, by such English critics as Carlyle,
Ruskin, Hobson and Tawney.

William Grampp also overlooks his role

in the otherwise quite perceptive study, "Classical Economics and
Its Moral Critics."
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James Sherburne is more knowledgeable when

he writes:
Ruskin*s ethical and Romantic bias places him closer
to Simonde de Sismondi (1773-1842) than to any other eco
nomist critical of the abstraction of the classical school.
Sismondi is best known today for his vast histories of Italy
and France. Nonetheless, his Nouveaux principes d *economie
politique (1910) is a landmark in radical economic criticism.
. . . Sismondi rejects the assumption of economic man and
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urges the study of real producers and consumers. He
differs from other advocates of an empirical approach
in the extent of his ethical concern. For him as for
Rnskin, the attack on method is a way of injecting
ethics into economic analysis. Unlike Ruskin, Sismondi
retains a strong interest in making economics more
accurate as a science. Ruskin’s debt to the Swiss
scholar is unknown. Although he was familiar with
Sismondi's history of the Italian republics, it is
difficult to determine whether he had read Nbuveaux
principes.28
How Sismondi came to this role of moral critic is an inter
esting story and well worth a digression at this point.

J. C. L.

Simonde de Sismondi was b o m into a somewhat impoverished but
aristocratic family in Geneva in 1773.

In 1793 his family was

forced to flee to England where Sismondi thoroughly examined the
English industrial system and socio-politico-econimic institutions.
The young Sismondi learned to love England as a kind of second
country and to adopt the principles of political and economic
liberalism.

After eighteen months in England, his family returned

to Geneva and then on to northern Italy where Sismondi published his
first work on the agriculture of Tuscany (Tableau de 1 ’agriculture
en Toscane).

In 1803 he published a two-volume treatise, De la

richesse comnerciale, ou principes d'economie politique appliques,
a la legislation du commerce which was chiefly, but not entirely,
an attempt to expound and popularize the ideas of Adam Smith through
out the French-speaking world . ^

This book was much noticed at

the time for Jean Baptiste Say's study had not yet been published,
and it met a need in French-speaking countries.

Sismondi was offered
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the chair of political economy at the University of Wilna in
Poland, but he refused the offer that he might pursue his other
academic profession, that of an historian.

For the next twelve

years of his life he concentrated on writing the monumental
sixteen-volume history of the Italian republic which established
for him a solid and lasting reputation as a historian.

During

the same time he also published a two-volume work on the literature
of southern Europe.

After 18Q3, the year when he published his

work on economic theory popularizing Adam Smith, he had read very
little in economics.

In 1815, however, he was asked to write the

article on policical economy for the Edinburgh Encyclopedia, and
his study of economics was resumed.

Upon a re-examination of the

economic theory, Sismondi discovered that his judgment of classical
economy theory had changed, and he was now led to condemn what
formerly he had praised.

Beneath the appearance of England's

prosperity and political freedom he discerned an economic system,
the true name of which was not liberty but servitude.
As a consequence of his revision in thought Sismondi published
a two-volume treatise, Nouveau principes d 1Economie politique ou
de la Richesse dans ses rapports avec la Population, in 1819, which
he re-edited in 1827 with important additions.

Though this study

does not seem to have been widely read, it was immediately attacked
in the press by the classical economic school.

McCulloch inserted

a six-page digression condemning Sismondi's thought in an article
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for the Edinburgh Review. ^

In a private correspondence to David

Ricardo, McCulloch mentioned that "Sismondi is too much of a
sentimentalist to make a good political economist."^
Undoubtedly one of the themes in the Nouveaux principes which
made McCulloch view Sismondi as being "sentimental" was his teleological definition of wealth.

For Sismondi explicitly rejected

that definition of wealth as it was defined in the following pas
sage by a leading orthodox economist:
To what extent and under what circumstances the
possession of wealth is, on the whole, beneficial or
injurious to its possessor, or to the society of which
he is a member; what distribution of wealth is most
desirable in each different state of society; and what
are the means by which any given country can facilitate
such a distribution?--all these are questions of great
interest and difficulty, but no longer form part of
the science of political economy . . . The subject
treated by political economy is not happiness but
wealth.*^2
What was Sismondi's view of wealth?

Why did his view provoke

the wrath of the leading economists of his day?

In beginning his

study Sismondi reviewed the definitions of the ancient Greek
philosophers.
But at least they (the
of the fact that wealth had
contributed to the national
because their treatment was
of view was oftentimes more

Greeks) never lost sight
no other worth than what it
happiness; and precisely
less abstract, their point
just than ours.33

In both his Nouveaux principes and his later Etudes sur l'Economie
politique Sismondi is insistent throughout on the distinction which
he obtained from Aristotle between the science of "chrematistics"
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which treats with the accumulation of monetary wealth or items of
exchange value for their own sake, and political economy which
treats of the role that economic production and consumption should
play in achieving the final goal of society.

He states his posi

tion in the following two quotations:
When one takes the increase of economic goods as the
end of society, one necessarily sacrifices the end for
the means. One obtains more of production, but such pro
duction is paid for dearly by the misery of the masses.34
. . . the chrematistic science, or the study of the
means of increasing wealth, in setting aside the purpose
of this wealth, is a false s c i e n c e . 35
Since Sismondi disagreed with the conventional economic theo
rists of his day in his perception of the ultimate end of the
economy, it is not surprising that he came to different policy
conclusions.

During the era that Sismondi was writing the main

debate raging within the economics profession was what came to be
known as the general glut controversy.^
Say's law and the possibility of general

This controversy over
causing periodical

economic crises reached a peak of intensity and volume of output
in the 1820's, involving every major economist of the period, and
which was unrivaled until the Keynesian controversy of the mid
twentieth century.

With the exception of Malthus, according to

the classical writers, the general growth of production presented
no inconvenience, thanks to the fortunate spontaneous mechanism of
the market which inmediately corrected the errors of the entre
preneur if he in any way over-estimated the quantity demanded.
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Sismondi’s teleological approach to the production and consumption
of economic wealth led him to reject this optimistic conclusion.
Among those opposed to this optimistic faith in the automatic
equilibriating mechanism of the market, Sismondi alone thought
that the cause of such crises might be over-production as well as
underconsumption.

Although Sismondi is frequently cited as being

one of the founders of the theory that underconsumption was the
main cause of the recurring economic crises,^ it would be much
more precise to say that he viewed overproduction as the cause of
the economic crises.

This distinction between underconsumption

and overproduction is important to the analysis of Sismondi.
If one views economic productivity to be the Ultimate End as,
according to Sismondi, did the dominant "chrematistic" economic
theorists of his day then, of course, the cause of all economic
depressions is lack of consumption.

It would be a contradiction

in terms to say that there was too much production and, therefore,
underconsumption must be the cause of such economic depressions.
Such a view implies that the solution to such crises is found in
increasing the quantity of consumption or, in other words, increasing
the effective demand.

In all cases it is better to modify consump

tion upward than to reduce production downward.

And to compound

this attitude, the classical economist added that the way to increase
consumption was to increase production.

"It is not a consequence

of production being too much increased.

Increase it more."

TO
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Implicit in such a reconroendation is the normative position that
more is always better and that the solution to such economic depres
sions is not to thoroughly investigate the society that suffers
from the crisis, but to resolve all such macro-economic recessions
and depressions by somehow increasing effective demand.
however, was not content with such an analysis.
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Sismondi,

If one acknow

ledges a more final goal than production and consumption, then
the cause of economic crises could be either overproduction, under
consumption or, as more likely in those early days of the Industrial
Revolution, some combination of both, and it is the task of the
political economist to investigate the matter more thoroughly by
exploring the effect of economic production and consumption upon
the welfare of mankind.

This was a task that Sismondi attempted

in his later economic writings.
Such an investigation will not use the same type of analysis
as the classical economists which Sismondi criticized for being
too abstract.

For instance, the abstract economic theory of

Ricardo was attacked by Sismondi, not because it reasons from the
general to the particular, but because the generalizations are not
based on the actual observations of particular men and also because
such generalizations do not take into account that manls consumption
is designed to fulfill a higher goal.

Sismondi comments that:

. . . it is a natural habit of the human mind to seek
to reduce all its operations to the simplest formula, to
generalize all its rules, and to accomplish this uniform
procedure whenever it can to avoid more complicated pro-
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cedures. That habit, which tends to simplify every
thing, to classify everything, to generalize everything,
is no doubt the most essential cause of the progress of
various sciences. It is not necessary, however, to abandon
one's self to it in an unreflecting manner.40
The science in their hands is so speculative, that
it seems to be detached from all practice. It was be
lieved at first that in extricating the theory from all
the accessory circumstances, one ought to render it
clearer and easier to seize, but the opposite is attained.
The new English economists are quite obscure and can be
understood only with gTeat effort because our mind is
opposed to admitting the abstractions demanded of us.
This repugnance is in itself a warning that we are turning
away from the truth, when in moral science, where everything
is connected, we endeavor to isolate a principle and to see
nothing but that principle.^1
Sismondi begins his analysis by comparing the economic society
in which the majority worked for themselves as craftsmen and trades
men with the industrial society in which most laborers worked for
others,

(It was Sismondi who coined the word proletariat).

Since

the craftsman's reward was the fruits of his own labor, and the
amount of this reward was determined by the natural order of things,
he would stop producing when he had reached the point that he would
prefer to enjoy the leisure and the fruits of his labor,

Sismondi

remarked:
For the laborer who works for himself there is a
point reached in the accumulation of wealth beyond which
it would appear as folly to accumulate still more, since
such a laborer would not be able to increase his consump
tion in a proportional amount. But the needs of the
laborer who works in an industrial society appears to be
infinite. No matter how many riches he has massed, there
is no point at which he will say: "This is enough."
. . . Moreover this is a serious error into which
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have fallen most of the m o d e m economists that they
think that the act of consumption is unlimited and
always ready to devour an infinite quantity of pro
duction. They do not cease from encouraging the
nations to produce, to invent new machines, to im
prove their work so that the quantity of production
achieved in the year will always surpass that of
the preceding year: they are very distressed when they
see the number of unproductive workers to multiply,
they would point out the idle for the indignant
public, and in a nation where the power of the worker
has been increased by a hundredfold, they want that
everyone should work in order to l i v e . 42
How does it happen that the industrial laborer works beyond
that point which he would in a more natural system?

Sismondi notes

that the workers were getting a relatively small share of the
output due to the institutional economic system of that early
industrial era.

Because of these low wages, the worker and his

family had to work long hours in order to obtain the necessities
of life.

Sismondi questions whether the marginally increased out

put is worth the marginal extra hours of work.
If all'les pompons de la richesse1 were offered to
the manual worker as a recompense for his assiduous tra
vail of twelve and fourteen hours a day, as many do today,
there is not one of these workers who would not choose
less luxury and more of leisure, less of frivolous orna
ments and more of liberty. Such would be the choice of
the entire society, if only there was more equality in
our society. Every craftsman who profits the total amount
of his own industry, when he compares the almost inperceptible
pleasure that he would receive from a slightly finer suit of
clothes with the additional work that such a suit of
clothes entails, would not wish to pay this price. The
luxury is not possible except when it is paid for by the
work of others. Assiduous and constant labor is able to
be procured, not for the sake of frivoloties, but only to
gain the necessities of life.4?3
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For Sismondi, overproduction is when workers strain to pro
duce more than they would in a system in which they received a
larger share of the fruits of the productive process.

Because

the owners reaped where the laborers worked, the decision to expand
production was made by those who profited from such production
rather than by those who bore the real cost of labor that such
expanded production necessarily entails.

Sismondi wrote about the

England of the early days of the Industrial Revolution with its
nascent factory system.

New technology and organization of large

scale production increasingly polarized society into a minority
of possessing capitalists and a majority of dispossessed workers.^
It is important to note that in this critical period of transition
Sismondi was unwilling to glorify economic production for its own
sake as other economists were able to do because of their absolute
faith in the salvific efficacy of Say's Law which declared that
since supply created its own demand, an increase in production was
a sign of increased demand for such production.

Sismondi instead

asked a more fundamental question:
What, then, is the object of human society? Is it
to dazzle the eye with an iiimense production of useful
and elegant things; to daunt the senses with the control
which man exercises over nature, and with the precision
or the speed with which a human work is executed by
lifeless beings? Is it to cover the sea with vessels
and the earth with railways which distribute in all
directions the products of an ever increasing industry?
. . . If such is the case, we have undoubtedly made
immense progress as compared with our ancestors; we are
rich in inventions, rich in activities, rich in scien
tific powers, rich in merchandise everywhere; for every

92

nation has produced not only for itself but also for
its neighbors. But, if the aim which society ought
to accept, in encouraging labor and protecting
the fruits of the labor of man, fruits which we call
wealth,--if these fruits, which consist of moral and
intellectual goods as well as material goods, should
be the means of improvement as well as of enjoyment,
are we sure that we are approaching our goal?4^
Sismondi's observation of the industrial system reminded him
of the story of Gandalin.
In the time of enchantment, Gandalin, who lodged
a sorcerer in his home, noticed that every morning the
sorcerer would take a broom-handle and, saying a few
magic words on it, he made out of it a water-carrier,
who at once would get for him as many pails of water
as he desired. One morning Gandalin hid himself behind
a door and listened with all his might to overhear the
magic words which the sorcerer pronounced for his en
chantment. He, however, did not hear what the sorcerer
said next to undo it. As soon as the sorcerer went
away, Gandalin repeated the experiment; he took the
broom handle, pronounced the mysterious words and the
broom water carrier went forward to the river and
returned with water, and then again went forward and
came back with it, thus again and again; Gandalin's
reservoir was already full and the water flooded the
room, "It's enough!" cried he, "Stop!" But the machineman neither saw nor heard; insensible and indefatigable,
he would have brought all the water from the river.
Gandalin, in his despair, took an axe and hit his carrier
with repeated blows. Then he saw the fragments of the
broom, upon falling on the ground, immediately get up
and reassume the magic form and run to the river.
Instead of the carrier, he had now four, eight, sixteen;
the more that he struck down the machine-men, the more
machine-men got up to do his work in spite of him. The
entire river would have passed into his home, if the
sorcerer had not fortunately come back and destroyed
his enchantment
Sismondi comments then that
. . . the water, however, is a good thing. Water,
just as much as the work, just as much as the capital, is
necessary for life. But one is able to have too much, even
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of the best things of life . . . Each new application
of science and the useful arts, similar to the axe of
Gandalin knocking down the machine-man which the magic
words had created, only to find soon two, four, eight,
sixteen in its place; so the productivity continues
to increase with a rapidity without measure. Has not
the moment come, or at least is not the moment able to
come, when one should say: This is too much?
According to the theory which is professed today
in all the schools of political economy, this moment
has not yet come, and it is never going to c o m e . 46
The story of Gandalin epitomizes Sismondi's view of his so
ciety.

It was increasing economic production with a rapidity

without measure but for what?

His historical studies had taught

Sismondi that there was more to a superior civilization than just
increased material production.
well do more harm than good.

Such increased productivity could
As Sismondi grew older, he grew more

pessimistic about his society that would not reduce its frenetic
activity and orientate its economic production and consumption
by some final goal.

On September 19, 1834, he wrote in his private

journal:
I read in the Westminster Review a striking article
on civilization, in which the author points out many of
the bad effects of the present system, which hitherto I
have been almost the only one to remark. There is much
ability in this article, but it inspires one with a
melancholy feeling, because the evils are so serious and
one does not see the remedies; the too much of everything
is the evil of the d a y . 4 7
(Underlining is in the original).
Before we conclude with Sismondi, it is interesting to point
out that he could be considered a precursor for another socio
economic ideal which has recently gained some attention.

Although
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E. F. Schumacher never mentioned Sismondi in his Small Is Beautiful:
Economics as if People Mattered, it would be possible to gather
together a selection of some of Sismondi's writings and label them
with that same title.

In twin articles--"On Landed Property" and

"On the Condition of the Work People in Manufactories"--published
by the Revue mensuelle d'Economie politique in 1834 Sismondi criti
cized the stress on large-scale fanning and concentration of eco
nomic power which was being advocated by both the theoretic commu
nists of his day, the Saint Simonians, and the classical economists.
In the agricultural sector Sismondi observed the following:
The Saint Simonians, and all those who wish to
regenerate society by the co-operation system, fall
into a great absurdity, when they wish to give by turns
to the same men the enjoyment of luxury, and the often
rude, sometimes disgusting labours of poverty. He who
has been required in the morning to spread manure on
the common field, will care little for a ride in a
carriage at noon, or for an evening ball in velvet and
lace. But the chrematistics fall into an absurdity of
much the same kind, when they say, 'The more you produce,
the more enjoyment will there be for all." . . . Where
is the use of offering to the nation more sources of
enjoyment, if you are to destroy those who are to bene
fit by them?48
The chrematistic school has represented us as an
eminent progress in agriculture, the power acquired of
doing the same work with a continually decreasing number
of hands; this progress has been pushed very far in
England, where they have succeeded in driving more than
half the nation out of the fields into the towns. The
economist of men, not of wealth, cannot behold such
progress without extreme sorrow.49
And in his study of the urban industrial scene Sismondi commented:
It is in the midst of these trades, exercised by the
freeman of towns, which formerly did all the industrial work
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in all nations, that manufactories have arisen. The
masters of manufactories in towns hold the same place
in the industry of towns that great landowners do in
the country. Like them, to make their own great
fortunes, they must cause the disappearance of one
or two hundred small independent properties: like
them they afterwards, by agreeing together, reduce all
the men who work under them to a state approaching to
servitude; . . . Industrialism, or the substitution
of one great workshop for many small ones in the common
arts, has been considered to be one of the benefits of
civilization, in consequence of many illusions.SO
Is it not evident, that instead of making a virtue
of industrialism, that is, of the effort which all are
making to glut the markets still more, society and
government should endeavor to give another direction
to hisnan activity, so that, as machines will henceforth
do the work of men, men should no longer do the work of
machines.
In general, this extolling of the societal advantages of
small proprietorships and what today would be known as "inter
mediate technology" fell on deaf ears.

Conventional orthodox

economical theory was not preapred to give a hearing to, much less
to investigate, the effects of concentration of economic power on
society.

The classical economics with its praise of free competi

tion and its fundamental goal of an ever-increasing production had
no place for a theory which questioned its very premises.

Sismondi's

questioning of economic concentration out of humane considerations
was not even worthy of a reply by the orthodox economic profession.
It is interesting to note that the only formal reply to this position
favoring decentralization of economic power through intermediate
technology was by Lenin in 1893 in a treatise entitled "A Characteri
zation of Economic Romanticism:

Sismondi and Our Native Sismondists.
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Lenin thought that "Sismondi occupies a special place in the history
of political economy, in that he stands off the track of the main
trends, that he is an ardent advocate of small production and
opposes the advocates and ideologists of large scale enterprise.
For Lenin as for Ma r x , ^ however, Sismondi was only worthy of scorn
because he did not realize that the facts of history in their
inevitable march toward the centralized accumulation of monopoly
capitalism and thence to Communism were showing up his errors.
Hence it was that the ideas of Sismondi, characterized as
"sentimental" by the orthodox economists and scorned as hopelessly
romantic by the Marxists, were, for the most part, totally neglected.^
Even today m o d e m economists find it difficult to appreciate
his analysis, just as he found it difficult to understand the
position of the political economists of his day.

"The new English

economists are quire obscure and can be understood only with great
effort because our mind is opposed to admitting the abstractions
demanded of us.

This repugnance is in itself a warning that we

are turning away from the truth, when in the social sciences, where
everything is connected, we endeavor to isolate a principle and
to see nothing but that

p r i n c i p l e ,

M o d e m economists simply

do not agree with Sismondi that l ’economie politique n'est elle
pas une science de calcul, mais une science moral.

Elle egare

quand on croit se guider par des nombres; elle ne meme au but que
quand on apprecie les sentiments, les besoins et les passions des
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honmes."56
It is easy to find the reason for this difference in outlook.
As both Grampp and Sherburne have noted in their discussion of
the moral critics of orthodox economic theories, it is a difference
in basic philosophies of life.^?

The classical economists derived

their inspiration from the philosophic liberalism and utilitarianism
of their day.
world view.

Sismondi, and later Ruskin and Tawney, rejected this
Using the ancient Greek philosophers as their mentors,

just as had the medieval scholastics, Sismondi and Ruskin thought
that the theory of political economy was one which investigated
the utilization and consequence of economic production on the
ultimate end of mankind rather than just an unbounded maximization
of production.
As we leave this perceptive observer of the transition age to
m o d e m industrialism and turn to a later age of greater production
and abundance, we should not forget that it was Sismondi who first
criticized the economic theorists who made the increase of produc
tion a national goal.

In that early industrial age of long working

hours for not only for the laboring men and women but also the
children, he was concerned not so much about the effect of consump
tion on achieving the final goal of man's nature, but whether the
cost in human suffering was too great for the frivolous items being
produced.

We now turn to an author who will continue this line of

investigation, but who will also question the worth of more consumption
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in itself.
John Ruskin
As the Industrial Revolution advanced through the nineteenth
century, the worst excesses of its exploitative labor practices
were gradually decreased.

Most of these reforms, such as the Coal

Mines Act in 1842 and the Factory Act of 1844 with 6-1/2-hour
maximum working day for children under 13 and a maximum of 12
hours for women, were the result of government intervention to
effect a policy which Sismondi had advocated for some twenty years.
Though John Stuart Mill could argue as late as 1848 that it
was doubtful whether any of the inventions yet produced had
"lightened the day's toil of any human being," he nevertheless noted
that "they have increased the comforts of the middle class," even
if "they have not yet begun to effect those great changes in human
rq

destiny, which it is in their nature and futurity to accomplish."
At the same period in time when John Stuart Mill was writing these
sentiments in his Principles of Political Economy, another writer
was beginning to investigate what effect these great changes in
physical inventions as well as social machinery with their result
ing increase in the comfort of the middle classes were having on
human destiny.

John Ruskin was b o m in 1819 into a moderately

wealthy London merchant family.

Though he knew firsthand the power

and pleasures that conmercial success brought in its train, his
puritanic and artistic parents made sure that he never judged the
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accumulation of wealth to be the main goal of his life.

Trained

as an artist and art critic, John Ruskin’s reputation grew im
mensely with his successive publication of the four volumes in
his series M o d e m Painters.

It was always, however, Ruskin's

ambition to bring the beauties and inspiration of art to the repre
sentative British worker.

When the average British laborer failed

to respond to the beauty and inspiration of the intellectual and
artistic world, Ruskin set himself to the task of finding the
cause of such blindness.

His observations into the life and society

of the British laboring class rather quickly led him to believe
that something was wrong with an economy that produced so much
quantity of things of so little quality, yet brutalized so many
people in doing so.

Similar to other English critics of the in

dustrial society such as Coleridge, Cobbett, Carlyle, Dickens,
Arnold, Morris and many others,
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Ruskin soon denounced the com

mercial society of his time for its worship of Mammon, its "gospel
of g r e e d , a n d the conventional political economy which he saw
as intellectually supporting such a system.^

As the historian Asa

Briggs has mentioned, "indeed, they (the poets) had probed far
more deeply than the political economists into the inner meanings
of the processes of change, had taken the world of nature as well
as the world of men into the reckoning."

fi2

Yet of all these English

critics, only Ruskin attempted to challenge the economic theorists
on their own ground by undertaking the task of thoroughly analyzing
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precisely what were the errors of conventional political economy.
In Unto This Last and Munera Pulveris, Ruskin attempted to demon
strate what were the basic errors of the political economists of
his day.

Rather than attempt to summarize Ruskin's criticism of

orthodox political economy and the positive content of his economic
theory,^ I shall focus upon his analysis of how the worth of
final economic output should be evaluated.

Or, as Ruskin phrases

it, what determines what is real wealth and what is the opposite
of wealth or "illth."
By the mid-nineteenth century there was evidence that the
world was shifting from an era of scarcity of intermediate goods
such as shelter and food to one of, at least potential abundance
in such goods in the industrialized world.

If so, then the

question of wealth or "illth" becomes not only a theoretical ques
tion but one of real life.

James Sherburne has noted that "the

history of the discovery of abundance is yet to be written."^
The only scholarly study to face the problem of the discovery of
abundance is Daniel M. Fox's intellectual biography of the Ameri
can economist, Simon N. Patten, who first discussed the implications
of abundance The Discovery of Abundance: Simon N. Patten and the
Transformation of Social Theory.

Sherburne claims that Ruskin

"stands as the most important nineteenth-century precursor of Simon
N. Patten and twentieth-century abundance thinking."^
Ruskin begins his analysis of real wealth by contrasting his

101

definition of wealth to the approach of John Stuart Mill.

Mill

had commented that "everyone has a notion, sufficiently correct
for common purposes, of what is meant by wealth"^ or, in other
and more illuminating words, whatever commodities individuals
value to be wealth, that evaluation, in itself, makes such com
modities wealth to be valuable and a source of wealth.

This basic

definition of wealth is critical and Ruskin vigorously rejects
this first step of Mill's.

Mill's definition of wealth is grounded

in that branch of positivistic and utilitarian philosophy which
not only sought the "greatest happiness for the greatest number"
(as, in some vague but real sense, do all philosophies), but also
made the crucial assumption that there is no objective criterion
other than the individual consumer's subjective preferences for
determining what is conducive to happiness.

In other words, as

Sherburne has noted, it is utilitarianism strongly modified by a
strong attachment to individual liberty. ^

In such an ideology

the logical goal of the economic system has to be to maximize the
satisfactions that the individual consumers receive from fulfilling
their own self-perceived desires.

As Jeremy Bentham has noted:

if other things are equal, and if pushpin is preferred to poetry,
then pushpin is more valuable.
Ruskin, however, viewed wealth in a different light.

He thought

that the economist's view of wealth as determined by freely per
ceived desires of autonomous individuals was erroneous.

He pointed
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out that the economist’s ideal of liberty was entirely deficient
in scope, eventually self-defeating, a phantom in other words.6**
Since the definition of wealth revolves around one's concept of
liberty, it is necessary to pursue the meaning of liberty further
in the writings of Ruskin.

Ruskin held that true liberty, like

happiness, can only be achieved when it is recognized that there
is a Law to which all must be obedient.

Ruskin notes "how frantic

the pursuit of that treacherous phantom which men call Liberty. . .
How could it be otherwise: since if there be any one principle
more widely than another confessed by every utterance, or more
sternly than another imprinted on every atom, of the visible crea
tion, that principle is not Liberty, but Law."6^

Ruskin claims

that this principle was acknowledged in ancient Greek thought and
in the medieval society.

If one somewhat arbitrarily decides that

such societies were undesirable because they did not seek directly
and immediately to maximize individual freedom, then one is forced
to forego an appreciation of most of the leading thinkers of the
past ages intheir

quest for those politico-economic laws which make

for a satisfactory comnunity.

Ruskin, like Sismondi, had a great

deal of respect for the ancient writers.
The study which lately in England has been called
Political Economy is in reality nothing more than the
investigation of some accidental phenomena of m o d e m
conmercial operations, nor has it been true in its
investigation even of these. It has no connection
whatever with political economy, as understood and
treated of by the great thinkers of past ages.
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In order to understand Ruskin's rejection of the political
economist1s definition of wealth which was based on the philosophy
of utilitarianism modified by a strong attachment to individual
liberty, it is necessary to pursue the implications of such an
ideological position.

Ruskin notes that in such a society

. . .the persons who become rich are, generally speak
ing, industrious, resolute* proud, covetous, prompt,
methodical, sensible, unimaginative, insensitive, and
ignorant.
The persons who remain poor are the entirely fool
ish, the entirely wise, the idle, the reckless, the
Jumble, the thoughtful, the dull, the imaginative, the
sensitive, the well-informed, the improvident, the
irregularily and impulsively wicked, the clumsy
knave, the open theif, the entirely merciful, just
and goodly person.71
In such a society the more industrious, resolute, proud,
covetous, etc. pursue wJiat they perceive as ever more liberty but
which should be called license, according to Ruskin.^

In their

pursuit of "liberty" they attempt to both manipulate and satisfy
the perceived final goals of the less forceful with vendible com
modities.

This achievement of market power allows them to make

decisions that affect their own lives and others.

This decision

making ability is then looked upon as "liberty."
Whereas in former times it was the task of ethics, moral
philosophy, or moral theology to aid mankind in the moderate and
harmonious use of intermediate goods, which goods are the end
products of any productive economy, in his time Ruskin perceived
that these end products of the economist system had become the
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perceived final goals of mankind.

Accordingly, the science of

political economy had become the ethics and moral philosophy of
the age because it is the task of political economy to aid man
kind in making the correct decisions on how efficiently to produce
and allocate scarce means to achieve as many satisfactions as
possible.

More simply, since what were formerly intermediate

goods, whose usefulness was determined by a more ultimate goal as
determined by the ethical sciences, are now perceived as final
goals, that science, political economy, which deals with the effi
cient production and allocation of those formerly intermediate, but
now viewed as final, goals becomes the moral philosophy of an age.
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And regardless of what political economy was supposed by its sup
porters to be, Ruskin asserts that it abets mamonism.

James E.

Caimes, an economist of Ruskin*s time, said that political economy
abets nothing; it stands neutral among systems and gives no advice.
Political economy stands apart from all particular
systems, and is, moreover, absolutely neutral as
between all . . . For there are few practical prob
lems which do not present other aspects than the
purely economical--political, moral, educational,
artistic aspects--and these may involve conse
quences so weighty as to turn the scale against
purely economic solutions. On the relative importance
of such conflicting considerations, Political Economy
offers no opinion, pronounces no judgments.?4
Ruskin ignores the fact that political economy gives no advice,
being only too aware that its advice is taken by practical men.
John Fain has noted about this issue the following:
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Ruskin's position here is very strong. To the scientists
who formulated the natural laws of political economy those
laws were statements of human tendencies which never
operate in isolation, or as they always said, which are
subject to the qualification ceteris paribus. To practical
men those laws assumed the aspect either of justice or of
inevitability. And we cannot say that the scientists
were entirely justified and the practical men entirely
benighted. It is difficult to exclude normative im
plications from descriptive statements.
If the statesmen of Ruskin's day had been wise enough to apply
economic policies as suggested by the best political economists,
all might have been well.

But they were not, and their half

wisdom dictated unmodified applications of economic theory.

The

record is filled with illustrations of this tragic state of mis
understandings.

One will suffice:

All this time, the attitude of English statesmen was one
of indifference. In 1845, the Devon commission laid bare
the fatal defects of the Irish land system and suggested
sensible remedies. But no proposals for reform could
make headway in face of the prevalent doctrine of laissezfaire. Private property was regarded as sacred, and the
principles of the classical political economy were invoked
in support of a policy of inaction. It was in vain that
the economists themselves pointed out the uselessness of
maintaining the forms of free contract when the reality
was absent.
As late as 1868 Robert Lowe, a Conservative and economist,
opposed Irish land reform with the principles of political economy,
for only such principles stood as an "oasis in the desert of
politics upon which we may safely rest."
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Ruskin*s criticism of political economy began by rejecting
the fundamental premise that liberty, the power to make decisions,
was the final end of a society.

In a nutshell, the ability to make
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good decisions was his ideal.

He, therefore, rejected also the

attendant economic conclusion that individuals were the best
determinants of what was valuable.

Ruskin is adamant in his stand

that there is an objective source of wealth.

"The value of things,

therefore, is independent of opinion, and of quantity.

Think what

you will of it, gain how much you may of it, the value of a thing
itself is neither greater nor less.

For ever it avails, or

* " 78
avails not.
It is the task of political economy to analyze this true source
of wealth, that is, how the production and consumption of economic
commodities will lead to an increase in the ideal life.

Similar to

Sismondi, Ruskin distinguishes between the true science of political
economy which subordinates the quest for wealth to an Ultimate
End of man and that tTbastard science" which merely attempts to
maximize wealth.
The real science of political economy, which has yet
to be distinguished from the bastard science, as medicine
from withcraft, and astronomy from astrology, is that
which teaches nations to desire and labor for the things
that lead to life; and which teaches them to scorn and
destroy the things that lead to destruction.™
And for Ruskin, "the ideal of human life is a union of Spartan
simplicity of manners with Athenian sensibility and imagination."®®
Thus for his definition

of wealth it was natural for Ruskin to turn

to the Greek writer, Xenophon for his answer.

Ruskin claimedthat

the Economist of Xenophon "contains a flawless definition of wealth,
and an explanation of its dependence for efficiency on the merits
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and faculties of its possessors;--a definition which cannot be
bettered; and which must be the foundation of all true Political
Economy among nations, as Euclid is to all time the basis of
81
Geometry." x
Economist,

Ruskin is referring to the first chapter of Xenophon's

"The Management of Property, that is Whatever is of Use

to a man, But is of No Value to Such as Are Slaves to Their Pas
sions" where Xenophon is intent on showing that some economic
possessions aid man in living and thus are true wealth or property,
and some possessions, on the contrary, contribute to the destruc
tion of man's nature.

These latter possessions cannot be considered

as true wealth, but must be considered as the opposite of wealth
or property--illth was Ruskin's label for such possessions.
Then the very same things are property to a man
who knows how to use them, and not property to one who
does not. For instance, a flute is property to a man
who can play on it fairly; but to one who is wholly un
skilled in its use it is no more property than mere
useless stones would be,--unless indeed he sold it.
So it is clear to us that a flute in the hands
of a man who does now know how to use it, is not property
to him, unless he sells it. So long as he keeps it, it
is not property. And indeed, Socrates, we shall thus
have reasoned consistently, since we before decided that
a man's property must be something that benefits him.
If the man does not sell the flute, it is not property,
for it is of no use; but if he sell it, it becomes
property.
To this Socrates answered, Yes, if he know how to
sell it. But if he, again, were to sell it to a man
who does not know how to use it, it would not be property
even when sold, according to what you say.
Your words, Socrates, seem to imply that not even money
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would be property unless a man knew how to use it.
Well, you seem to agree with me that a man's
property is only what benefits him. Suppose a man were
to make this use of his money, to buy, say, a mistress,
by whose influence his body would be worse, his soul
worse, his household worse; how could we then say
that his money was any benefit to him?
We could not,--unless, indeed, we are to count
as property henbane, the herb that drives mad those who
eat it.82
This is an important passage for Ruskin and one that he
would return to more often than to any other for his inspiration
when pursuing problems in political economy.

One can see a

glimpse of it in the following often-quoted declaration of Ruskin:
"And possession is in use only, which for each man is sternly
limited; so that such things, and so much of them as he can use,
are, indeed, well for him, or wealth; and more of them, or any
other things are ill for him, or Illth.
Thus the concept of wealth includes more than just the measure
ment of one's actual possessions, it includes, secondly, the
capability of utilizing them in an appropriate and vital manner.
"'Having' is not an absolute, but a graduated, power; and consists
not only in the quantity or nature of the thing possessed, but also
(and in a greater degree) in its suitableness to the person pos
sessing it and in his vital power to use it. . . Wealth, therefore,
is the 'posession of the valuable by the valiant.'"
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There is also

a third aspect to wealth; a commodity cannot constitute wealth unless
it has been produced in an appropriate manner.

"The whole question,
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therefore, respecting not only the advantage, but even the quan
tity, of national wealth, resolves itself finally into one of
abstract justice. . . Any given accumulation of conmercial wealth
may be indicative, on the one hand, of faithful industries, pro
gressive energies, and productive ingenuities; or, on the other,
it may be indicative of mortal luxury, merciless tyranny, ruinous
chicane."8S
This third aspect of Ruskin's thought on wealth leads into a
discussion of the concept of cost.

Conventional economics sepa

rates the production and consumption processes and considers
separately the men functioning in each process.

For Ruskin, as

for Sismondi, this separation is unwarranted, because the produc
tion process itself has an impact upon the consumer.

If the

production process is heavy with human cost, this will have a ruinous
effect on the worker's ability to make wise decisions concerning
consumption.

As Sismondi had remarked, "Those who spread manure

in the morning will not t/ant to dance in silk clothes in the after
noon."

Ruskin attempted to carry this discussion a step forward

by distinguishing between intrinsic costs, "that of getting the
thing in the right way," and effectual cost "that of getting the
thing in the way we set about it."
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Another concept of great importance in Ruskin's analysis is
'value."

As Ruskin characteristically phrases it, 1Valor, from

valere, to be well or strong (

);--strong, in life (if a man),
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or valiant; strong for life Cif a thing), or valuable.
Valuable,1 therefore, is to 'avail towards life.'

To be

A truly

valuable or available thing is that which leads to life with its
whole strength.

In proportion as it does not lead to life, or as

its strength is broken, it is less valuable; in proportion as it
leads away from life, it is invaluable or malignant."^
valuable , therefore, is to ’’avail towards life."

To be

To give this

concept concreteness Ruskin distinguishes between intrinsic value
and effectual value.

Intrinsic value is "the absolute power of

anything to support life.

A sheaf of wheat of given quality and

weight has in it a measurable power of sustaining the substance of
the body; a cubic foot or pure air, a fixed power of sustaining its
warmth; and a cluster of flowers of given beauty a fixed power of
enlivening or animating the senses and the h e a r t . H o w e v e r ,
useful criteria of intrinsic value as life-giving power would have
to be derived chiefly from the physical and biological sciences,
fields in which Ruskin was not adept and thus he did not pursue
this line of thought.
It may be worth a digression here to note that an early biographer
of Ruskin was a biologist and fixed upon the quotation as the first
instance of an expression of an "objective" value wherein
. . . physical and physiological properties, or ’values,'
can indeed indefinitely be assigned: the one so much fuel,
its heat-giving power measurable in calorimeter, or in
actual units of work, the other a definite sensory stimulus
. . . It is interesting then to note that the shout of
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’sentiment versus science,1 with which Mr. Ruskin has been
for so many years turned out of court, did after all
accurately enough describe the controversy; . . . the
inductive logic and statistics, the physics and the
chemistry, the biology and medicine, the psychology
and education were all essentially on the side of Mr.
Ruskin; while on the other were too often sheer blind
ness to the actual facts of human and social life--organism,
function and environment alike— concealed by illusory ab
stractions, baseless assimiptions, and feeble metaphors
stuck together with scholastic logic and frozen into
dismal and repellent form by a theory of moral senti
ments QO
which assumed moral
temperature
at its absolute
~
zero,8y
In this respect Ruskin may be considered a forerunner to much
of that work which has attempted to assign
of value to an item's absolute

a more prominentindex

or entropic usefulness, ratherthan

rely totally upon a comnodity's monetary value as the only cri
terion of a comnodity's worth to society.

A noted twentieth-

century physical chemist and economist, Frederick Soddy, has analyzed
this idea of absolute wealth much more fully than either Ruskin or
Patrick Geddes.

Soddy recognized Ruskin as his predecessor and

often paid tribute to his thought.

In the following passage from

Soddy*s Wealth, Virtual Wealth and Debt, we are able to see once
again the need of the humanistic scientist for the basic physical
scientist and vice-versa and, we should add, the need of the economic
scientist for both in his attempt to fulfill human needs from the
world's physical resources:
Ruskin, in solitary and picturesque protest
against the hallucinations of his age, pleaded in vain
for an economics founded upon life. Hostile . . . to the
chrematistic pursuit of science which desecrates the
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countryside and doomed the workers to
of existence, and a great champion of
higher spiritual and aesthetic values
of a sordid materialism, yet it is to
we must turn if we require the theory
of his philosophy.30

bestial conditions
the cause of the
against the onrush
materialistic science
and justification

Thus it is worthwhile to note that Ruskin1s concept of in
trinsic value brings into the realm of political economy the
physical and biological sciences.

Though, as just mentioned,

Ruskin did not pursue this line of thought, he seems to have been
dlert to the essential role of such sciences.
Such and such a piece of land, with its asso
ciated lakes and seas, rightly treated in surface and
substance, can produce precisely so much food and power,
and no more, its surface treatment (agriculture) and
substance treatment (practical geology and chemistry)
are the first roots of economical science.31
In addition to intrinsic value with its emphasis on the ab
solute or entropic value, Ruskin used the concept of effectual
value.

Intrinsic value is present in goods used or unused; ef

fectual value results whenever these conmodities with intrinsic
value are used by an appropriate "acceptant capacity."

"The pro

duction of effectual value, therefore, always involves two needs:
first, the production of a thing essentially useful; then the
production of the capacity to use it."

This latter ability to

use properly a conmodity is clearly inspired by Xenophon^
Economist which we have already discussed.

Thus if a good thing

avails toward life in the consumptive process, it is valuable.
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In distinguishing between Ruskin's definitions of wealth
and value, it is enough to note that, for Ruskin, a commodity
might be valuable without constituting wealth.

Wealth has three

aspects whereas value has only two; wealth requires that a thing
be good, that it be honestly got, that it be effectively used,
whereas value requires only that a thing be good and effectively
used.

Consequently, before we may designate a valuable comnodity

to be a part of a nation's wealth, we must ascertain the intrinsic
cost, which may under certain conditions negate the resultant value.
In concluding this section on wealth, intrinsic and effec
tual, and on intrinsic and extrinsic cost, we see that for Ruskin
the true political economist had to be aware of his border dis
ciplines.

Ruskin's stress on effectual value and intrinsic cost

brought ethics, morals and social philosophy into the realm of the
political economist, while his elaboration upon intrinsic values
made some knowledge of the results of the physical and biological
sciences imperative.
It is clear from this discussion of Ruskin's notions of wealth
and value that he could not consider the mere accumulation of
wealth and possessions to be the final goal of either the individual
or the nation.

He contrasts the erroneous from the correct per

ception of wealth in the following passage:
There will be always a number of men who would
fain set themselves to the accumulation of wealth as
the sole object of their life. Necessarily, that class
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of men is an uneducated class, inferior in intellect, and
more or less cowardly. It is physically impossible for
a well-educated, intellectual, or brave man to make
money the chief object of his thoughts; just as it is
for him to make his dinner the principal object of them.
All healthy people like their dinners, but their dinner
is not the main object of their lives. So all healthilyminded people like making money--ought to like it, and
to enjoy the sensation of winning it: but the main
object of their life is not money; it is something
better than money.^
Generally speaking, Ruskin taught that moderate wealth should
be the goal.

"A nation which desires true wealth, desires it

moderately, and can therefore distribute it with kindness, and
possess it with pleasure; but one which desires false wealth, de
sires it inmoderately, and can neither dispense it with justice, nor
enjoy it in peace.
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Ruskin urges the individual to recognize

that
. . . the law of life is that a man should
he desires to make annually, as the food he
eat daily; and stay when he has reached the
fusing increase of business, and leaving it
so obtaining due freedom of time for better

fix the sum
desires to
limit, re
to others,
t h o u g h t s . 95

Hence his prescriptions for the running of a state:

"I strongly

suspect that in a well-organized state, the possession of wealth
ought to incapacitate for public o f f i c e , a n d "one of the most
important conditions of a healthy system of social economy, would
be the restraint of the properties and incomes of the upper classes
within certain fixed limits."^
This call for moderation and restraint did not fall on fertile
ground in Victorian England.

Sherburne points out that "Ruskin's
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final call for restraint was, perhaps, the most incomprehensible
to his Victorian contemporaries.

It lies in the sensitive area of

social advancement or 'getting-on.*

Ruskin denies the 'gospel

of whatever we've got, to get more' as vehemently as he does that
of ’wherever we are, to go somewhere else.'"®®
The customary reaction was that expressed in a leading article
by the Manchester Examiner and Times on October 2, 1860: "He
(Ruskin) is not worth our powder and shot, yet, if we do not crush
him, his wild words will touch the springs of action in some
hearts, and ere we are aware a moral floodgate may fly open and
drown us all."®®

For better or worse, the Manchester Examiner and

Times and, one might add, the conventional political economists
were able to keep shut the moral floodgate that Ruskin*s thought
represented and thus to keep the Victorian economic theory on the
dry road of amorality.

Though one economist predicted in 1888 that

future economic theory would be built with Ruskinian bricks rather
than with Ricardian s t r a w , t h i s prediction has simply not come
true.
Yet Ruskin's wild words have touched deeply sane minds and
hearts.

Such diverse individuals as the heretical English economist

John A. Hobson,^®1 the artist and craftsman Eric Gill,*^ the
biologist Patrick Geddes,
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ifM
the physical chemist Frederick Soddy, *

the economic historian R. H. Tawney,*0^ a founder of the American
Economic Association Richard T. Ely,*®® the English novelist and
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distributist G. K. Chesterton,

the French novelist Marcel

lnft
Proust, uo and Indian pacifist and political leader Mohandas
G a n d h i , w o u l d all pay homage to Ruskin and his ideas.

John A. Hobson
Although John A. Hobson often claimed that he was Ruskin1s
disciple, and in many of his works indicated that he was merely at
tempting to fill in some of the gaps in Ruskin1s ’’magnificent plunge"
into economic theory which brought "whole civilizations to a grand
assise,"HO

nonetheless true that John Hobson added to and modi

fied as much as he kept intact from Ruskin's thought.

Ewald Grether

has described the relationship of Ruskin and Hobson in the following
manner: "It is clear that it was neither a faith nor a creed that
descended from Ruskin to Hobson, but primarily an attitude."HI
This inherited attitude was that of subjecting standard or conventional
economic theory to the test of human assessment.

Though Hobson, even

more than Ruskin, admitted that there was a place for that orthodox
economic theory which took the narrow and more quantitive vision that
simply attempted to allocate efficiently scarce resources among the perceived needs of individuals,
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nonetheless, Hobson's plea for

a "wider human assessment" of the output of the economic system
than was undertaken by such orthodox economic theorists, marks him
clearly as a Ruskinian.

For both Ruskin and Hobson the discipline

of economics had to be moderated by a social ethics and brought under
the umbrella of a broader science; the art or science of human welfare.
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However, whereas for the idealist and Tory Ruskin, the ethical
order was imminent in social behavior and thus socio-economic
behavior was ultimately reducible to ethical behavior, the prag
matic and democratic Hobson took a more "organic" view of social
welfare which derived as much of its inspiration from the physical
sciences, especially biology, as it did from absolute ethical
s t a n d a r d s . M i c h a e l Freeden has remarked about the foundations
of Hobson's economic theory:

"In terms of the intellectual origins

of his thought, this means that his idealism was tempered by an
emphasis on biological processes, especially by the 'organism'
model and by evolutionary theory,”114
Ruskin and Hobson were men of different generations and no
where is this fact made more clear than by their attitude towards
the biological sciences,

Ruskin had resigned his chair at Oxford

chiefly as a protest against the establishing of a physiological
laboratory within its classical precincts, while Hobson had enthu
siastically accepted the findings of such laboratories.

Ruskin's

thought apparently had matured too far before the evolutionary
concepts of biological science became thoroughly impressed upon the
thought of his age.

Hobson, on the other hand, was the product of

an age in which the science of biology in general and the evolu
tionary process in particular were the guiding tenets to much of
social thought.

This is not to indicate that Hobson took an amoral

and a-ethical stance, quite the contrary.

It does indicate, however,
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that Hobson’s ethical base was formed somewhat differently (more
adequately?) than was Ruskin's.

Hobson was quite aware of this

difference in his economic theory and that of Ruskin, and often
lamented Ruskin’s lack of appreciation for the science of biology:
"Had Mr. Ruskin been less scornful or suspicious of the rising
science of Biology, he might have greatly strengthened the ethical
supports on which he r e l i e d . H o b s o n would support Ruskin's
ethics by showing that Ruskin's ethical conclusions were similar
to the conclusions inspired by an organic worldview.

For example,

The law of just distribution of wealth, to Mr.
Ruskin primarily a moral problem, is seen to rest upon
a necessary physical basis, so soon as we learn to trace
through all the changing processes of vegetable and
animal life the natural interdependence and interaction
between nutrition and function, the intake of food and
the output of energy in work. Once let us grasp com
prehensively the truth that society is rightly classed
as an organism, and the great principle of apportion
ment of work and its products contained in the formula,
"From each according to his powers, to each according
to his needs," no longer rests only on a sentimental or
a purely moral basis; it becomes the necessary applica
tion of a natural law of progress in every department of
organic life.*16
Before plunging into Hobson's thought on the nature of eco
nomic wealth, it is worth noting that although Hobson's name is
most often linked with Ruskin's in the history of economic theory,
in some significant respects Hobson’s thought was aligned more
closely to Sismondi's than to Ruskin.

Both Hobson and Sismondi

can be considered as professional, though somewhat heretical,
economists in addition to their role of humane critic of the eco
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nomic profession.
theory.^

Both made significant contributions to economic

Hobson and Sismondi made their major contribution to

economic theory in their research into the causes of the periodic
economic crises, and both rejected Say's Law in their belief that
over-production was the cause of such crises.

John M. Keynes has

acknowledged his debt to H o b s o n , b u t not to Sismondi.

Keynes

attributed the origin of the idea of the possibility of a general
underconsumption/overproduction and the consequent rejection of
Say's Law to Thomas Maithus, and, in so doing, was apparently
unaware that Maithus had mostly borrowed this analysis from Sismondi.
Marx is closer to the truth when he cynically described Maithus'
Principles as merely the "English translation" of Sismondi.^
And finally, although Sismondi considered himself a "republican"
and Hobson thought of himself as a "democrat," they were both
politically far removed from the quite conservative Toryism of
Ruskin.
With that introduction, we can now sally forth into Hobson's
evaluation of economic wealth.

Hobson begins his discussion of

consumption by pointing out an inconsistency in orthodox economic
thought:

"Though everybody agreed that consumption was the final

goal, this goal, as such, was nobody's concern.

When goods passed

through the hands of farmers, manufacturers, and traders, into the
hands of consumers, they seemed to pass out of the economic system
into a destructive process that took place in privacy and obscurity."

12Q

And though "consumption remained the formal end of economic
processes, production was the real end."*^
Such an ostrich attitude towards the problems of evaluating
the worth of final consumption could only lead to further error,
implied Hobson.
Only so far as current tastes and appetites are
reliable indices of human utility, only so far as we
can identify the desired with the desirable, is the
evolution of customary standards of life a sound human
art. But it is needless to cite the ample evidence
of the errors and wastes that are represented in
every human standard of consumption.'^
In order to obviate such errors Hobson attempted to dispel some of
the "privacy and obscurity" that surrounded the consumption of eco
nomic products, or as he peceived the task, "some further adjustment is needed to assess the desired in terms of the desirable."
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Hobson first rejected the approach taken by standard economic
textbooks when dealing with the section on consumer behavior.

Hobson

saw behind the facade of measuring the fulfillment of the effective
desires of consumers or utilizing sane elasticity of demand index,
and then using this measurement as an indicator of how well the
economic system was performing its essential task of achieving the
final goal of all economic system.
But a study primarily directed to the ascertain
ment and measurement of elasticity of demand, does not
yet accord the disinterested valuations of consumptive
processes required by a theory in which consumption is
the "sole end." For consumption here only enters the
economic field as a factor in markets and the determina
tion of prices, not as the means of realizing the pur
pose of which the whole economic system is directed.124
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In order to realize the purpose by which the whole economic
system is directed Hobson had to determine what it was that was
desirable, or, in other words, what was the Ultimate End by which
the economic system could be oriented and measured.

Hobson's

favorite phrase for such an ideal was "organic welfare" about
which he once added, "Though in form a mere synonym for good life,
it is by usage both more restricted and more precise,"-^

In

another study he was concerned to show that "organic welfare" had
both a materialistic component and a non-material or artistic,
spiritual component.
The organic conception of mens sano in corpore
sano still stands as the first principle of human
welfare. . . It finds its justification in the truth
so strongly enforced by Aristotle that we must first
have a livelihood and then practice virtue.126
What contributes to a mens sano in corpore sano?

More

specifically, what contribution does the economic process make to
a mens sano in corpore sano?

As Hobson notes, we are immediately

"Confronted by the question how far the actual economic conduct,
with its accompanying desires and gratifications, can be taken
as a safe index of the desirable or organic welfare in its true
sense."

His response is that "we cannot assume a full identity

of the income of an individual or a conwnunity, expressed interms
of current satisfactions, with that income expressed in terms of
human welfare."

This is so because "the total process of consump

tion- production may contain large elements of human waste or error,
in that the tastes, desires, and satisfactions which actively
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stimulate this wealth creation may not conform to the desirable."127
Later Hobson is more explicit in his condemnation of using the satis
faction of current consumer's effective demand as the Ultimate End
of economics.
We cannot admit as the objective of economic activi
ties either the yield of material goods which these
activities produce, or the "psychic income" which they
yield as assessed in terms of current deservedness or
satisfaction, without reference to their intrinsic de
sirability.
Hobson then echoes Ruskin by immediately adding "A material or a
psychic income may contain 'illth' as an alloy to its wealth."12^
The notion of excess production appears next in Hobson’s
analysis.

His declaration that "Mechanical production can easily

outrun organic consumption," reminds one of both Ruskin's concept
of "acceptant capacity" and Sismondi's strictures of the politi
cal economists "que de se representer la consomnation comme une
puissance sans bomes, toujours prete a devorer une production
infinie,"12^
After surveying the results of actual consumption patterns and
the economist's analysis of such consumer behavior Hobson concludes
that "it cannot be said that any adequate study either of the
evolution of actual standards of consumption, or of 'desirable
standards,' has yet been made."

Hobson also indicated the reason

for such failure:
Though much attention has been given to the economy
of expenditure in equalizing "marginal utilities," it has
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not been clearly recognized that the several margins
are themselves determined by processes of utilitarian
calculations based on balances of organic requirements.
This failure to recognize that the determination of the "several
margins" is due, at least partly, in Hobson's mind to the fact
that economists fail "to realize adequately that the organic
nature of man necessarily stamps itself on his standard of con
sumption, and that, therefore, the various items of consumption
must be studied as contributions toward the organic whole."130
John Hobson would expend a considerable portion of his ana
lytical energies in studying not only the various items of consump
tion, but also the process of production in an industrial system,
and how both consumption and production contributed to or inhibited
the organic welfare ideal.

Hobson's analysis of the process of

production is best sunmarized in Work and Wealth: A Human Valuation
(1914), while the best compendium of Hobson's thought on the items
of consumption is found in chapter five "Standards of Consumption"
in Part IV, "Organic Reform of the Economic System" in his Wealth
and Life: A Study in Values (1929).

Hobson begins his analysis

in the former study by formulating the general problem provisionally
in terms of three questions: "(1 ) What are the concrete goods and
services which constitute the real national income?
these goods produced?

(3) How are they consumed?"
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(2) How are
Hobson,

however, rejects these questions as inappropriate for an organic
welfare political economist.

Goods, production and consumption
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have to be measured in human terms.

As he expresses it:

In order to express business "costs” in terms of
human costs, we require to know three things:
1. The quality and kind of the various human ef
forts involved in the business "cost."
2. The capacitites of the human beings who give
out these efforts.
3. The distribution of the effort among those who
give it out.
Correspondingly strictly to this analysis of "costs"
of Production will be the analysis of "utility" of
Cons imp tion. There we shall want to know:
1. The quality and kind of the satisfaction or
utility yielded by the "economic utility" that is sold
to consumers.
2. The capacities of the consumers who get this
"economic utility."
3. The distribution of the economic utility among
the consuming public.
The humanist criticism of the Industry is condensed
into this a n a l y s i s . 132
Hobson devoted the next several chapters of his Work and
Wealth to investigating the human costs of the process of produc
tion in an industrial society.

Though he is quite aware of the

great value of machines to lighten human labor, he is also aware
of their human costs.

The "loss of liberty" of being tied to the

inexorable pace of a machine is the first cost that he discusses.
Second, he explores the indictment "that the worker in one of
these routine subdivided processes has no appreciation of the
utility or social meaning of his

labour.

"1^3

Hobson recognizes
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that machinery can lead to men who are not interested in their work,
and who do not recognize in it either beauty or utility.

Hobson

comments that such a "man is degraded by that work, whether he knows
it or not.

When he cones to a clear consciousness of that degrada

tion, the spiritual cost is greatly enhanced.
As concerning the process of consumption, though Hobson never
fully resolves in his own mind the absolute value of the items of
consumption, he was unwilling to agree with the "popular thinking
that is apt to brush aside the questions with the remark that
values are matters of individual tastes, and quot homines tot
sententiae."

Hobson considered such a position to be false because

"we know that there exists a substantial body of agreement as to
the main constituents of welfare, and even as to the order of their
evaluation."135
From his observations on consumption behavior around him Hobson
noted that an industrial economy has a built-in bias towards ex
cessive production and consumption of material goods.

"This

charge of materialism made against the more advanced industrial
conmunities,. , . is based on an over-stimulation of certain
instincts for physical satisfactions, due to the innovating ten
dencies of m o d e m capitalism with its elaborated apparatus of
selling pressures."

This leads to an excess which is due to "a

hasty exploitation of newly roused tastes that absorb too much of
human nature in economic processes.

'Getting and spending, we

126

lay waste our powers.” '-^
"Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers" is the poet's
lament over the philosophy of materialism that seems to be the
inevitable consequence of an industrial economy in which narrow
minded and tunnel-visioned economists only describe a minute
portion of the social canvas.

Such economists never take off their

blinders, and though they may peak from time to time to the left,
they never look above to the Ultimate End, nor below to the
primary and absolute foundations of all economies, the environ
mental resources.
Hobson’s final solution to this inherent bias toward excessice production is the following:
Human energy, therefore, increasingly demands
that half the power of mechanical production shall be
applied, not to producing more goods, but more leisure,
that is to say, to so liberating the producer from the
strain and burden of specialised production that he may
become a skilled consumer, with leisure and energy enough
at his free disposal to assimilate the slower gains of
scientific production, instead of being overwhelmed by
them, while at the same time bringing his harmonised
economic standard of living into proper relations with
the non-economic activities and satisfactions of his life.
This seems impracticable so long as profiteering rules
the economic system. For the profit-maker can only
gain his end either by working his machines and his
workers to their full capacity, and turning out goods
so rapidly that his skilled marketeers must induce the
general body of workers to take their share in increased
goods, not in increased leisure and other non-economic
satisfactions, or by restrictions of output that give a
wasteful or excessive leisure.137
As a fitting summation of J. A. Hobson's contribution to the
analysis of wealth and the economic system which produces such
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wealth, and, at the same time, an introduction to the thought of
Richard Henry' Tawney, the noted economic historian and student of
the current economic scene who will be the subject of our next
section, we can quote a passage from Tawney's quite favorable
review of Hobson's Wealth and Life.
The essence of humanism, perhaps, is the attitude
which judges the externals of life by their effect in
assisting or hindering the life of the spirit. It is
the conviction that the machinery of existence--property
and material wealth, and industrial organisation, and
the whole fabric and mechanism of social institutions-is to be regarded as means to an end, and that this end
is the growth towards perfection of individual human
beings. In this sense, Mr. Hobson is the greatest of
economic humanists. Undisturbed by the roar of the wheels,
he approaches the engine with questions most of us are
too clever, or too superficial, to condescend to ask.
What is the thing for? In what way do its impressive
gyrations minister to the dignity and happiness of
mankind?138

Richard Henry Tawney
On the death of Richard Henry Tawney in 1962, Talcott Parsons,
the noted Harvard sociologist, wrote that "it would, I think, be
fair to say that Tawney regarded both his historical scholarship
and his knowledge of m o d e m economics as primarily instrumental.
He was above all a moralist, deeply concerned with understanding,
in full historical depth, what he felt to be the moral problems
of his times."139

This instrumental role of historical and eco

nomic knowledge is clearly observed when one reviews the chronology
of Tawney's early life.

After graduation from Balliol College in

Oxford in 1903 with a standard classical education he decided that
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he would attempt some kind of social work.

After looking around

at the possibilities Tawney finally settled down to work for the
charitable organization called the Childrenfs Country Holiday Fund
while he lived at Toynbee Hall, a university settlement house in
the East End of London.

For a very important three years of his

life Tawney actively attempted to directly ameliorate the standard
of living for the impoverished by philanthropic and educational
means.

Gradually, however, Tawney became disillusioned in the

effectiveness of such direct steps.

Perceiving such philanthropic

efforts to be somewhat superficial, Tawney turned to research and
analysis of the current economic scene.

By 1906 he was ready to

leave the active life of the social worker and turn to teaching
and research into the entire social system which spawned such evils
as he had encountered in his work in the East End of London.

Six

years later Tawney would describe the stages that his thought went
through as he searched for the cure to society's evils.
The stages of thought about social affairs through
which I, and I suppose other people, have passed are some
thing as follows. One begins by regarding poverty etc.
as a matter of individual misfortune. One does not connect
it with the main institutions of society; nor does one
think of those institutions as the work of the state and
dependent upon its support. One therefore does not look
to the state for improvement. In the second stage one
realizes that then there is a unity underlying the indi
vidual cases of poverty; that they are connected with
social institutions, specimens of a type, pieces of a
system, and that this system is, in the first instance,
the work of the state and can be altered by an alteration
of the law. One therefore now looks to the state for
reform. . . In the third stage one realizes that the
attitude of the state is just the attitude of countless
individuals, that to rage against it for not removing
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economic evils (Which state action can remove) is as
futile as it is to rage against the Pope for not being
a reformer, and that society cannot lift itself up by
the soles of its boots. The attitude of governments
. . . is wrong because the attitude of individuals to
each other is wrong, because we in our present society
are living on certain false and universal assumptions;
and that even when statesmen honestly mean to do good
they will often do harm . . . merely because all their
actions, good and bad, proceed from a character based
on those assumptions. What we have got to do first of
all is to change those assumptions or principles.
As Tawney searched in the pre-World War I era for the false
and universal assumptions that were the ultimate cause of society's
evils, he first turned to the study of conventional economic theory
for guidance and enlightenment.

From 1906 to 1908 Tawney was an

assistant in economics at Glasgow University.

Tawney very quickly,

however, came to the conclusion that conventional economic theory
was more a part of the problem rather than any help in understanding
the ultimate cause of social evils.

At Glasgow University Tawney

acquired his lifelong disesteem for orthodox theoretical economics.
Looking back on his time there, "as a kind of sub-assistant on
economic theory," he recalled having "exchanged apples for nuts in
the best manner of Marshall."

He quoted the words of the governess

to her pupil in The Importance of Being Earnest: "Do not read Mill's
chapter on the fall of the rupee, my dear; it is too exciting for
a young girl;" then observed:

"I found that my attitude to economics

was much the same, and that these austere heights were not my
spiritual home."-^

Tawney was more forthright in his assessment of

economic theory when he confided to his diary (December 11, 1913) an
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attitude which he continued to hold but did not later express so
boldly:

’There is no such things as a science of economics, nor

ever will be.

It is cant and iMarshall's talk as to the need for

social problems to be studied by ’the same order of mind which
twaddle.''^2

tests the stability of a battleship

in bad

weather1is

Failing to find what he wanted

in the

study ofconventional

economic theory, Tawney turned to the study of economic history
for guidance and enlightenment.

If

had been the historical development

he could only find out what
of his

economicsociety, such

knowledge should be useful in finding resolutions to society’s
evils.

Though he used history as an instrument in his private

and personal search for solutions to current social problems,
Tawney realized, as few do who seek for answers to problems with
which one is emotionally involved, that one cannot dictate to his
tory.

Instead one must commit oneself to the era that one studies

with an attentive ear, an inquisitive nose, a patient and thorough
mind, and a sympathetic heart as one searches for the clues to the
history of an era.

History can indeed serve as a useful instrument

in aiding one to understand current social evils, but it is a deli
cate instrument to be used only by the adept

(not

always the pro

fessionals) and is a tool which must be treated with respect if it
is to be used rightfully.

Tawney*s Religion and the Rise of Capi

talism (1926) and his earlier The Agrarian Problem in the Sixteenth
Century (1912) have been models for many who have published after
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him.

But before he could use history as a tool or instrument to
aid him in the understanding of current social maladies, Tawney had
to clarify in his own mind the broad general nature of the social
sickness of his era.

During this period of introspection and

reflection, Tawney wrote a long entry into his diary for July 12,
1913:
As long as individuals think the attainment of
moderate material comfort the chief end of life, so
long will governments plead as an excuse for not doing
this or that they cannot afford it. If m o d e m England
and America are right in believing that the principal aim
of man, what should be taught to children, what should
serve as a rough standard of merit, what merits appro
bation and respect, is the attainment of a moderate-or even immoderate--standard of comfort, and that moral
questions arise only after this has been attained; then
they must be content to go without religion, literature,
art, and learning. These are not hard to find for those
who really seek them, or who seek them first. But if
they are sought second they are never found at all . . .
What I mean is that the failure of society to make
the changes which are obviously important when regarded
in bulk is due to the fact that individually we all have
a false philosophy of life. We assume that the greatest
misfortune which can befall a man is poverty--and that
conduct which leads to the sacrifice of income is unwise,
impractical, etc.; in short that a man's life should be
judged by its yield of income, and a nation's life by
its production of wealth. Hence we have one group of
economists who have attacked certain reforms on the
grouping that they diminished wealth, and another school
who answered them not by saying 'let wealth be diminished,
fiat justicia,' but by arguing that they really would not
diminish wealth after all. The answer is I believe correct.
But it is, nevertheless, devilish; for it suggests that
hunan life, justice, etc, should be measured as items on
a balance sheet. . .
But supposing unearned incomes, rents, etc. are pooled,
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will not the world, with its present philosophy, do
anything but gobble them up mid look up with an impatient
grunt for more? That is the real question. It will not
be faced in my lifetime because as long as the working
classes believe, and believe rightly, that their mentors
rob than, so long will they look on the restoration of
the booty as the great reform, and will impatiently waive
aside more fundamental issues, as a traveller robbed by
a highwayman declines to be comforted by being told that
money, after all, does not buy happiness. But when their
masters are off their backs they will still have to face
the fact that you must choose between less and more wealth
and less and more civilization. . .
Again may not it be that the real way to overcome
the power of the wealthy is to despise wealth?
When three or four hundred years hence mankind
looks back on the absurd preoccupation of our age with
economic issues with the same wonder as, and juster con
tempt than, we look back on the theological discussions
of the middle ages, the names which they will reverence
will be those of men who stood out against the prevalent
fallacy that the most important problems were economic
problems, and who taught men to conquer poverty by
despising riches.*
Six years later, after being interrupted by World War I and
its aftermath, Tawney returned to this question of what was the
basic problem facing the economic society of his era, and wrote
first "The Sickness of an Acquisitive Society" for the Hibbert
Journal which he soon

expanded into the

book, The Acquisitive

Society which quickly

became one of the

most controversialbooks

of the 1920's as he called on the British society to reform its
fundamental philosophy of life.
These are times which are not ordinary, and in
such times it is
not enough to follow the road. It
is necessary to know where it leads and, if it leads
nowhere, to follow another. The search for another
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involves reflection, which is uncongenial to the
bustling people who describe themselves as prac
tical . . . But the practical thing for a
traveler who is uncertain of his path is not to
proceed with the utmost rapidity in the wrong
direction: it is to consider how to find the
right one.145
Tawney next pointed out that the path upon which England’s
industrial and economic leaders would guide her, the philosophical
path that viewed economic productivity as its own end, had been
tried in the past and had been found wanting.
When they desire to place their economic life on a
better foundation, they repeat, like parrots, the word
’’Productivity," because it is the word that rises first
in their minds; regardless of the fact that productivity
is the foundation on which it is based already, that in
creased productivity is the one characteristic achieve
ment of the age before the war, as religion was of the
Middle Ages or art of classical Athens, and that it is
precisely in the century which has seen the greatest
increase in productivity since the fall of the Roman
Empire that economic discontent has been most acute.146
Increased
appear.

productivity alone will not cause societal ills to dis
Such a response is based upon an illusion.

Hence the idea, which is popular with rich men, that
industrial disputes would disappear if only the output of
wealth were doubled, and everyone were twice as well off,
not only is refuted by all practical experience, but is
in its very nature founded upon an illusion. For the
question is one not of amounts but of proportions; and
men will fight to be paid $120 a week, instead of $80, as
readily as they will fight to be paid $20 instead of $16.14?
Such leaders whose faith is that "riches are not a means but
an end," and who imply "that all economic activity is equally
14fi
estimable, whether it is subordinated to a social purpose or not,"A °
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are "like a man who, when he finds that his shoddy boots wear
badly, orders a pair two sizes larger instead of a pair of good
leather, or who makes 14) for putting a bad sixpence in the plate
on Sunday by putting in a bad shilling the next."149
Tawney would point out the direction that the correct path
would lead by harkening back to a central theme of Ruskin
The purpose of industry is obvious. It is to supply
man with things which are necessary, useful or beautiful,
and thus to bring life to body or spirit. In so far as
it is governed by this end, it is among the most important
of human activities. In so far as it is diverted from it,
it may be harmless, amusing, or even exhilarating to those
who carry it on, but it possesses no more social signifi
cance than the orderly business of ants and bees, the
strutting of peacocks, or the struggles of carnivorous
animals over carrion.151
The true political economist realizes that "all rights . . . are
conditional and derivatice, . . . They are derived from the end
or purpose of the society in which they exist."1^
Tawney draws on his knowledge of history to say that mankind
has ordinarily understood that productivity sought for its
own sake is a vice and must be constrained.

However this disci

plining of productivity is no easy task for society.

In a passage

made memorable by his adept use of history, Tawney skillfully
enlightens his readers to the problems involved in restraining
untrammelled and functionless economic productivity.
To do so (determine the quantity of productivity
by some final social purpose) requires a constant
effort of will, against which egotistical instincts are
in rebellion, and because, if that will is to prevail, it
must be embodied in some social and political organization,

which may itself become so arbitrary, tyrannical and
corrupt as to thwart the performance of function153
instead of promoting it. When this process of degenera
tion has gone far, as in most European countries it had
by the middle of the eighteenth century, the indispensable
thing is to break the dead organization up and to clear
the ground. In the course of doing so, the individual
is emancipated and his rights are enlarged, but the
ideal of social purpose is discredited by the discredit
justly attaching to the obsolete order in which it is
embodied.154
Thus in England the functional relations of society were
displaced by "modem economic relations . . . which replaced the
conception of purpose by that of mechanism."1

The Industrial

Revolution would not only profoundly modify the facts of economic
structure, '*but the minds which appraised them.1,1^

The essence

of the change was the "disappearance of the idea that social insti
tutions and economic activities were related to common ends which
gave them their significance and which served as their criterion."
Society became viewed as a self-adjusting mechanism in which the
pursuit of private ends is transmuted by an invisible hand into
the attainment of the Ultimate End.
If pressed, however, to give an answer to the obvious ques
tion of what was the final goal of the economic system, the indus
trialists and conventional economists would give an answer
reminiscent of the Benthamite formula "the greatest happiness of
the greatest number."

Tawney*s response to this answer is charac

teristic of his historical approach to social problems.

Instead

of attacking the obvious mathematical impossibility of a double
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maximization in one order (the vagueness of which Tawney alluded
to) he perceptively noted that, historically speaking,
. . . to say that the end of social institution is
happiness, is to say that they have no conmon end at all.
For happiness is individual, and to make happiness the
object of society is to resolve society itself into the
ambitions of numberless individuals, each directed towards
the attainment of some personal purpose.158
Such a doctrine has been historically used to assure "men that
there are no ends other than their ends, no law other than their
desires, no limit other than that which they think advisable.
Under the impulse of such ideas men do not become religious or
wise or artistic; for religion and wisdom and art imply the accep
tance of

l i m i t a t i o n s . "159

jn brief, the Benthamite formula of

"the greatest happiness for the greatest number" leads to the
"Acquisitive Society" whose whole tendency "is to promote the
acquisition of wealth."-^®

According to Tawney's historical studies,

the Benthamite goal had been guilty of obscuring the notion of
final humane standards or principles by which mankind throughout
history had moderated the pursuit of economic possessions.

Twaney

claims that
. . .when we condemn slavery, sweating, the exploitation
of a weak race by a conqueror, even though these things
are convenient to the greatest number concerned, we do
so because we recognize . . . there is a law higher than
the well-being of the majority, and that law is the
supreme value of every human personality as such.l°l
Such an untraumelled pursuit of maximum individual happiness leads
to what Tawney regards as the nemesis of industrialism.

Paradoxi-
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cally, it is not the failure of industrialism which causes the
general malaise of m o d e m economic society, but its very success,
its total domination of society as a way of life.
The will to economic power, if it is sufficiently
single-minded, brings riches. But if it is single-minded
it destroys the moral restraints which ought to condition
the pursuit of riches, and therefore also make the pursuit
of riches meaningless.162
Like the spirits in Dante's Inferno, they are punished by the at
tainment of their desires.
Tawney notes that such a frenetic rush to produce without any
guiding ultimate principle creates a situation where "part of the
goods which are annually produced, and which are called wealth, is
strictly speaking, waste . . . (which) should not have been pro
duced at all."163

those who clamor for increased produc

tivity as the solution to society’s ills, Tawney responds "Would
not 'Spend less on private luxuries' be as wise a cry as 'Produce
more’?"

To do so, however, would be "to admit that there is a

principle superior to the mechanical play of economic forces, . . .
and thus abandon the view that all riches, however composed, are an
end, and that all economic activity is equally justifiable."164
Tawney continues by comparing "Prussian militarism" to "English
industrialism."

Both of these ideologies have killed the souls of

men by allowing a subordinate social system to dominate their
societies.

"When the Press clamors that the one thing needed to

make this island an Arcadia is productivity, and more productivity,
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and yet more productivity, that is Industrialism.

It is the con

fusion of means with ends."^^
Tawney concludes The Acquisitive Society by declaring that
what English society needs, therefore, is a purpose, a principle
of limitation.

Such a parinciple of limitation would divide

"what is worth doing from what is not, and settles the scale upon
which what is worth doing ought to be done . . . Above all, it
assigns to economic activity itself its proper place as the servant,
not the master, of society."1****
This is not the place to review the historical portion of
Tawney*s Religion and the Rise of Capitalism,*6 ? but it is appro
priate to our analysis to review the conclusions which Tawney drew
from his historical studies.

J. D. Chambers has succinctly sum

marized the importance of Tawney*s findings:
As is well known, Tawney*s main preoccupation was
with the secularization of traditional Christian values
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries— the greatest
event, he considered, in the history of Western civiliza
tion. It was the first step, in Tawney's view, on the
way to the establishment of an acquisitive society based
on competition, individualism, and the divine right of
self-aggrandisement on the assumption that what is good
for one is, in the long run, good for all.1*"
In the concluding chapter of Religion and the Rise of Capi
talism Tawney returns to many of the concerns that had troubled
him in the opening pages of The Acquisitive Society.

He quotes

Berkeley's aphorism 'TYhatever the world thinks, he who has not much
meditated upon God, the human mind and the sunmum bonum may pos-
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sibly make a thriving earthworm, but will most indubitably make
a sorry patriot and a sorry statesman."
that
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He continues by noting

"the most obvious facts are the most easily forgotten.

the existing economic order,

Both

and too many of the projects advanced

for reconstructing it, break down through their neglect of the truism
that, since even quite common men have souls, no increase in
material wealth will compensate them for arrangements which insult
their self-respect ahd impair their freedom."

Then Tawney sums

up the result of much of his historical study:
The distinction made by the philosophers of clas
sical antiquity between liberal and servile occupations,
the medieval insistence that riches exist for man, not
man for riches, Ruskin's famous outburst, 'there is no wealth
but life,’ . . . are but different attempts to emphasize
the instrumental character of economic activities by
reference to an ideal which is held to express the true
nature of man.170
Once again, as we conclude our review of Tawney's analysis of
the function of wealth and the economic system, we are led around
to the question of what is the "true nature of man."

Though Tawney

never defined the nature of man in so many words, late in his life
Tawney remarked that man, "as known to history, is a religious
animal."

And he considered the m odem industrialism and Capitalism

not as irreligious but as counterreligious with their "idolatry of
riches and the idolatry of p o w e r . " * I n his diary he had remarked
some twenty years earlier, "If it be asked what is your criterion:
why do you condemn this and approve that?

I answer that the stan

dard which we apply is really a transcendental, religious, or
mystical one."
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The important thing for Tawney was not to define
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precisely the ideal--such an achievement was clearly inpossible in
any total or definitive sense--but to recognize the need to acknow
ledge the primary importance of such a standard or principle.

As

he wrote "These (ideals of religion, art, and understanding) are
not hard to find for those who really seek than, or who seek them
first.

But if they are sought second they are never found at

Indubitably, Tawney sought them first.

a l l . "*73

Perhaps this is why another

eminent British economic historian, T. S. Ashton, was able to write
of Tawney that "students who had the good fortune to sit at his feet
rose with the sense of having been in touch not only with scholar
ship, but with

wisdom."*

G. K. Chesterton and the Distributists
Sympathetic with, but independent of, the Hobson and Tawney
attempt to persuade economic theorists to include a more ultimate
goal in the analysis of economic production and consumption, was
the effort by G. K. Chesterton, Hilaire Belloc and their followers
to bring about a general reform in the English socio-economic
structure.
Disturbed by the increasing lack of individual freedom and
creativity both in the industrial market society of England with
its cash nexus and in the collective society of Russia with its
stifling bureaucracy, Chesterton and Belloc searched for a socio
economic alternative to the feral individualism of capitalism and
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the oppressive centralization of Comunism.
tributism.

The result was Dis

Distributism was formally b o m when Hilaire Belloc

published The Servile State in 1912.

Belloc claimed that capi

talism was leading western society to a state of servility in
which the few with economic power based on a monopoly industri
alism and commercialism would have coercive power over the lives
of the many.

Because, however, of the fact that the many would

have political power, capitalism as such was not stable and would
evolve either into a plutocracy, a collective state, or to Dis
tributism in which the means of production would be widely dis
tributed among the citizenry.

Belloc elaborated further on this

in his Economics for Helen published in 1924.

In order to develop

both the theory of Distributism and to spread its message G. K.
Chesterton founded the remarkable weekly newspaper G . K.’s Weekly
in 1925.

Ian Boyd has written that

. . . if there was a classical period of Distributism,
it occurred during the years between 1926 and 1936 when
G. K. Chesterton was at once the president of the Distributist League and the editor of G. K.’s Weekly which was
its political organ. During this last decade of his life,
he and his associates produced a considerable body of
literature in which they attempted to supply Distributist
answers to the political and economic questions of the day.* 5
During this decade Chesterton developed five overlapping
objections to the orthodox economic theorists:

First and basic

to the rest of his objections was Chesterton’s claim that conven
tional economic theorists were only concerned about efficiency and
not about the fundamental value-system and Final Cause of the
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economic system.
At least people seemed to take a particular
interest in every kind of theory except that which
is called theology. One gentleman said that theo
logical questions did not interest him; quite
arrogantly for all the world as if it were something
to be proud of. As a matter of fact, the refusal to
go to the roots ofthought is responsible for a great
deal of failure inthe fruits of it .^'6
Second:

Such theorists tended to be very political and would

shift their views in order to stay in favor with powerful groups.^ 7
Third:

Chesterton saw economic theory being used as an

accomodating tool by

both the capitalists and the socialists to

enslave the majority

of

Fourth:

individuals by the few

inpower.

This lack of a moral base and this political out

look led to frequent internal contradictions and inconsistencies.
In a lecture at Oxford Chesterton declared that he was unwilling
to enter the arena of "howling and shrieking economists who contra
dicted each other, if not themselves, at every point."178
Fifth:

Economists tended to be too literal and quantity-

minded, or as Chesterton describes them "simple realists" who are
not able to understand "the idea of an idea."

Chesterton illus

trates this exaggerated literalism in his description of an ad
dress that he presented before the London School of Economics:
The Editor of this paper recently had occasion
to give an informal address to a meeting at the London
School of Economics; which should be the very temple
of the abstract sciences. But what impressed him most
in the debate, entertaining and energetic as it was, was
that the prevailing process of thought seemed to be not
so much a pedantic or academic detachment as an almost
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childish literalism. Some of the brightest debaters
seem to be like the schoolboy who cannot even imagine
a triangle without turning it into a three-cornered
tart.
Sometimes the conments sounded uncomtionly like
those sometimes uttered by Sandwich Islanders or other
savages, when a missionary strives in vain to explain
the theoretical nature of theology.
It is not difficult to perceive why the study of conventional
economic theory had little appeal to the mind of Chesterton.
Though Chesterton and his followers were aware of the need
for efficiency in the economic system, they were adamant in de
claring that there was much more to political economy than the
conventional political economist's final goal of the maximization
of production under certain constraints.

As one Distributist

remarked, "Not maximum but sufficient production is the economic
aim par excellence."
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The Ultimate End of the Distributists, on the other hand, is
somewhat more complex.

G. K. Chesterton attempted to define it

in the following manner:
Distributism, as we understand it, really consists
of two propositions, one purely economic and the other
ethical or psychological. But they have only to be
stated to be recognized as parts of the same spirit,
operating on the two planes. The first is that any sort
of economic power, whether in cash or credit or the ma
terials that make true wealth, had much better be
distributed rather than left undistributed in the hands
of individual millionaires. The second is that this
distribution of mere cash or credit is but a mere symbol,
or a minor application, of a much more vital principle;
that what should be distributed is not merely the legal
power of a man over money, but the divine or mystical
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power of a man over matter. Man is made man, after
the fact that he prays, by the fact that he ploughs,
that he builds, that he cuts wood for transport
or carves it foT ornament; in short, by the fact
that he has this mystical privilege of mastery over
the material universe. The one essentially true
idea of democracy is the desire to make what is
true of Man true of "a man;" that is, if possible,
of any man. In a free country, therefore, men
would become completely men in proportion as they
have land to plough if they choose, or wood to carve
as they like. It is as easy to see that this ideal
is difficult as to see that it is desirable.181
The final goal or Ultimate End for the Distributists was that
as many individuals as possible should have the economic freedom
to fulfill those instincts which lie at the core of his or her
being rather than to possess the greatest possible amount of eco
nomic goods and services.

For this reason Distributists promoted

that economic society which had as its ideal a wide diffusion of
the means of production, and one in which the majority of indivi
duals would be self-employed.

For to G. K. Chesterton, "the moral

of the whole nineteenth century is that it is vain to have political
equality with economic inequality."182

promotion of such

economic equality was thus dictated by the Ultimate End of man and,
as such, was a component of ethical justice.
turn, became subject to ethics.

Economic theory, in

"To make political economy merely

a physical or merely a mental science, or again merely a mixed
mental and physical science, is not much better than making it a
mere art: it is a part of ethics, nothing more and nothing less,"
is the manner in which a favorite textbook of the Distributists

183
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described the relationship between ethics and economics.
The economic activities of production and consumption have
their only rationale to the extent that they contribute to the
progressive approximation of that quality of life which is ap
propriate for individually free men who are created in the image
of their creator and, as such, have certain rather definite and
unique responsibilities.

That which the Distributists would

maximize was something different than material goods but something
in the soul of man.

One writer to the editor of the successor

to G. K.*s Weekly illustrated this difference between the economists
and the Distributists in the following manner:
The reason I have never laboured in the foot
steps of Ricardo and Mill, Marx and the Fabians is
that I could never get over my instinct that the first
step was a false step. Ruskin's mid-nineteenth chal
lenge has been evaded; it has never been answered.
In other words, . . . I have never found a definition
of wealth that seemed to make it much worth while
going on. A definition of wealth that leaves out of
account the soul of man seems to me to promise nothing
but a journey into the illimitable continent of
darknessT*®^
For the Distributist, increasing production levels or, as it
is sometimes phrased in conventional economic literature, "optimal"
growth rates could not be considered as final goals of an economic
system.

What was the effect of the production of commodities on

the personality of the worker?

What was the effect of the con

sumption of such commodities on the personality of the consumer.
These were the questions that the Distributists deemed important.
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As regards the first question, the Distributists were quite
conscious of the relationship between the object produced and
the producer.

"It is thus that man stands alone among the animals.

He alone can deliberately make things which, because of an intrinsic
quality, have an independent right to existence.

Man alone has the

power of making t h i n g s . Or, as Chesterton remarked in a
quotation that we have previously mentioned, "Man is made man . . .
by the fact that he ploughs, that he builds, that he cuts wood for
transport or carves it for ornament; in short, by the fact that he
has this mystical privilege of mastery over the material universe."
Productive activity thus has not only for its ideal a certain
quantity to be produced but also a certain type of productive ac
tivity.

That type of productivity which enabled an individual to

be free and creative, to exercise this "mystical privilege of
mastery over the material universe" was the ideal.

That type of

productivity which enslaved an individual was to be avoided at all
costs.

The whole point of Hilaire Belloc's The Servile State was

that both Capitalism and Socialism led to enslaved individuals;
capitalism by leading to the concentration of ownership so that the
proletariat became wage slaves and collectivism by leading to a
concentration of power in the hands of a few political leaders.
This concern over the concentration of the means of produc
tion led the Distributists to the program for which they are best
known and from which they have obtained their name; the distribution

147

of productive property among the citizenry.

This ideal of distri

bution of productive property came to be the distinguishing mark
of Distributism.

The true contrary of the word ’’property" is the

word "prostitution" proclaimed Chesterton in the preface to
Outline of Sanity. Though the Distributists were aware that such
a distribution of productive property could not be carried out
completely, nor did they actually desire an exact redistribution
of all productive property, they did, however, plead for a society
in which ownership of private property would be the norm and one
in which extensive private ownership of productive property would
set the tone.
The Distributists were aware that certain industries had such
benefits from economies of scale and mass production that it was
technically impossible to abolish them.

Eric Gill pointed out

that the goal of Distributism was not to abolish large-scale
industries but to minimize the influence of such industries to
the greatest extent possible:
Electric light, for instance, could not be, but
for the fact that millions of miles of fine copper
wire can be turned out by factories. Fountain pens
and typewriters could not be, but for standardised
labour. But bread and beer and houses and clothes
and books
could be better
without suen h m u j l .
For those industries which had to be massive in size because
of obvious economies of scale there was seme controversy among the
Distributists over the best policy of ownership.

Some advocated
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state ownership while others favored some sort of worker ownership
through share holding.

A majority, however, probably would have

agreed with Chesterton that "such necessary machines should be
owned by a small local guild, on principles of profit-sharing."*8^
In order to distinguish between those industries which were
necessarily of large size and those which could be separated into
smaller units of production, G. K. Chesterton had in mind the idea
"of a series of exhaustive examinations of the big combines and the
big shops, written by somebody who could afford the time and
trouble to investigate them thoroughly."IBS

gut the money and

talent necessary for such an investigation was not available at
the time, and apprently this series of examinations of large corpora
tions was never performed.

Earlier, however, Chesterton on his own

had investigated the economies of scale in retail stores.

His con

clusions was:
Except the illegitimate advantages of being
able to kill the competition of a small man, and to
bamboozle the public with display in the shop and in
printed advertisement, we fail to see that a big
store possessesfiany advantage, even in terms of cash,
over a market.
The Distributists also did some actual experiments in the agricul
tural industry, and concluded that moderate-sized farms were just
as efficient as the large absentee-owned farming operations.
But even if a certain amount of efficiency in production was
foregone, all Distributists were at one in claiming that such ef
ficiency was not their only goal.

As Chesterton phrased it, "If
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we can make men happier, . . .

it does not matter if we make

them less p r o d u c t i v e . I t was, moreover, his contention that
there were already too many things being produced.

"We use a

thousand things to stun and stupefy people, when we might use a
third of those things to awaken and enlighten them."-^

Thus the

Distributists would violate the first maxim of the standard economics
textbook and be quite content with being inside the boundary of the
production possibilities curve.

For the Distributists, to have

as a goal that the economy always be on the boundary of the produc
tion possibilities curve makes an intermediate end into a final
end, and thus ultimately is enslaving.

Indeed they would claim

there is something basically irrational about a theory which, having
no criterion anterior to itself, is its own justification and
which must, therefore, necessarily end in disaster.
Distributists were also concerned about the quality of goods
produced as well as the quantity.

Distributists felt that the

responsibility of ownership of productive property would make for
higher quality goods both directly and indirectly.

Directly,

because each worker would feel more directly responsible for the
goods produced.

Indirectly, because the responsibility of such

ownership would make for better individuals, and such individuals
in turn would be capable of producing better quality goods.

Among

the Distributists, Eric Gill especially lamented the loss of
individually responsible craftsmen and the quality of work performed
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under mass production.
. . . it is as responsible workmen, that men
must own; for it is only as owners that they can do
to things as they should be done by, . . . In every
case ownership is necessary for the good of the
work to be done, and if the work be done well the
whole consnunity will benefit.!92
If the Distributists were attempting to determine the health
and prosperity of a nation's economy, it would not be sufficient
to sum up the money value of the national output as is done in
sane gross national product (GNP) measurement.

They would also

want to know sanething about the quality of the goods produced,
and, moreover, they would want some information about the indivi
dual liberty of those most intimately involved in the production
process.
Since Distributism did not have maximum production as its
primary goal, it could not have maximum consumption as one of its
goals; nor did it.

Even though the Distributists were well aware

of the joys of consumption and certainly were not an ascetic group
(One of the reasons given for the decline of Distributism was that
"distributism got mixed up with a sort of mystique of beer-drinking
and noisy good-fellowship."

193

), they distrusted the society in

which they lived which set such a superior value upon efficient
mass production and gross consumption of material goods.

G. C.

Heseltine expressed the Distributist viewpoint in the following
manner:
It may, indeed, be the way of perfection and the
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achievement of an earthly paradise to work for a few
whose philosophy is wholly material, and to accept
the substitute foods, the cheap and depraved
amusements, the mechanized routine life that the system
gives them . . . But the Distributist is unconvinced.194
The Distributists believed that mass production and its at
tendant of mass advertising had led to a society in which the
quality of man's life suffered because man forgot that he was
more than a mere consumer of material goods.
Though the Distributists were unwilling to dictate to the
individual precisely what means he should take or what he should
consume to be hippy because they believed that such decisions
should be left up to the free choice of the responsible propertied
individual, the Distributists did feel that one of the marks of
a responsible individual is precisely a rejection of the "more is
better" philosophy.

They realized that the utilitarian economic

philosophy which emphasizes maximum production and consumption is
detrimental to the Distributist way of life.

For the Distributist

system to work would demand a society of individuals who placed
individual freedom and self-reliance above increased consumption
of material goods.

Thrift in consumption would be a social virtue

rather than a social vice.

G. K. Chesterton saw clearly the re

lationship between liberty and self-control in consumption.

"If

we are to preserve the old eighteenth century ideal of liberty,
we must go back to the old eighteenth century ideal of thrift.
Consumption of goods is thus moderated by a higher end or
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goal rather than being an end in itself.

This is perhaps the es

sential difference between Distributism and m o d e m economic
theory,

G. K. fs Weekly was well aware of this critical distinc

tion in outlook toward consumption and made every effort to analyze
this difference, to expose its implicationsf and to abet the
Distributist position.

For instance, one of its writers attempted

to get to the heart of the distinction and to show the wisdom of
the Distributist position by calling in Aristotle for support:
But, being a man, one will also need external
prosperity, for our nature is not self-sufficient for
the purpose of contemplation, but our body also must
be healthy and must have food and other attention.
Still, we must not think that the man who is happy
will need many things and great things, merely because
he cannot be supremely happy without external goods;
for self-sufficiency and action do not involve excess,
and we can do noble acts without ruling earth and sea.196
Herein lay a crucial dilenma for Distributism and one which
they never overcame, to wit; they wanted to maximize the indivi
dual’s liberty, but the majority of individuals apparently of
their own free will did not want this freedom.197

majority

of people seemed to prefer the security of a fixed income to the
arduous responsibility of self-employment.

G. K. Chesterton

wrestled with this dilenma and attempted to define what had led
men apparently of theiT own free will to such an enslaving eco
nomic decision.

In one of his most penetrating essays he wrote:

When I began it (G. K. *s Weekly), I merely thought
it reasonable that there should be one weekly paper to
represent a reasonable alternative to conventional
Capitalism and academic Socialism. But I now realize . . .
that what we have taken on is something much bigger
than m o d e m Capitalism or Comnunism combined. I
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realize that we are trying to fight the whole world;
to turn the tide of the whole time we live in; to
resist everything that seems irresistible; . . .
For the thing we oppose is something of which
capitalism and collectivism are only economic by
products; , . . It is so vast and vague that its
offensiveness is largely atmospheric; it is perhaps
easier to defy than to define. But it might be
approx
t spirit
which

Chesterton then continues in this essay to state that if men
refuse to recognize and respect the natural boundaries inherent
in their created beings, if they refuse to respect their creator’s
transcendence, then they have nothing left to respect but their
own efforts, which is precisely efficiency in production and con
sumption.

Such a pursuit after efficiency in production is basically

irrational according to G. K. Chesterton.

Since it has no criterion

anterior to itself, it is its own justification and must perforce
culminate

in social anarchy.

It is this refusal to recognize

these transcendent truths that had led England to such a baneful
situation that most of her citizens would prefer the security of
economic slavery to the exhilaration of being self-reliant.

They

were unwilling to follow behind the banner of Distributism which
declared:
Distributism is the negation of all parasitism,
for it sees in every man a potential living, thinking,
acting free man, made in the image of God, conscious
of the omnipotence of God and yearning to develop
the God that is in him.l"
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But if one does not recognize the transcendence and primal
authority of a God, how can one yearn to develop the God that is
in him?

It was for this reason that Chesterton believed that his

role, the role of G. K.*s Weekly, and Distributists everywhere
was not so much to draw up a detailed program of Distributist
4

policy and how to achieve it (though such programs were drawn up
and plans devised on how to achieve the Distributist state), but
by peaceful persuasion of public opinion, a revolution in values
and ideas, a change of heart in the direction of humility before
one's God.
Nowadays it is exactly those who realize that
we have here no abiding city who alone can build
anything like a city that will abide.
It is ex
actly those who know that man on earth is man in
exile who can alone turn the earth into anything
like a home.200
This then was G.K. C.'s role; to teach man that earth is not
his permanent home, that there is more to life than material pro
duction and consumption.

Strangely enough, such an unearthly

philosophy put such an emphasis on the rights of each individual
to own a portion of this earth.

Yet Chesterton and the Distributists

were completely consistent in this respect.

For they realized that

if an individual is not to be of the world,

he has tohave some

ownership in the world, or else his freedom

to be not of this

is constrained.

world
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CHAPTER IV

SIGNIFICANCE OF CAUSA MATERIAL IS AND CAUSA FINALIS

To understand and then to improve the reality of commercial
production, allocation and consumption is the double-barrelled chal
lenge that we economists place before ourselves.

Both understanding

and improvement of the economic system require a disciplined intel
lect that can use all the relevant epistemological tools in the
attempt to penetrate the veils of superficial appearances to the
essence of the economic system.

Just as mere description of what

ever economic data one thinks relevant is not sufficient for a
thorough understanding of an economic system so mere extrapolation
of whatever trends one thinks desirable is not a sufficient base for
a thorough reform of the system.

Both knowledge and reform require

more than one's unsubstantiated personal intuition and desires;
they require, above all, a consistency between one’s mind and ob
jective reality.

Such wisdom requires much insight, the ability

to observe and contemplate as well as to reason and act.
In our western intellectual and moral tradition, the most
important key both to understanding and reform has been the concept
of causation.

As Aristotle has stated, 'Imen do not think that they

know a thing till they have grasped the 'why* of it ."1

In order

to grasp the "why" of it, Aristotle next showed that there were
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four essential causes for every rational human act; the causa
materialis, the causa efficiens, the causa formalis, and the
causa finalis.

An example is the building of a house wherein the

wood and other materials are the causa materialis, the carpenter's
labor and the tools are the causa efficiens, the blueprint or plan
in carpenter's mind is the causa formalis and the desire to have a
home for shelter and comfort is the causa finalis. To both under
stand and judge this act of production and consumption in its
totality, one would have to investigate all four of these causes
since all four play an essential part in both understanding the
essence of the action and determining the usefulness of the end
product.

Were the most satisfactory materials used?

carpenter and his tools efficient?
blueprint?
nature?

Were the

Did he have a good plan or

Was the planned house consistent with the needs of his

All such questions are relevant in both understanding

this act of production and in assessing its worth.
The same methodological approach has to be taken when a
social scientist would investigate the total economic system with
a view towards understanding and reform.

In current methodology,

however, in economics as well as in other theoretical sciences,
two of the types of causes advanced by Aristotle have been reduced
in importance;

these are the causa materialis and the causa finalis.^

In its search for understanding and its quest for reform, eco
nomics has tended to utilize only the causa efficiens and the
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causa formal is. and of these two it has emphasized the causa ef
ficiens much more than the causa formalis. More accurately, the
causa formalis is oftentimes submerged by the causa efficiens.

As

Phyllis Colvin remarked, “theoretical science tends to meld these
two fundamentals of explanation, concentrating far more on the
causa efficiens than on the causa formalis."^
own justification.

"Doing*' becomes its

We no longer ask, "Doung what?"

Even less do

we explore "doing what for what?" or analyze the consequences of
"Doing what for what and with what?"
To attempt to study and to reform

the economic system of

reasonable purposive beings and to neglect the causa materialis
and causa finalis of such a system while merging the causa formalis
into the causa efficiens would have appeared to Aristotle to shirk
one's intellectual responsibility and to ensure that one would end
up with the most dangerous kind of knowledge and reform, i.e.,
half-knowledge and half-reform or, more accurately, quarterknowledge and quarter-reform.
Why have most economists neglected the causa materialis and
causa formalis and focused their attention on the causa efficiens?
Is it because they covet the precision and mathematical rigor of
the physical sciences which have as their object the analysis of
the quantifiable dimensions of
jects?

inert (i.e., non-purposive) ob

For instance, in classical mechanics the only type of

causation that was necessary for the research scientist to be
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concerned ahout was the materially measurable causa efficiens.
In such a reductionist and mechanistic methodology every immediate
physical cause (the causa efficiens]) can be viewed as discretely
distinct from all other immediate physical causes as a single
nunber is distinct from all other numbers.

This arithmomorphic

assumption, to borrow a term from Georgescu-Roegen,^ allowed the
classical physicist to make extensive use of mathematics and con
sequently to construct an imposing exact and precise intellectual
edifice.

Yet the epistemological cost of such a discretely

ordered methodology is great, even for the physical sciences as
both Georgescu-Roegen and Colvin have shown.

The cost is even

greater for the economist who deals not with inert objects but a
social system composed of reasonable and purposive beings.

If

one treats only of the causa efficiencs in an economic system,
(only the labor and tools of the carpenter) one is forced to
neglect the treatment of such topics as the adequacy of the ma
terial resources of the environment or the evaluation of the ulti
mate end of the system.

[Do we have enough wood for the house?

Do we really need a house?).

Yet since it is through analysis

of the adequacy of material resources and the evaluation of the
ultimate end that we determine what is actually possible and
important, such an arithmomorphic approach based upon the philos
ophy of logical positivism "comes perilously close to saying of
C

the important we have nothing important to say."J
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Is the reason that economists have excluded a complete
analysis of the causa materialis and causa finalis from their
methodology because, on the one hand, they believe that tech
nology will resolve all problems of absolute material shortages and,
on the other hand, nothing useful can be said about the causa
finalis beyond stating that the causa finalis of the economic
system is the fulfillment of the given individual consumer’s
preferences?

Such an assuirption will allow the economists to

continue to use the arithmomorphic model in which all effective
wants are viewed as morally neutral.

Or, in other words, if a

consumer purchases an item, that is positive proof that this item
is a causa finalis in itself.

Since in such an approach there are

as many ultimate goals as there are self-conscious free economic
agents, the causa finalis of the economic system treated as a
whole is the most harmonious and greatest possible achievement of
all these individual goals.

Hence the appreciation for the

Benthamite goal, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number,"
as the implicit final goal of the economic system.
Some such causa finalis supports the crucial "revealed
preference theorem" with its assumption of given tastes.

Such a

utilitarian and positivistic presupposition has widespread credence
in our age and important implications; not the least of which is
the result that since any individuals's preferences are an legiti
mate as any other, not too much can be said about good or bad,
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wasteful

ot

necessary production and consumption with the result

that the science of economics ends up in a moral and ecological
nihilism.

If individual goals did not conflict either with each

other or with those of future generations, one might not object;
but if they did (and they do)f then we would be thrown back into
the problems of justice and ethics, but without the possibility of
there being any such thing as justice and ethics!

As Fred Hirsch

has noted, 'The problem here is that the pursuit of private and
essentially individualistic economic goals by enterprisers, con
sumers, and workers in their market choices . . . must be girded
at key point by a strict social morality which the system erodes
rather than sustains."^

Without a moral base, economic power

itself becomes the final arbiter of crucual decisions and we have
a full-blown plutocracy.

One can understand why this choice of

the fulfillment of individual preferences as the causa finalis
of the economic system has popular appeal to those who possess a
large share of current economic wealth, but less appeal to those
who do not or who are concerned about the lot of future genera
tions.

Perhaps the historian J. C. Hare was not too far wrong

when he noticed in the early part of the nineteenth century,
Often indeed the current philosophy is merely
the reflexion of the reigning vice of an age: as has
been the case with a great part of that which has as
sumed the name of philosophy in England during the
last hundred years. Its chief aim has been to palliate
and justify, to establish and define that worship of
Maimon.
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Thus the economic presupposition that the fulfillment of an indivi
dual's imnediate preferences is the causa finalis of an economic
system has some societal ramifications which are not inmediately
apparent.

And, whether we like it or not, individual characters

and mores are to a great extent formed by the socio-economic
structures in which people live, work, and consume.
Frank Knight has stated that "the individual cannot be a
datum for the purposes of social policy, because he is formed in
and by the social process, and the nature of the individual must
be affected by any social action.

Consequently, social policy

must be judged by the kind of individuals that are produced by
or under it, and not merely by the type of relations which subsist
among individuals taken as they stand."®

This belief that the

causa finalis of the individual is the fulfillment of his economic
desires leads to a consumerism in which man's desires for com
modities are reinforced rather than checked as in more previous
societies.

The value of an individual comes to depend on the

amount that he produces and consumes and the individual's identity
becomes coterminous with his material possessions.

"Justifying

significance . . . now attached to compensation and thence to
consumption," is the phrase used by the theologian William Stringfellow to describe the consumption ethic of our m o d e m society.^
The science of economics then continues and completes the circular
argument by assuming that since demand for consumption constitutes
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the causa finalis of an article, the more conmodities that are
produced, the better off individuals in our society will neces
sarily be, which, in turn, leads individuals to identify them
selves by what they possess, which, in turn, leads economists
to value things by the consumer’s demand for them, which, in
turn . . .
Though the conventional economic theorist will plead innocent
to any charge of normatively forming the tastes and wants of the
"economic agent" (to use the economist's label for a man, not
mine),, such a plea is based upon a shallow understanding of the
consumer.

Georgescu-Roegen has remarked about such a stance:

The tastes of an individual being given, his ac
tions on the market-utility theory teaches us-are
completely determined. But as some economists (in
cluding nyself) claim, with this result we have not
exhausted the consumer problem. More important, per
haps, is the question of what determines the tastes or better, the wants - of a person.
The economist's lack of any final goal beyond that of immediate
consumer preference is itself a normative judgment and one that
has implications for the very tastes and wants of consumers by
causing consumers to tend to identify their own worth by the
amount of their economic possessions.

Ben Seligman has sunmarized

the positivist's methodology in the following manner:
Consider the circle into which the positivist
would take us: having defined his terms by what his
propositions may achieve, he takes his premises for
granted and then asserts that his enterprise is
indeed "scientific."11
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To escape from this circular argument, one must look beyond
the circular flow of monetary-valued income and product that
economists explicitly or implicitly use in describing the economic
system.

Instead of viewing the economy as a closed circular system

having no contacts with the material universe or with the final goal
of human nature, one must take a more comprehensive view of the
economy and its relations with both the material universe and the
nature of man.

"One of the evil results of positivism is that it

has abolished the desire to engage in open and free speculation
about the nature of man and the u n i v e r s e . " ^

This is just another

way of saying that economists should, as Aristotle argued many
centuries before, incorporate a critical analysis of the material
and final causes of the economic system into their methodology, if
one wants to ensure that one*s analysis is congruent with reality.
Abstract economic "wheels of monetary-valued income and product"
can roll on indefinitely and expand to an infinite size, but the
material universe is a limited sphere and the ideal society is
one which recognizes that a moderate or sufficient amount of eco
nomic production and consumption is a prerequisite to the good
society rather than one which places an ever-growing gross national
product as its goal.

When mankind overemphasizes one aspect of

his society, you can be sure that another aspect will suffer.

If

we overproduce and overconsume, we shall to that extent not only
have less time to carry on the non-productive and non-consumptive
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work of life hut, more importantly, less ability to enjoy leisure:^
to contemplate, to worship, to philosophize, to marvel, to glorify
God, to wonder, to sacrifice (sacer-facio: to make something holy
precisely by not consuming it); to love, to give thanks, to medi
tate, to be amazed, to question, or, in sumnary, to experience to
the maximum the tensions and joys of one's life.

This statement

implies nothing against production and consumption.
production and consumption are necessary acts of man.

Of course
But the

question is: whether the life of man is exhaustively defined by
production and consumption; can man develop to the full as a pro
ducer and consumer.
tion and consumption?

Is human existence coextensive with produc
Stated differently, is the causa finalis

of our existence production and consumption or is it the celebra
tion of awareness?*4

Even though economists will often give lip-

service to such non-productive and non-consumptive activities in
their introductory chapters, the main body of their analysis
completely ignores such non-productive and non-consumptive uses
of one's time.
The object of this study has been to discuss how one could
begin to construct a methodology which would incorporate the
material and final cause of the economic system into one's analy
sis.

It should be emphasized that the aim is not to replace

standard economic theory but to add to it.

Just as an economic

theory that neglects a scientific and rigorous analysis of the
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causa materialis and causa finalis tends to terminate in a moral
nihilism and wastes resources due to the lack of meaningful abso
lute reference points, so a theory that would neglect a rigorous
analysis of the causa efficiens and causa formalis would result
in a waste of resources and inability to reach the perceived
final goal due to internal and relative inefficiencies.
Since the causa materialis of an economic system is the
primary natural resources such as metal-bearing ores* energy
resources and biological nutrients, it is clear that if economic
theorists want to analyze the causa materialis of the economic
system, they must be cognizant of the relevant conclusions of
those scientists who have as their formal subject of analysis the
biophysical universe.

For example, it is imperative that economic

theorists incorporate within their analysis concepts such as abso
lute limits, ecological threshholds, and entropic degradation of
useful matter.

Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen has shown in

The

Entropy Law and the Economic Process that because of the nature
of matter, such incorporation rules out reversible mechanistic or
arithmomorphic models.

Such mechanistic and arithmomorphic models

will lead to grave inconsistencies and insoluble paradoxes.

But,

as shown above in chapter 2, even before Georgescu-Roegen's master
ful opus, there were economists who realized that the incorporation
of the limits inherent in the physical universe would expand the
boundaries of economic theory.

The names of Maithus, Jevons in
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The Coal Question, John Ise, Lewis C, Gray and Frederick Soddy
jianp into one's mind.

Without having to determine the precise

physical limits of such resources, if one admits of absolute
scarcity and the consequent need to conserve essential resources
for future generations, then somehow one must in his analysis
explicitly provide for the conservation of such resources.

Such

a presupposition will have as one implication that the crucial
definition of costs are changed.

A society's throughput of re

sources will have to be viewed as a cost to society that has to
be explicitly minimized rather than maximized.

The growth of

gross national product can no longer be an object of society per
se.

At the very least, more analysis and insight into the com

ponents of gross national product will be required.

Much of

what now appears to be desirable in our economy will no doubt
turn out to be undesirable.

The immediate goal for an economy

would be to level out its gross national product at the most ef
ficient point, using as one's reference points for efficiency the
biophysical limitations of the universe's natural resources and
the economic needs of the human nature of the individuals who make
up the society.^
What are the economic needs of the individuals who compose
economic society?

The fulfillment of such needs is, of course,

the causa finalis of any society.

Just as we had to turn to the

physicists and biologists for help in resolving the question of
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the dimensions of the causa materialis so we must turn for aid to
the scholars who study human nature to resolve our difficulties
at this point since the question of legitimate economic needs
ultimately depends upon how one answers the perennial question
first asked by Socrates, what is the nature of man.

As E, F.

Schumacher has pointed out,
Economics is being taught without any awareness of
the view of human nature that underlies present-day
economic theory. In fact, many economists are them
selves unaware of the fact that such a view is implicit
in their teachings and that nearly all their theories
would have to change if that view changed. ^
If this Socratic question is ignored by economists, it will still
be answered, but by default

rather than by design.

Such an

avoidance of the question ignores the vast amount of study and
reflection that scholars have performed in their analysis of human
nature.

Such an avoidance ignores the potential of the mind of

man to study his own nature and, as such, is patently irrational
and leads to the rational pursuit of an irrational end.

As Paul

Hayne has written:
Economists ought to re-examine their thinking on the
whole subject of value judgments. They enter inevitably
into scientific work. Their critical examination can
sometimes contribute at least as much to the development
of warranted knowledge as can the further refinement of
data or the logical improvement of formal models. Eco
nomists will, of course, shy away from such a challenge
if they continue to maintain that value judgments are
nothing but statements of subjective preference. But
this is itself a dogma that flies in the face of the un
deniable fact that people do hold at least some value
judgments to be interpersonally valid, that they do offer

185

evidence and reasons to support their value judgments,
and that rational discussion often does lead to consensus
among people who began by holding Cor supposing that they
held) conflicting ethical or political positions.*?
Though it is true that the analysis of human nature will
require insights and disciplines of a different nature than that
of the physical scientists,*® such a prerequisite does not make
such knowledge impossible unless one is constrained by the epistemology and methodology of the physical sciences.

The fault,

in short, lies not in the epistemology of the physical scientist
but with the ’’naive belief that science represents an absolute
and exclusive view of reality."*^
Though it may be admitted that the more one explores the
ultimate material and final causes of the economic Systran the
less precise and less subject to mathematical logic one’s knowledge
can be; this, however, does not mean that such knowledge will be
less valuable or secure.

Indeed, the contrary conclusion would

be more correct, for as the noted mathematician and philosopher
of science, Alfred N. Whitehead, has noted, "No science can be
more secure than the unconscious metaphysics which it tacitly
presupposes."20

To refuse to study such presuppositions because

of the incapability of their being subjected to the methodology
used by the physical sciences does not, of course, negate their
existence or real importance.

One should not expect a scientific

methodology whose usefulness is limited to analyzing mechanistic
matter and to devising the most efficient manipulations of such
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matter for ends already established, to be capable of dealing with
the more fundamental question of final causes and ultimate values.
This avoidance of the issue means that crucial fundamental pre
suppositions and principles of causation will exist and perform
their function in a hidden and implicit manner.

Historically

speaking it appears that when economists ignore the question of
the causa finalis as, by and large, they have for the last century
or so, economic activity becomes its own justification, which is
a perversion of the traditional role of ends and means.

When

this happens, when the economic system becomes autonomous of the
civilization and culture within which it operates, arrogating to
itself that culture and civilization, instead of serving the ends
of culture it becomes destructive and cannabilizes the culture.
To take as "given" the material causes and the final causes
of the economic system and consequently to focus one economic
analysis solely on the severely limited area of the immediate
physical cause (capital, labor and land) of economic productivity
has led to serious distortions in perspective and to harmful per
versions of values in our society.
With gross national product per capits of more than
$5,600 and gross national waste of about 11,000 pounds per
year per capita, it is not hard to contrast us with Nero.
What we have is too much to be appreciated, beyond ade
quate perception yet within our purchasing power at least
partially because of the exploitative use of externalities.
Our consumption is almost totally conditioned by an in
satiable desire for individual advancement, invidious
comparisons of the class uimediately above, or a rat
like attempt at domination and sublimation . . . What
a Martian would perceive is not only an infinite desire
for goods but an infinite desire gone mad.**
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What is the final goal which motivates economic productivity
and camsunption.

As mentioned above, when pushed on this ques

tion, economists have usually resorted to the Benthamite goal of
"the greatest good for the greatest number."

Economists have

avoided the difficult problem of defining "good" by substituting
the word "goods," in the sense of commodities.

The principle

thus became "the greatest per capita product for the greatest
number."

More products per capita and more people to enjoy those

products, lead, in this view, to the greater social good.

Our

conmitment to growth is no doubt based in considerable degree on
this principle which implies that right action is that which leads
to more goods for more people.
But there are two problems with "the greatest per capita
product for the greatest number."

First, as others have pointed

out, the dictum contains one too many "greatests."
possible to maximize more than one variable.

It is not

It is clear that

numbers of people could be increased by lowering per capita product,
and that per capita product could be increased by lowering numbers,
since resources taken from one goal can be devoted to the other.
Second, it makes a big difference whether "greatest number" refers
to those simultaneously alive, or to the greatest number ever to
22
live over time.

To resolve the first of these difficulties we must maximize
one variable only, and treat some chosen level of the other as a
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constraint on the maximization*
must substitute ''sufficient."

For one of the "greatests" we
There are two possible substitu

tions: the greatest per capita product for a sufficient number; or
a sufficient per capita product for the greatest number.
is the better principle?

Which

I suggest that we adopt the latter, and

that "greatest number" be understood as greatest number over time,
which takes care of the second problem.

The revised principle

thus becomes, "sufficient per capita product for the greatest
number over time."
It is hard to find any objection to maximizing the number of
people who will ever live at a material level sufficient for a
good life.

However, this certainly does not mean maximizing the

number alive at any one time.

On the contrary, it means the

avoidance of any destruction of the earth’s capacity to support
life--a destruction that results from overloading the life sup
port system by having too many people--especially high consuming
people--alive at once.

The opportunity cost of those extra lives

in the present is fewer people alive in all subsequent time periods,
and consequently a reduction in total lives ever to be lived at
the sufficient level.

Increasing per capita product beyond the

sufficient level (extravagant luxury) may also overburden life
support systems and have the same long-run life reducing effect
as excess population.
Maximizing number while "satisfying" per capita product does
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not imply that quantity of life is a higher value than quality.
It does assume that beyond some level of sufficiency, further
increase in per capita goods does not increase quality of life,
and in fact may well diminish it.
consideration.

But sufficiency is the first

To put it more concretely, the basic needs of all

present people take priority over future numbers, but the ex
istence of more future people takes priority over the trivial
wants of the present.

The impact of this revised utilitarian

rule is to maximize life, or what is the same thing, to economize
the long run capacity of the earth to support life at a suf
ficient level of individual wealth.^

The sufficient level may

be thought of as a range of limited inequality rather than a single
specific per capita income applicable to everyone.

Some inequality

is necessary for fairness.
I do not want to make too much of this modified utilitarian
principle.

It is a bit too arithmomorphic and it certainly offers

no magic philosopher's stone for making difficult choises easy.
But it does seem superior to the old Benthamite goal in that it
draws our attention to the concept of sufficiency, and extends
time horizon.
of purpose:

out

It forces us to face the causa finalis, the question
Sufficient for what?

Needed for what?

In our "advertising age" which prides itself on its two and
three car families, on its technical prowess, on its gadgetry,
on its deep velvet creature comfort,^ the concept and notion of
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economic sufficiency does not attract much attention among social
scientists.

We Americans, who during the first hundred years of

our nation*s history had an ever-expanding land area, and for the
second hundred years experienced an apparently limitless energy
techno logy frontier, are not used to the notion of economic limits,
of

sufficiency.

We think that included in our manifest destiny

is the right to an ever-growing plethora of economic goods. We
are the captains of our fate and that includes our economic fate
as well as our political fate.
The difficulty in combatting such a view is that it does
contain a half-truth.
possesses.
should they.

Man does yearn rightly for more than he

His current economic goods do not satisfy him, nor
However, it is not more economic goods that will

satisfy his desires.

"Our hearts are restless and only in God

will they be satisfied," was the Augustinian observation concerning
this quest.

Or as the economist Alexander Gray has stated, "In

bustling too much, one forgets that the purpose of labour is
rest, that wealth exists to be consumed, that man's chief end is
to glorify God and enjoy Him f o r e v e r . M o d e m man's error is
not in yearning for more and better things, but in his contrived
endeavor to ensure that he will remain ignorant of what the good
life does in fact consist.

His rejection of the study of legi

timate final goals has allowed any goal, no matter how unreason
able, to be considered a final goal of society.
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M o d e m society prides itself on its pluralism,
which means that a large number of things are admissable
as "good in themselves," as ends rather than as means
to an end. They are all of equal rank, all to be ac
corded first priority. If something that requires no
justification may be called an "absolute," the modem
world, which claims that everything is relative, does,
in fact, worship a very large number of "absolutes."
. . . Not only power and wealth are treated as goods
in themselves--provided they are mine and not someone
else's— but also knowledge for its own sake, speed of
movement, size of market, rapidity of change, quantity
of education, number of hospitals, etc., etc. In truth,
none of these sacred cows is a genuine end; they are all
means parading as ends.*6
As a result of this omission of an absolute goal we have
not been able to determine what is sufficient on a lower level
of life's hierarchy of values.

Whether he likes it or not, m o d e m

man must make a choice in this matter of absolute goals.

He has

three choices. He can make an act of faith in a transcendental
reality as traditionally has been the dominant practice in western
civilization.

Though this faith is superrational, it is not how

ever irrational; at least in part it evolves from a reflection
upon the reality which emerges from our human experience and
which calls for a man’s free decision upon the source of reality.
Faith in a transcendental reality is thus aided by one's trust in
the reality of the universe.

"When he assents to God, man opts

for an ultimate reason, support, meaning of reality.

In belief

in God assent to reality turns out to be ultimately substantiated
and consistent: a basic trust anchored in the ultimate depth, in
the reason of reasons . . .

In this sense it displays a radical
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rationality - which is not the same thing as rationalism."2^
Man can also make an act of faith in the notion of Pro
gress or, what is the same thing, an act of faith in the inherent
and unaided perfectibility of man himself.

Chauncy Wright, the

influential early American empiricist, described this faith in
the following manner:
Progress is a grand idea - Universal Progress
is a still grander idea. It strikes the keynote of
m o d e m civilization , . . What the ideas God, the One
and the All, the Infinite First Cause, were to an
earlier civilization, such are Progress and Universal
Progress to the m o d e m world . . . Faith that moral
perfectibility is possible, not in remote times and
places, not in the millenium, not in heaven, but in
the furtherance of a present progress, is a faith which
to possess in m o d e m times does not make a man suspected
of folly or fanaticism. He may forget the past, cease
to be religious in the conventional sense of the word,
but he is the m o d e m prophet.28
Though this faith in Progress and the perfectibility has
occasionally been found throughout history, it was not until the
time of the Enlightenment that it became fashionable.

Chauncy

Wright is probably correct when he wrote in 1865 that "it strikes
the keynote of m o d e m civilization."2^
The third option for man in this matter of faith is the
option of the radically agnostic.
faith that there is no faith.

In other words, one has the

Ultimately there is no source of,

support for, or meaning in reality.

This option has a wide fol

lowing in the m o d e m age and seems to be surpassing the faith in
progress.
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The author of this study opts for the traditional act of
faith in a transcendent God.

Since it is an act of faith, by

definition I cannot '‘prove" that my choice is the correct one
just as no person can "disprove" it.

I

my reasons for choosing this position.

can, however, present
The third option of

agnosticism is rejected because if followed to its ultimate
logical conclusion

(and,

in

opposition to many in my age,

I

like to follow things to their logical conclusion) it can easily
be shown that it leads to a nihilism and despair which is unac
ceptable to me.

As Will Herberg has written, "The philosophy

that has become normative for m o d e m man is part of an entire
spiritual complex which paradoxically combines a practical Prumetheanism with a world-outlook that is nothing short of nihilism."30
Small wonder that the m o d e m world suffers from a general malaise.
The faith in Progress and the perfectibility of man is re
jected because it seems to be just a half-way house, a somewhat
arbitrary stopping-point, between the first act of faith and the
third.

As J. B. Bury has noted, it will in the end fall a victim

to its own denial of finality.3^

Though one can glorify man for

a certain length of time as was done in the last half of the
nineteenth century in western civilization:
Glory to Man in the highest
The Maker and Master of all things.
(Algernon Charles Swinburne, Hymn to Man, 1871)
such a philosophy has no lasting power.

Less than a hundred years
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after Swinburne penned this ode to man it has become clear to
many thoughtful observers that such a faith is incongruous, to
say the least.

As one of the leading theoriticians of the

British Labor Party writes,
The evolutionary and revolutionary philosohphies
of progress have both proved false. Judging from the
facts, there is far more to be said for the Christian
doctrine of original sin than for Rousseau's fantasy of
the noble savage, or Marx's vision of the classless
society.32
We have found out that if there is one thing that the twentieth
century knows, it is that the more manipulative knowledge is at
tained by people who do not have a transcendental reference point,
"the more that knowledge is used for evil p u r p o s e s . T h u s we
perceive that the world-outlook of the faith predicated upon
Progress and the perfectibility of man, compounded by a positivistic scientism, leads to a relativism which can find no place
for absolute values in their vision of reality and, as a result,
(as Schumacher has noted) we have a plethora of means masquerading
as final ends.

But without a secure foundation, human life and

all its economic enterprises are deprived of sense and meaning.
Idolizing man dehumanizes him no less than enslavement.

If man

is looked upon as the center of the universe, then it is not dif
ficult to look upon his economic role as "maker and master of
things" as an end in itself, especially when the idea of Progress
is dethroned.

The original error of this positivistic and con

sequently relativistic faith is not, of course, in taking man
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seriously but in making man the center of the universe.

Be

cause of a too narrow perspective, m o d e m man's socio-economic
goals are rendered empty of meaning.

Relying solely on his

strength, m o d e m man is bereft of a reference point.

This has

led to a crisis which Will Herberg describes as follows:
We stand at the brink of an abyss with all
our supports swept away. Science, History, Culture,
Economic Progress, Socialism - yes, even conventional
ethics and religion - how vain and powerless they have
shown themselves to be amid the cataclysms of our
time . . . The abyss can be crossed in one way and
in one way only - by the "leap of faith." It is a
leap beyond experience, beyond science, beyond objec
tive logic. Experience, science, philosophy can bring
us to the edge of the precipice and point beyond;
they cannot help us cross: only the decision of faith
can do that,34
Contemporary economic and ecological crises are reflections of
an underlying moral and spiritual crisis of civilization, and
their resolution depends upon the resolution of that deeper
crisis.

The underlying dileirma is that, somehow, transcendental

values have come to be a luxury, a functionless decoration,
superinposed upon values determined by economic efficiency,
rather than being the measure of the appropriateness
values.

of economic

We are thus led straight to agnosticism, the faith that

there is no faith.
Our task, after having explicitly stated our basic trans
cendental faith and fundamental values, is next to explore scien
tifically the economic implications of such a stance.

In this

traditional Greco-Judaeo-Christian thought with its belief in an
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absolute and transcendental creator or First Cause, the primary
evaluation concerning economic activity is obvious: Economic ac
tivity has its rationale only to the extent that it contributes
to the progressive approximation of that quality of life which
is appropriate for men made in the image of their creator.^5
This fundamental evaluation does not signify that economic pro
ductivity

and consumption are unimportant; indeed, the opposite

conclusion would be more true.

Greco-Judaeo-Christian thought,

precisely because of its analytical investigation into the nature
of man and the final goal of man, is able to buttress its con
clusions about man's economic activities much more securely than
that rationalistic and positivistic thought which unquestionably
accepts that caricature of man, "the economic man" and his fleeting
desires as the foundation for its analysis.

This primary evalua

tion does, however, signify that economics is a subdicipline in
the realm of moral philosophy and theology.

Economics loses its

autonomy and the economist must consider ethical implications in
his analysis.

Not to do so would cause one's economic analysis

to lose all significance.

As John Maynard Keynes has testified

about the analysis of economists, "there are practically no issues
of policy, as distinct from technique, which do not involve ethical
considerations.

If this is emphasized," he goes on to say, "the

right of religion to interfere in what is essentially a branch
of ethics becomes even more obvious."^

Earlier Philip Wicksteed
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had made the same observation, "If we reflect upon these things
. . . we shall understand that the ultimate significance (of our
economic investigations) is determined by ethical considerations."3^
This does not mean that the analysis of economists loses in
importance.

Once again, on the contrary, it means that economic

research is elevated in importance and its logical foundation
supported more securely by finding its realistic niche in the
hierarchy of disciplines.

Not only is economic activity an ob

vious material prerequisite to man’s approximation to that quality
of life which befits one made in the image of his creator, but
according to the Judaeo-Christian heritage it is a spiritual pre
requisite since it is in service to man that service to God is
approved.

Judaeo-Christians "cannot take God and His will

seriously without at the same time taking seriously man and his
well-being."38
One can also support the conclusion that the discipline of
economics is elevated by subordinating it to a transcendental
final goal by discussing the Judaeo-Christian theology of labor.
If the Judaeo-Christian ideal is progressively to approximate
that quality of life which is appropriate for men and women made
in the image of their creator, is not man’s creative activity
(and that includes economic activity) an important facet of such
a society?

Though man cannot create ex nihilo, he can create

new things out of the material resources of the universe.

Man,
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alone of all animals, can deliberately make things which, because
of an intrinsic quality, have a right to existence.

G. K.

Chesterton has defined the Christian view of the noble, though
secondary, importance of economic productivity in the following
manner:
Man is made man, after the fact that he prays, by
the fact that he ploughs, that he builds, that he cuts
wood for transport or carves it for ornament; in short,
by the fact that he has this mystical privilege of
mastery over the material universe.39
It is important to note that G. K. Chesterton implies that prayer
comes before work in importance,

Economic activity, and conse

quently economic research, has great meaning but only if it accepts
the challenge of contributing to that quality of life which is
appropriate for man made in the image of his creator.
Although the study of political economy can dull
the feeling of the narrow-minded and make them see
nothing on earth but merchandise, sales and profits,
for those with a larger perspective the study of politi
cal economy will always be a source of noble meditation
on the means of improving the lot of man, and on the
largesse of the eternal creator of all things.40
This subordination of economics to ethics does not imply that
theologians should be allowed to dictate particular economic
politicies based on sacred sanctions.

Christian theology, as

befits its leader, who certainly did not dictate economic policy,
should only want to be a servant to the other disciplines by
showing them the highest meaning of life, and should not want to
take over their unique, arduous and agonizing particular re
sponsibilities.
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Theology can never be a comprehensive, systematic
world view, worked out down to the smallest details and
rendering ultimately superfluous any further reflections
of sociologists, psychologists, economists, jurists, medican experts and natural scientists . . . No science theology no more than any other science - can take as its
object all aspects of human life and action.
Hans Kung then goes on to say that the legitimate object of theology
is to attempt to answer "the often tormenting but perhaps never
theless liberating question about an ultimate w h y . N o

less

than the economist, when the theologian attempts to overstep the
boundaries of his discipline he becomes prone to error.

Economi

cally ignorant moral theology is as objectionable as morally
callous economics.

Historically the theologian who attempts to

perform economic analysis without a proper training has become a
pawn in the hands of the economically powerful or a naive revolu
tionary.

In his time Marx had more than enough evidence to make

his succinct statement that "religion is the opium of the people"
just as Whitehead has more than enough evidence to state now that
"scientism is the opium of the people."

One can readily under

stand why economists are wary of the moral directives of theo
logians when one studies some of the political-economic involve
ments of theologians in the past ages.

Unfortunately, this is

still true of some documents of the m o d e m Church authorities.
But such shenanigans are not part of theology any more than arbi
trarily defining man to be solely an "economic agent" is part of
economics.
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The true theologian who studies the absolute Creator and
man's relationship with this creator realizes, as one of his
greatest predecessors has stated, that he sees through a glass
darkly when it comes to man's most important goals and values.
This is what one should expect given the extreme "otherness"
that separates God and man.
The most important task of philosophy and theology in re
gard to economics is to set in perspective what should be the
final goals of economists.

In witnessing the intense desire of

economists to analyze the gross national product, their zeal to
maximize the utility of every resource and commodity, one can
easily get the impression

that economists regard wealth, and

the productive activity that results in wealth, as the end to
which man's existence is subservient.

Theologians in their search

for the ultimate why should have learned by this time that man's
greatness does not lie in having possession of external goods
but in utilizing such goods in a manner which recognises that
their true value lies in being used in a dependent fashion dependence upon God through His law of nature.

Such dependence

leads to the virtue of humility and away from the vice of hubris
and one cannot help but wonder if economists have acquired this
virtue of humility and avoided the vice of hubris.

This may be

analagous to what the ecological scientist is trying to tell us
when he discusses the utter dependence of man upon nature.
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What is that quality of life that is appropriate for men
made in the image of their creator:

What is the role of economics

in contributing to that quality of life?

It is clear that such

a life will find its meaning, its inspiration, its goal in
reflection upon the source of all things, its Godhead.

In Greco-

Judaeo-Christian civilization this reflection has started with
exploring all dimensions of creation itself with the hope that by
analyzing the created one might catch some glimpses of the creator.
The Judaeo-Christian, furthermore, believes he has been aided in
this search by divine revelation.

And though the Greco-Judaeo-

Christian scholar studies the material and physical dimensions of
the universe just as intently as the positivistic scientist, and
though the Greco-Judaeo-Christian investigates the manifold di
mensions of man just as thoroughly as the agnostic humanist and
will find no difficulty in accepting the conclusions of such
scholars in their appropriate areas of studies, and, indeed, will
find much that is worthy of admiration and support, the very fact
that the Greco-Judaeo-Christian perceives this analyzed mind and
matter as created adds an overlapping dimension that adds a crucial
meaning to all of the conclusions.

Only the Greco-Judaeo-Christian

can evaluate the absolute worth of all features of this created
universe from the most insignificant neutron to the most significant
works of man and even man himself.

Without this dimension that

orders all things we would have perhaps a brilliant analysis of
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certain particular aspects of the universe but we would not have
the slightest idea of the real importance of such analysis.
Because of this fundamental intellectual anchor, the JudaeoChristian has the key that can evaluate the worth of economic
goods, as E. F. Schinnacher does in the following passage.
begins by quoting the Spiritual Exercises

He

of St.Ignatius Loyola,

the Spanish founder of the Jesuits.
Man was created to praise, reverence, and serve God
our Lord, and by this means to save his soul; and
the other things on the face of the earth were
created for man's sake, and in order
to aidhim in
the prosecution of the end for which
he wascreated.
Whence it follows
That man ought to make use of them just so far as they
help him to attain his end,
And that he ought to withdraw himself from them just
so far as they hinder him.
The logic of this statement is unshakable; it is in
fact the kind of logic we invariably try to apply in
our everyday affairs, whether it be business, or
science, or engineering, or politics. We first try
to clarify what we want to achieve; we then study the
means at our disposal; and we then use those means
just so far as - in our judgment - they help us to
attain our objectives, and when it appears that we
are overdoing things we withdraw from these means
just so far as they hinder us.
When applied to mankind's presentday economic
situation, the statement also seems eminently realis
tic. It implies that where people do not have enough
means to attain their ends they should have more, and
where they have more than enough they should "with
draw" from that which is excessive.42
How much is "enough" and what is "excessive?"

The Christian

views man as composed of a material body and an immaterial com
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ponent that interpenetrate each other thoroughly.

Man has,

therefore, the material economic needs of any oxidizing machine
while at the same time he has an interior spirit that will not
be satisfied with only an ever-increasing accumulation of
economic goods.

Material economic goods, besides being absolutely

necessary as inputs to keep alive, are the usual prerequisites
needed to attain that society which is appropriate to persons
who are in the image of the Creator.

Yet, too much accumulation

of such economic goods can be toxic to this optimal quality of
life.

But as the precise amount of economic goods that is optimal

for the average man to attain his final goal, it would be unwise
to attempt to find an exact amount per person.

When dealing

with one's search for the transcendental, one should not expect the
preciseness that can be obtained in a cost-benefit analysis (which
is frequently spurious in any case).

To attempt to delineate

precisely and exactly the optimum amount of economic possessions
for achieving a transcendental sumnum bonum is a contradiction in
terms.

We can only quantifiably measure the inert physical things

of this world.

As we cannot measure qualities of beauty, goodness,

and attributes of the hunan spirit, much less can we measure the
achievement of transcendental goals.

When we measure something,

we analyze an item within a closed system and, by definition, the
transcendental cannot be enclosed.

Since we cannot measure the

goal, it follows that we cannot measure precisely the means to
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achieve the goal.

To attempt to make a precise and exact measure

ment of the optimal amount of economic goods useful in achieving
a transcendental goal would be a detour from actually achieving
such a goal and would be a manifestation that one was more inter
ested in preciseness and mathematical rigor than in pursuing
one's final transcendental goal.

One could end up by placing

one's faith in numbers and man's ability to logically manipulate
such numbers rather than in the transcendental creator.
Although we can never determine the precise amount of
economic goods that are instrunental in achieving the final goal,
this does not mean that we have to go to the other extreme and
say that we cannot acquire some significant conclusions about
the relationship of economic activity and the sunmum bonum of man.
Even if we could go no further than saying that there was a rela
tionship between the summum bonum and the quantity of economic
goods produced and consumed, we would have already gone a long
way.

We would have demonstrated that "a society which, like ours,

defines the good life as identical with the high standard of
living is running contrary to a fundamental characteristic of the
nature of man."^
Assume that we lived in a world in which, because of a more
abundant and equitable supply of natural resources and fuels, all
of the earth's inhabitants were able to own all the motorized
vehicles and electrical gadgets which they apparently desire.
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Would it be a better world if we had no transcendental goals but
we could go from nowhere to nowhere at 80 miles per hour?

Or

would we only be more anxious about our increased amount of
possessions?

Would it not be true that "more production of

material goods and services conducive to comfort m y be detri
mental to the satisfaction of 'higher,1 noneconomic needs such
as love, friendship, silence, solitude, contemplation, aesthetic
and religious experience, community, environment?"^

As my

neighborhood mechanic remarked to me recently on one of my fre
quent visits to his shop, "there is no such thing any more as a
good car.

The only trouble is that we cannot survive without

the bad ones,"
The general criterion to be used in determining what
are sufficient economic goods would then be that whatever goods
aid one in achieving his transcendental goal are to be used, and,
conversely, those goods which detract more than they add in
achieving this goal are excessive.^

The essential norm is that

the transcendental goal be sought first.

We shall never be able

to define the notion of sufficiency if there is no transcendental
sutnnum bonum, because we must face the question: sufficient for
what?

For realization of the surnnum bonum.

But we can only

realize the summum bonum by seeking a hierarchy of intermediate
ends.

Yet we cannot get this hierarchy in the right order without

some independent perception of the smrroum bonum.

This struggle
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to set priorities forces us to clarify our perception of the
summum bonum.

Current conflicts over responsibility of man to

sub-human creation as well as his own species, needs of future
as well as the present, and what amount of economic goods are
sufficient for the ideal quality of life are examples of con
troversial issues which will aid us in the never-ending task
of clarifying the notion of the summum bonum. What society
needs is not so much a precise resolution to all these issues
but a shift in the hearts of men away from external material
possessions towards more immaterial goals.
Such a change in goals will have important direct and in
direct implications for economic theory.

All economic activity

will have to be explicitly scrutinized with a view to its effect
on achieving the transcendental summum bonum.

This will require

the inclusion of many imponderable and indeterminate variables
into our analysis.^
In conclusion, as examples of the extended implications of
a transcendental goal upon economic analysis, it becomes clear
that problems of scale in economic production are important be
cause of the impact that the centralization of decision-making has
on the person of both the few decision-makers who can then
manipulate the lives of many others and the many powerless who
became dependent upon the arbitrary decisions of others.

Because

of this excessive economic power in the hands of a few and the
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alienation of decision-making away from those who will be af
fected by the decisions, for the economist with transcendental
ideals ’’small is beautiful," or as expressed in Thomistic
scholastic terminology, the principle of subsidiarity ought to
be utilized when making decisions concerning the optimal sizes
of economic enterprises.

In conventional economic theory monopolies

are disliked, not because of their large size and centralization
of economic power, but because they remove the economic system
away from the "ideal" economic structure of competition between
enterprises.

A large quantity of competition among economic

enterprises is looked upon as a desideratum because it theoreti
cally leads to equality of marginal costs and benefits and con
sequent "efficient" allocation of material resources.

If, how

ever, natural economies of scale exist, the conventional economist
will then allow such monoplies to exist but will attenpt either
through state ownership or regulation to force these monopolies
to price their product as if they were a competitive firm.

The

economist whose goal is that quality of life which is most ap
propriate to persons made in the image of their creator will have
different criteria with which to judge monopolies and large-scale
enterprises.

Large-scale enterprises, whether monopolies or not,

tend to concentrate economic power and decision-making and thus
to take away from the average individual any creative expression
of his unique being in both his productive and his consumptive
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role.

As Richard Crossman has written, "We must assume that in

creased concentration of power, whether in the form of technologi
cal development or social organisation, will always produce ex
ploitation, injustice and inequality in a society."4 '7
Another related implication of having a transcendental goal
can be found in the economic theory of labor.

Does man's work

dignify him in the sense that he shares in the creative work of the
transcendent creator?

Is it true that "bodily labor, which even

after original sin was decreased by Providence for the good of
man's body and soul, is in many instances changed into an instru
ment of perversion; for from the factory dead matter goes out
improved, whereas men are corrupted and degraded?" 48

Do m o d e m

laboring practices enslave a worker so that he degenerates to a
lower level of being than that destined for him, to an animallike existence in which he is fettered by his own material and
sexual desires, or even less to a machine-like existence in which
he has no desires at all except the motivated drive to be efficient?

49

Though this latter type of attitude may be able to

masquerade as a Christian work ethic (i.e., the Puritan work
ethic) because of some superficial similarities, it would not take
long for a critical observer to tell which is which.

Labor theory

in economics should attempt to construct an economic system which
encourages to the extent that it is possible a worker may be
creative, to exercise in a responsible manner that "mystical
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privilege of mastery over the material universe."

Those laboring

practices which are degrading should be minimized to the extent
that is possible.

Maximization in output and economic efficiency

cannot be the sole goals of labor theory.
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